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I. LIST OF THE PARTIES 
Intervenors/ appellants: The following are the Intervenors in the proceedings in the 
Fifth Judicial Court in and for Washington County, Utah: 
1. Mary Ruth Cooper, 
2. Steven E. Kirkland II, 
3. Benjamin T. Kirkland, 
4. Linton C. Kirkland, 
5. Hylan F. Kirkland, 
6. John H. Kirkland, 
7. David R. Kirkland, 
8. Kevin B. Kirkland, 
9. Richard A. Kirkland, 
10. Kirk B. Kirkland, 
11. Daniel B. Kirkland, 
12. James H. Kirkland, and 
13. Ephraim B. Kirkland (collectively referred to as the "Beneficiaries"). 
Plaintiff and Defendants/appellees: The following are the plaintiff and defendants in 
the proceedings in the Fifth Judicial Court in and for Washington County, Utah: 
1. Vaiden Cram as the former Executive Trustee of the Terrestrial Kingdom of 
God Trust, and 
2. Penn Smith as Plaintiff in his individual capacity and as a defendant in his 
former capacity as trustee of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust 
(collectively referred to as the "Defendants"). 
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IV. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Fifth Judicial District in and for Washington County, Utah (the "District 
Court") issued a final order on June 26, 2015. On August 5, 2015, the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah issued an order transferring this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals 
(the "Court") pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Therefore, the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j): "The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction ... over: (j) 
cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court." 
V. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether Genuine issues of Material fact preclude summary judgment. 
The first issue on review is whether the District Court erred in granting 
Defendants summary judgment when there were genuine issues of material fact and 
Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
a. Standard of review: "[T]he appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment 
for correctness, giving no deference to the [district] court's decision." Schroeder 
Investments, LC v. Edwards, 2013 UT 25, ,I9, 301 P. 3d 994,996 (citing Bahr v. 
Imus, 2011 UT 19, ,I15, 250 P.3d 56). 
b. Citation to the Record: See Motion to Strike at See R. 5669; 54(b) Motion to 
Reconsider at R. 5750; 60(b) Motion at R. 6074; 60(b )(6) Motion at R. 6300; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement 1 ("MSJ I") at R. 
5465; and Transcripts of oral arguments at R. 6581 and 6291. 
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2. Issue: Whether the district court should have allowed Beneficiaries more 
time to oppose the 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment instead of granting it 
at a pretrial conference. 
The second issue is whether the District Court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Beneficiaries more time to oppose MSJ2 before granting Defendants' MSJ2 at a pretrial 
conference, considering that the district court had previously granted Defendants latitude 
on procedural issues or failures to oppose motions within the allotted time; and 
considering that there was already a great amount of evidence in the record that there 
were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. 
a. Standard of review: We review a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion for 
relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion." Jones v. Layton/Ok/and, 2009 UT 
39, ,r 10,214 P.3d 859. However, we review any underlying legal questions for 
correctness. See Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, iJ 7, 104 P.3d 1198. See also 
Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, ,I24, 263 P .3d 411. 
b. Citation to the Record: See Motion to Strike at See R. 5669; 54(b) Motion to 
Reconsider at R. 5750; 60(b) Motion at R. 6074; 60(b)(6) Motion at R. 6300; 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement 1 ("MSJl") at R. 
5465; and Transcripts of oral arguments at R. 6581 and 6291. 
3. Issue: Whether the award of attorney fees to Defendants was improper. 
The third issue is whether the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to 
Defendants under UTA §78B-5-825(1) when there was no evidence and no findings of 
"bad faith" or ''without merit" against Beneficiaries. 
9 
a. Standard of review: We give no deference to the trial court's determination as to 
whether attorney fees were allowed under a statute. See Still Standing Stable, LLC ~ 
v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ,r 8, 122 P .3d 556 ("Whether the trial court properly 
interpreted the legal prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under [ a statute] is a 
question oflaw that we review ... for correctness.")." Fisher v. Fisher, 2009 UT 
App 305, iJ8, 221 P. 3d 845. 
b. Citation to the Record: Transcript of February 7, 2015 oral arguments at R. 
6582. 
4. Issue: Whether Beneficiaries' first, ninth, and eleventh claims were before the ~ 
trial court on MSJ2 and whether they should have been dismissed at that 
time. 
Did the trial court err in granting Defendants' summary judgment on Intervenors' First, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action when these claims were not part of Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment? 
a. Standard of review: "[T]he appellate court reviews a grant of sunnnary judgment 
for correctness, giving no deference to the [district] court's decision." Schroeder, 
2013 UT 25, iJ9. 
b. Citation to the record: See 54(b) Motion to Reconsider at R. 5750; 60(b) Motion 
at R. 6074; 60(b)(6) Motion at R. 6300. 
5. Issue: Whether the failure of the Trustor in preparing and delivering the lease and 
stewardship agreements invalidated the Trust. 
10 
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Did the trial court err in granting Defendants' partial summary judgment ("MSJ 1 ") in 
determining that the failure of the Trustor to prepare or deliver the Lease and Stewardship 
agreements to the Beneficiaries of the Trust before his death did not invalidate the Trust itself? 
a. Standard of review: "Reformation is an equitable remedy and 'because of the 
advantaged position of the trial court, we give considerable deference to [the trial court's] 
findings and judgment."' Bowen, 2011 UT App at,I14 (citing Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 
P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976)). 
b. Citation to the record: Memorandum in Opposition to MSJI at R. 5465; and 
Transcript of oral arguments at R. 65 81. 
VI. STATUTES OR RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(c)(3)(A) (2013): 
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of 
~ material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact 
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, 
such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
controverted by the responding party. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) (2013). 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
11 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56( e) (2013). 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
ii) 
~.:, 
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provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for w 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
Utah Code Ann§78B-5-825: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party 
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under 
Subsection (1 ), but only if the court: 
12 
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(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the 
court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1 ). 
Utah Code Ann§75-7-415: Reformation to correct mistakes. 
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform the terms to 
the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence that both the 
settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, 
whether in expression or inducement. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case began in 2006 and involves disputes between the Beneficiaries of the 
Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust ("Trust") and the trustees. The Beneficiaries of the 
Trust filed a complaint against the trustees ( the Defendants and Plaintiff) for various 
breaches of their fiduciary duties and in order to prevent one of the trustees, Plaintiff 
Penn Smith ("Smith") from obtaining compensation based on what the Beneficiaries 
believe is a violation of the trust provisions. 
The Trust states that the trustees shall serve without compensation, but it also 
states that someone may be appointed a Trust Manager and receive reasonable 
compensation for his/her time. From its inception in 1993 until around 2006, one of the 
Beneficiaries served as the Trust Manager without pay. Then around 2006, the trustees 
named one of their own, Smith, as Trust Manager and agreed to pay him $50 per hour. 
13 
Beneficiaries contend that Smith improperly began charging the Trust for his trustee 
activities under the guise of Trust Manager and sought compensation in violation of the 
Trust provisions. Smith then sued the Trust for compensation but neither he nor the other 
trustees informed the Beneficiaries of the filed complaint. The other trustees did not 
respond to Smith's complaint and Smith obtained a default judgment. 
After learning of these events after-the-fact, the Beneficiaries intervened in 
Smith's lawsuit and filed their own complaint against the trustees/Defendants and 
Plaintiff Smith for various breaches of their fiduciary duties and to deny Smith the 
compensation he sought. Defendants and Plaintiff contended that they did nothing wrong 
and everything they did was within the law and their authority under the Trust. 
In 2008 the Beneficiaries filed two motions for summary judgment, asking the 
court to find that (1) the Defendants breached their duties and (2) Smith was not entitled 
to compensation. The district court granted the two motions after Defendants failed to 
respond. However, in 2009 the district court granted Defendants' 60(b) Motion. In 2013, 
Defendants filed their own summary judgment ("MSJ 1 ") and obtained partial summary 
judgment. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment 
("MSJ2"), seeking judgment on the issues that remained after MSJl. Beneficiaries filed a 
Motion to Strike MSJ2, but the district court granted Defendants' MSJ2 and determined 
that all issues before the court had been decided. Beneficiaries now appeal the district 
courts' granting of MSJl and MSJ2. 
1. Statement of Facts 
14 
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The following are the facts relevant to the issues that are presented to this Court 
for review: 
a. On or around November 26, 1993, the trustor Steven E. Kirkland 
{"Trustor") executed a Declaration of Trust naming some of his children and his wife as 
beneficiaries. See Trust at R. 5498. 
b. The Trust requires that Trustor "prepare and deliver" to the beneficiaries 
Lease and Stewardship Agreements ("LSAs") signed by Trustor and the Trustees. Id. at 
c. Trustor did not deliver the LSAs before his death a few years later to be 
signed. See R. 5469:,rl-5470:,r7. 
d. Since the inception of the Trust, some of the Beneficiaries served on a 
Board of Managers without pay. See R. 203-204:116-7. 
e. On or about February 15, 2006, Defendants appointed themselves as 
managers and began charging the Trust $50/hour for their services. Id. 
f. On September 1, 2006, the parties submitted to a Board of Arbitration 
("2006 Board") that determined the Defendants breached their fiduciary duties in 
multiple respects and the amount of compensation Smith was demanding was 
inappropriate based on the Trust. See 2006 Board Findings at R.1678-1685. 
g. On September 26, 2006, Plaintiff Smith filed a lawsuit against the Trust, 
seeking compensation. Id. at 11 1. 
h. The Defendants/Trustees did not oppose the lawsuit nor did they tell 
Beneficiaries about it. See R. at 5470:117-8. 
15 
i. Smith obtained a default against the Trust. Id. at if 8. 
j. Beneficiaries found out about what happened after-the-fact and on 
November 14, 2006 filed suit against Defendants/Trustees. The complaint alleged 
multiple breaches of fiduciary duties by Defendants. See Complaint at R. 928. 
k. Defendants asked for another Board of Arbitration on February 13, 2007, in 
which Beneficiaries did not participate, that made determines on issues that were not 
before the district court. See 2007 Board Findings at R. 1773-1774. 
I. On April 18, 2008, Beneficiaries filed two motions: Motion to Remove 
Trustees and Motion to Void Transactions, seeking to remove Defendants for breaches of 
fiduciary duties and to prevent Smith from obtaining compensation from the Trust. See R. 
152-200 and R. 201-378. 
m. On May 14, 2008 ("2008 MSJ Order"), the district court granted 
Beneficiaries motions. See May 14, 2008 Order at R. 387-395. 
n. On July 10, 2009, the district court set aside the 2008 MSJ Order for 
reasons not stated after a hearing on the matter. See July 10, 2009 Order at R. 2050:,I3. 
o. On May 13, 2013, Defendants filed their own motion for summary 
judgment (MSJl) on the compensation and breach issues as well as whether Trustor' s 
failure to prepare and deliver the LSAs was fatal to the Trust. See MSJl at R.5384-5393. 
p. Beneficiaries opposed MSJ 1 and provided multiple pieces of evidence. See 
MSJI Opposition at R. 5465-5481, and 5482-5539. 
q. After a hearing on MSJ 1, the district court found there were genuine issues 
of material fact that precluded summary judgment as to the compensation and breach 
16 
issues, but granted summary judgment on the other issue. See July 9, 2013 MSJl Order at 
~ R. 5601-5603. 
r. On August 23, 2013, Defendants filed a second motion for summary 
judgment ("MSJ2") on the two issues in MSJl that the district court had determined there 
were genuine issues of material fact, namely the breach and compensation issues. See R. 
at 5613-5617. 
s. On September 9, 2013, Beneficiaries filed a Motion to Strike Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. 5669. 
t. On November 8, 2013, the district court ordered that the Motion to Strike 
be set for a hearing. See Order, at R. 5717. 
u. On November 26, 2013, the district court held a pretrial conference at 
which it asked to hear oral argument on the Motion to Strike and MSJ2. See Transcript at 
R. 6291, p.2:15-18. 
v. At the hearing, the district court took Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike under 
submission and granted Defendants' MSJ2 in its entirety. See Transcript at 6291, p.7:23-
24; and p.18:12-13; see also MSJ2 Order at 6026-6027. 
w. The district court's order on MSJ2 was entered on January 23, 2014. See R. 
6026. 
x. Beneficiaries subsequently filed a Motion to Reconsider and two Rule 
60(b) Motions. See R. 5750, 6074, and 6300. All these motions were denied. See July 18, 
2014 Memorandom Decision and Order at R. 64 3 5-6441. 
y. The district court issued a final order on June 26, 2015. See R. 6552-6553. 
17 
z. On July 23, 2015, Beneficiaries filed a Notice of Appeal. See R. 6557. 
aa. On August 5, 2015, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah issued an order '-> 
transferring this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals (the "Court") pursuant to rule 42(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
bb. Beneficiaries now raises five main issues on appeal, requesting that 
motions for summary judgment be reversed. 
VIIl. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Beneficiaries assert that Defendants who were the trustees of the Trust breached 
their fiduciary duties to Beneficiaries in multiple ways and that Plaintiff Smith was not 
entitled to compensation by the Trust for his actions as a trustee or Trust Manager. 
Additionally, Beneficiaries assert that the Trust itself failed due to Trustor's failure to 
prepare and deliver signed Lease and Stewardship Agreements ("LSAs") to the 
Beneficiaries. Defendants have maintained that the Trust is valid, they did nothing 
improper as trustees of the trust and that Smith is entitled to compensation as Trust 
Manager in the amount of$252,749. 
The district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants 
on several grounds that can be categorized into five main issues. First, there were genuine 
issues of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. Even if 
Beneficiaries failed to oppose MSJ2, it was inappropriate to grant Defendants' motion 
because Defendants' statement of facts were not properly supported by admissible or 
relevant evidence. See Utah R.Civ.P. 7(c)(3)(A) and Rule 56(c) and (e) (2013). Thus, 
18 
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Beneficiaries Motion to Strike should have been granted and the MSJ2 dismissed. 
r-. ~ Additionally, law of the case doctrine should have precluded Defendants from bringing 
up the Breach Issue and Compensation Issue in summary judgment again. See IHC 
Health Services, Inc. v. D & K MANAGEMENT, INC., 2008 UT 73, 196 P. 3d 588, 596. 
Additionally, Defendants' Fact Section of MSJ2 showed that there were genuine 
issues in dispute since it referenced the MSJl Order in which the district court found 
there were genuine issues of material fact on the very issues Defendants were again 
seeking summary judgment. See MSJ2 at R. 5614:iJ5. Any additional evidence 
~ Defendants produced for MSJ2 would have just gone to the weight of Defendants' 
evidence, but district courts are not to weigh the evidence on summary judgment. See 
Utah Community Credit Union v. Robertson, 2013 UT App 66, iJ18, 298 P.3d 1283. 
Second, Defendants should have been allowed the opportunity to oppose MSJ2. 
Beneficiaries erroneously believed that their Motion to Strike stayed the need to file an 
opposition at that time. Thus, Beneficiaries' Rule 54(b) and 60(b) Motions should have 
been granted due to mistake or excusable neglect. Additionally, the district court had 
previously granted Defendants latitude on such issues as deadlines for responding to 
motions, including overturning its grant of summary judgment in 2008 to Beneficiaries 
on the exact same issues that the court granted Defendants judgment on in MSJ2, because 
Defendants had been late in opposing Beneficiaries' motions in 2008. Moreover, it was 
an abuse of discretion for the district court not to have considered all the evidence 
~ previously presented to the court by Beneficiaries that showed there were genuine ussies 
of material fact. 
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Third, the award of attorney fees to Defendants was improper. Defendants stated 
they sought attorney fees under the bad faith statute. See UTA §78B-5-825(1). However, 
the district court did not articulate a clear basis for awarding the fees and Defendants did 
not present evidence of and the district court did not make findings of "bad faith" or 
"without merit" as required by the statute. See UBDH v. Davis County Com 'n, 2005 UT 
App 34 7, 17, 121 P. 3 d 3 9. Furthermore, since the district court had previously awarded 
Beneficiaries summary judgment (2008 MSJ) on various issues, a bad faith or without 
merit finding would go against the evidence. 
Fourth, three claims of the Beneficiaries were not addressed in MSJ2: (a) the first 
cause of action for a declaratory judgment as to who can be appointed a trustee and 
successor trustee and how to do so; (b) the ninth cause of action for conversion; and ( c) 
the eleventh cause of action for waste. See Amended Complaint at R. 2132, 2138, and 
2139-2140. At no time were these claims addressed by the court. Therefore, these claims 
should be remanded to the trial court and Beneficiaries should have the opportunity to 
present their claims at trial. 
Fifth, the Trustor's failure to prepare and deliver Lease and Stewardship 
Agreements ("LSAs") according to the Trust invalidated the Trust. Defendants argued in 
MSJI that pursuant to UTA §75-7-415, the court could reform the Trust. See MSJI at R. 
5391:,Il. However, there was no evidence presented that the Trustor was "affected by a 
mistake of fact or law" when he dictated the terms of the Trust. Furthermore, the Trust 
states that the Trustees do not have the authority to create or distribute the original LSAs. (;i 
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See Trust at R. 5498:,I7. Therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted in 
favor of Defendants in MSJ 1 on the issue of whether the Trustor' s failure to prepare and 
issue LSAs invalidated the Trust according to §75-7-415. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
1. Issue 1: There were genuine issues of material fact that should have 
~ precluded summary judgment. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Basic 
Research, LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co., 2013 UT 6, ,I 5, 297 P. 3d 578, 579 ( citing Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c)). "The summary judgment standard recognizes that the nonmoving party 
is entitled to all inferences arising from the facts of record." Uintah Basin Medical Center 
v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, ,I18, 179 P.3d 786, 790 (citing Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 
,I 10, 48 P.3d 235). In the present case, Beneficiaries were the non-moving party on 
summary judgment; therefore, they were entitled to the benefit of all inferences arising 
from the facts of record "in the light most favorable to [them]." Morris v. Farnsworth 
Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297, 290-91 (1953). 
A. Even if MSJ2 was unopposed, it was error to grant Defendants summary judgment. 
Even if Defendants' MSJ2 is considered unopposed, summary judgment was still 
inappropriate and should have been denied. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e) (2013). Summary 
judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
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as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Id. Rule 56(c). Furthermore, as this Court recently explained: 
[S]ummary judgment may not be entered against the nonmoving party 
merely by virtue of a failure to oppose; the rules of civil procedure allow 
entry of summary judgment against a defaulted party only " if appropriate." 
Id. R. 56( e ). Thus, while the nonmoving party's failure to oppose a motion 
for summary judgment will often result in a determination that there are no 
factual issues precluding a grant of summary judgment, the district court 
must still determine whether the moving party's pleadings, discovery, and 
affidavits demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. R. 
56(c); Basic Research, 2013 UT 6, ,I 5,297 P.3d 578. 
Pepperwood Homeowners Assn. v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App. 137, ,I6, 351 P.3d 844. Here, 
the evidence Defendants presented in MSJ2 did not entitle them to summary judgment. 
i. Breach Issue. 
The two main issues Defendants sought summary judgment on in MSJ2 were (1) 
whether or not Defendants breached their various duties to the Beneficiaries ("Breach 
Issue"), and (2) how much compensation (if any) Plaintiff Smith was owed for his 
services as trust manager ("Compensation Issue"). In regards to the Breach Issue, 
Defendants provided five statements in their Facts section, paragraphs 10 through 14. See 
MSJ2 at R.5615. Paragraphs 10-12, and 14 indicated that (1) Defendants had been 
accused of breaching their fiduciary duties, (2) a board of arbitration had been convened 
on February 13, 20071 ("2007 Board"), (3) who the 2007 Board members were, and (4) 
1 Defendants included a disputed conclusion oflaw in Fact # 11, namely that all disputes 
were required to be submitted to a board of arbitration according to the Trust. However, 
twice Defendants raised this issue throughout the litigation process and twice the district 
court had determined that all disputes were not required to go to arbitration. See June 11, 
2007 Order at R. 126-128 and See July 10, 2009 Order at R. 2050:,I3. 
22 
recommendations for paying Defendants' out of pocket expenses and legal Trust 
expenses. 
The only statement going to whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties 
was Paragraph 13: "After listening to arguments from Intervenors, the board concluded 
that ' ... the Trustees have acted in the best interest of the Trust..."' See MSJ2 at R. 
5615:,I13 (citing R.5661: ,I2 of the 2007 Board Findings). Then in Defendants' Argument 
section on the Breach issue, Defendants provided two sentences: "All that need be cited 
in this area is Exhibit VI [2007 Board Findings], attached hereto. An objective arbitration 
~ board, composed of duly appointed members, found no breach of Trustee's duties to the 
Beneficiaries or Intervenors. Further, Intervenors have no evidence of any breach of duty 
in this case." See MSJ2 at R. 5616:,I3. 
The above facts and argument do not support granting Defendants summary 
judgment on the Breach Issue. First, the evidence Defendants reference in Paragraph 13, 
the 2007 Board Findings, does not stand for the proposition Defendants claim it does. 
The very first paragraph of the 2007 Board Findings states: "The Board Members all 
concurred that in all matters not before the Washington County, Utah 5th District Court 
the Trustees acted in the Trust's best interest." See R.556lat ,r1 2 (emphasis added). In 
other words, the 2007 Board only dealt with matters that were not before the district 
court. The matters before the district court on February 13, 2007 were outlined in 
Beneficiaries' 2006 Complaint against Defendants: negligent breach of duties to 
2 It is also Exhibit VI of Defendants' MSJ2. See R. 5661-5662. 
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administer the trust per UCA § 7 5-7-801 and § 7 5-7-101 et. seq, breach of duty of loyalty 
per UCA §75-7-802, intentional breach of duties, and conversion of trust assets. See Nov. G;> 
14, 2006 Complaint at R. 928-935. 
In support of these claims, Beneficiaries' Complaint contained numerous 
allegations of specific instances of Defendants' bad conduct and how the conduct had 
affected Beneficiaries. Id. at ,I,rI 1-48. In addition, Beneficiaries included a prayer for 
relief, requesting damages and attorney fees. Id. at R. 934-935.Thus, none of the 
instances or allegations of breach addressed in the 2006 Complaint were before the 2007 
Board. The 2007 Board reiterates this in its Conclusions section: 
Therefore, based upon the aforementioned Findings, the Board Concludes 
that the Trustees have acted in the best interest of the Trust and that those 
matters dealing with facts in controversy between the Trustees, the Trust 
Manager, and the Trust Beneficiaries are being adjudicated by all parties in 
the ... 5th District Court and final judgment of that controversy should be 
left to that court. 
See R.5662:,r2 ( emphasis added). 
Therefore, whatever acts Defendants did "in the best interests of the Trust" that the 
2007 Board was referring to, had nothing to do with the allegations concerning the breach 
of fiduciary duties contained in the 2006 Complaint that was before the district court at 
that time. Furthermore, Beneficiaries amended their complaint in 2008 and included 
additional allegations of misconduct and additional causes of action. Consequently, 
whatever conclusions the 2007 Board may have reached in 2007 were not relevant at the 
time of Defendants' MSJ2. 
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Secondly, the 2007 Board Findings is an incomplete document that would not be 
admissible evidence at trial; therefore, it should not have been considered on summary 
judgment. See Rule 56(e). The 2007 Board Findings reference four exhibits: A, B, C, and 
D. Yet none of the exhibits were attached to the 2007 Board Findings for MSJ2. 
Furthermore, Defendants did not lay any foundation for the authentication of the 2007 
Board Findings (with or without the exhibits). Nevertheless, Defendants make the 
unsupported claim that the 2007 Board was "objective" and "composed of duly appointed 
members." See MSJ2 at 5616:,I3. Nowhere in the 2007 Board Findings or in an affidavit 
supporting MSJ2 is there evidence that the 2007 Board was objective. In fact, the 2007 
Board Findings indicates that none of the Beneficiaries were even present. See 5661 :,r2. 
Only board members and Defendants were present. Id. While it is true that Defendants 
provided an affidavit from one of the 2007 Board members ("Member Affidavit") in 
response to Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike, the Motion to Strike was never ruled upon. 
See Member Affidavit at R. 5693-5694; see also transcript of November 26, 2013 hearing 
at R. 6291, p.7:19-24). Regardless, the affidavit still does not provide any indication that 
the 2007 Board was impartial or indicate that the 2007 Board did actually consider 
matters that were before the district court. 3 
3 Of course, if the Member Affidavit did state or suggest that the 2007 Board did actually 
consider matters that were before the district court although the 2007 Board Findings 
state they did not, then that would call into question the whole validity of the 2007 Board 
viJ Findings since it is saying one thing and a member of the 2007 Board is saying the 
opposite occurred. That would be another issue of fact in dispute that Defendants 
themselves raised. 
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Therefore, the 2007 Board Findings were irrelevant to the Breach Issue before the 
district court because the 2007 Board did not deal with any matter before the district 
court, and their findings should not have been considered by the district court in ruling on 
MSJ2. Most importantly, since the only evidence Defendants put forth in support of their 
argument that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties, was the 2007 Board 
Findings4, MSJ2 should have been denied. MSJ2 was unsupported by any relevant 
evidence, making summary judgment "[in ]appropriate" and Defendants were not 
"entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." See Rule 56(c) and (e). 
ii. Compensation Issue: summary judgment should not have been granted on 
the issue of Plaintiff Smith's compensation and his hourly rate of $50 per 
hour. 
The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on the issues of 
whether Plaintiff Smith should be compensated by the Trust, how much he should be 
compensated, and whether $50 per hour was a reasonable rate. See MSJ2 Order at R. 
6026:,rl-6027:,r3. Plaintiff Smith was awarded $252,749.00 at the rate of $50 per hour. 
Id. at R. 6027:,r2 and ,r1 of Conclusions of Law. However, there were genuine issues of 
material fact that should have precluded summary judgment on these issues. 
a. Exhibit V and statement of fact #9 are inadmissible evidence that should not 
have been considered. 
Exhibit V to MSJ2 ("Ex V") should not have been considered by the district court 
in ruling on whether Plaintiff Smith's $50/hour rate of pay was reasonable. See R. 5647-
4 See MSJ2 at R. 5616:if3 ("All that need be cited in this area is [2007 Board Findings], 
attached hereto."). 
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5648. Exhibit Vis the only evidence Defendants offered to show that Plaintiffs rate of 
compensation was reasonable; and Defendants only statement regarding reasonable 
compensation in their argument was: "The Plaintiff ... has spent many hours in his 
capacity as Trust manager. In doing so, at the rate of $50 an hour, which has been shown 
to be more than reasonable by [Ex V], he has accrued the amount of $252,749 owed for 
his services." See MSJ2 at R. 5616: ,IL However, as outlined in Beneficiaries' Motion to 
Strike, Defendants offered the statements made in Ex V, an out-of-court statement, to 
prove their assertion that $50 per hour was reasonable compensation for Plaintiff. 
Therefore, Ex V is inadmissible hearsay that does not qualify for any exceptions found in 
Rules 803-804 of Utah Rules of Evidence. See Motion to Strike at R. 5674:,I2. 
Moreover, Ex V was an unauthenticated document per Utah R. Evid. 901. "To 
satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the 
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the 
proponent claims it is." Id. at 901(a). In the present case, Defendants laid no foundation 
for what Ex V was, who created it, whether it was authentic, etc. Defendants simply 
provide it as an exhibit with no explanation. Furthermore, Ex V does not qualify as a self-
authenticated document per Rule 902. Therefore, Ex V should have been stricken. 
Similarly, Ex V and Defendants' statement of fact regarding reasonable 
compensation did not comply with Rule 7 and 56 requirements. When supporting a 
motion for summary judgment, an admissible affidavit must be "made on personal 
lmowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." See 
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Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2013). Similarly, Rule 7 requires "[e]ach fact shall be separately 
stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or ~ 
discovery materials." Id. at 7(c)(3)(A) (2013). In their MSJ2 statement of facts, 
Defendants state: "In researching other Trust managers in Southern Utah, it is purported 
by [Defendants] that the amount of $50 an hour for Trust management is more than 
reasonable." MSJ2 at R. 5615:,I9. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "purported" as 
"said to be true or real but not definitely true or real." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/purported (2015). Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "purported" as "reputed; rumored." Pg.1250 (7th Edition). 
Thus, by its own terms, statement of fact #9 is not based on personal knowledge 
but based on rumor, a rumor that may or may not be true. Since Beneficiaries were the 
non-moving party they were entitled to the benefit of all inferences arising from the facts 
of record "in the light most favorable to [them];"5 and the reasonable inference here in 
C;:·, 
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light most favorable to Beneficiaries is that statement of fact #9 is not true. Additionally, GJ 
statement of fact #9 was not supported by affidavit of Defendants or discovery material 
or admissible evidence. Therefore, Ex V and statement of fact #9 should not have been 
considered by the district court in ruling on summary judgment. Since this inadmissible 
evidence was the only evidence Defendants brought forward in support of the 
reasonableness of the $50/hour rate, summary judgment should not have been granted on Q 
this issue. 
5 Morris, 259 P.2d at 90-91. 
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b. Plaintiff Smith's affidavit does not provide evidence of what compensation rate 
is reasonable, how much compensation altogether he is owed, or whether he 
should be compensated at all. 
Defendants stated in their Facts section ofMSJ2: "Plaintiff was later appointed 
manager of the Trust and the Trustees allowed him to be paid the amount of $50 an hour 
for his services." See MSJ2 at R. 5614:,I7. Defendants cited Plaintiff Smith's affidavit in 
support of this assertion. However, Smith's affidavit does not support this statement. 
~ Smith's affidavit states he served as a manager of the Trust, but it never states how he 
became a manager, i.e., whether he just decided to name himself manager or if he was 
appointed by somebody, etc. Smith's affidavit also does not indicate how much he was 
supposed to be paid, if any. Smith simply states: "During the aforementioned time I never 
received any payment for my duties." See April 10, 2013 Affidavit at R. 5643:12. Smith 
does not indicate that he was expecting payment or that he was promised payment. 
Similarly, in support of Defendants' claim that Plaintiff Smith should be paid 
~ $252,749, Defendants argued in MSJ2: "The Plaintiff ... has spent many hours in his 
capacity as Trust manager ... he has accrued the amount of$252,749 owed for his 
services." See MSJ2 at R. 5616: ill. Citing an Exhibit IV in MSJ2 ("Ex IV''), Defendants 
also stated: "During his tenure as Trust Manager, Mr. Smith spent many hours managing 
the Trust and incurred the amount of $252,749 in fees as a result." Id. at 5614:,r8. 
~ However, like Ex V addressed above, Ex IV is inadmissible evidence that does not 
comply with Rule 56 or Utah R. Evid. 901. In the present case, Defendants laid no 
foundation for what Ex IV was, who created it, or whether it was authentic. 
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For example, Ex IV is not signed by anyone, is not attached to or referenced in an 
affidavit, does not state who all of the calculations are for, and the last part of the 
document indicates somebody is owed $255,354, not the $252,749 Defendants state in 
MSJ2. Defendants simply provided Exhibit IV as an exhibit with no explanation and no 
supporting affidavit. Furthermore, Exhibit IV does not qualify as a self-authenticated 
document per Utah R. Evid. 902. Therefore, Exhibit IV should not have been considered 
in ruling on MSJ2. The "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits" did not show that Defendants were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
iii. Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike MSJ2 should have been granted. 
As addressed in part in the previous subsections, Beneficiaries Motion to Strike 
Defendants' MSJ2 in its entirety should have been granted; or at the very least, the 2007 
Board Findings and Ex V. See R. 5669-5677. Defendants did not support each fact with 
"citation to relevant materials" as required by Rule 7(c)(3)(A) (2013). Additionally, the 
law of the case doctrine should have precluded Defendants from reopening the same 
issues in MSJ2 that the district court had ruled on 45 days prior. See IHC Health Services, 
Inc. v. D & K MANAGEMENT, INC., 2008 UT 73, 196 P. 3d 588, 596. 
"[T]he law of the case doctrine acts much like the doctrine of res judicata -
furthering the goals of judicial economy and finality-but within a single case." Id. at 
,I26. Under the law of the case doctrine, "While a case remains pending before the district 
court prior to any appeal, the parties are bound by the court's prior decision, but the court 
remains free to reconsider that decision." Id. at ,I27. As in the present case, law of the 
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case doctrine applies to denials of summary judgment motions. See AMS Salt Indus. v. 
viJ Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d315, 319 (Utah 1997) (courtrecognizesthatthelaw 
of the case doctrine applies to subsequent motions for summary judgment on the same 
issue, subject to exceptions); Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 
736 (Utah 1984) (court finds that the law of the case doctrine applies to subsequent 
motions for summary judgment, subject to exceptions); and Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 
2000 UT 22, ,I4, 996 P. 2d 540, 542 (affirming the holdings in AMS and Sittner). 
There are three exceptional circumstances in which a court should not apply the 
law of the case doctrine: "(l) when there has been an intervening change of controlling 
authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is 
convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest 
injustice." IHC, 2008 UT 73, 34. None of these exceptions applied in the present case. 
The first exception did not apply as Defendants cited to no intervening changes in 
controlling authority. 
Exception two did not apply since all of Defendants' exhibits in their MSJ26 
contained information that was produced in MSJl or was available at that time: Exhibit I 
was an August 14, 2012 Order in this case, so it was available when Defendants filed 
their MSJl in May of 2013; Defendants provided Exhibits II, III, and IV in their MSJl; 
6 (I) Order of court regarding attorney fees, (II) Trust document, (III) Affidavit of 
Plaintiff, (IV) Document listing the compensation sought by Plaintiff, (V) purported fee 
-..d schedule of a trustee company; and (VI) alleged findings of fact from a board of 
arbitration. See MSJ2 at R. 5624-5662. Note: Exhibit I was not filed with Defendants' 
MSJ2. 
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as explained earlier, Exhibit V should have been inadmissible, but there was also no 
indication that this information was new or was unavailable at the time Defendants filed 
MSJl; and the 2007 Board Findings (Exhibit VI) was a document purported to be from 
March of 2007, so it was also available to Defendants when they filed MSJ 1. See MSJI at 
R. 5394-5434. 
Lastly, the third exception does not apply as there was nothing to suggest that the 
court's determination that there were material facts in dispute was clearly erroneous or 
that it would work a manifest injustice for the issues to be heard at trial. Thus, like in IHC 
Health Services, Defendants did not satisfy any of the exceptions to the law of the case 
doctrine. Therefore, Defendants' MSJ2 should have been stricken. See IHC, 2008 UT 73, 
,135. 
B. Defendants' Fact Section in MSJ2 showed there were genuine issues of material 
fact. 
Another reason why summary judgment was inappropriate is that on its face, the 
MSJ2 showed there were genuine issues of material fact. As part ofMSJ2's Facts section, 
Defendants cited the MSJI Order and explained that previously, there was an award of 
partial summary judgment in MSJl which "designated two remaining factual issues: (1) 
how much compensation Plaintiff is owed for his services as trust manager, and (2) 
whether or not the Trustees of the Trust have breached their various duties to the 
Beneficiaries." See MSJ2 at R. 5614:,15. In regards to these two issues, MSJI Order 
contains the following findings of fact by the district court: 
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3. There are genuine issues of material fact regarding the amount, if any, to 
which Penn Smith is entitled for his work as Manager of the 
aforementioned Trust. 
4. There are genuine issues of material fact such that the issues of whether 
or not the [Defendants] have breached their various duties to the 
Beneficiaries of the Trust and whether or not said [Defendants] should be 
removed should be reserved for trial. 
See MSJI Order at R. 5602:,r,r3-4. 
The MSJ 1 Order is evidence which Defendants included by reference in MSJ2 that 
contradicts Defendants' statement that there are no material facts in dispute. Put 
differently, MSJ2 included evidence (i.e., the MSJl Order) that there were genuine issues 
of material fact in dispute on the Breach Issue and Compensation Issue, which created a 
genuine issue of material fact on the face ofMSJ2. 
Additionally, in MSJ2, Defendants do not explain or argue how any new evidence 
they produced in MSJ2 negates the findings in the MSJl Order that Defendants 
referenced. Nothing changed between the time MSJ 1 was decided and Defendants filed 
MSJ2. The 2007 Board Findings had been available to Defendants five years before they 
filed their MSJl. Plus, just adding that one piece of evidence in MSJ2 does not mean you 
ignore all the counter evidence Intervenors provided in MSJ 1 which showed the district 
court there were genuine issues of material fact. The 2007 Board Findings may have gone 
to the weight of Defendants' evidence, but it does not destroy or wipe out the fact that 
Intervenors had previously shown there were genuine issues of fact. 
Regardless, any new evidence produced in MSJ2 would simply go to the weight of 
¥Jt) the evidence, but it does not mean all the counter evidence Intervenors provided in MSJ 1 
can be ignored. Furthermore, courts are not supposed to weigh evidence on summary 
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judgment. See Utah Community Credit Union v. Robertson, 2013 UT App 66, ,I18, 298 
P.3d 1283 ("It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a 
summary judgment,' regardless of whether 'the evidence on one side may appear to be 
strong or even compelling.") (quoting Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278, ,r 22,288 P.3d 
26). Thus, MSJ2 itself showed that there were genuine issues of material fact on these 
two issues and summary judgment should not have been granted even if MSJ2 was 
unopposed. 
2. Issue 2: District court should have allowed Beneficiaries the chance to oppose 
the MSJ2 and not granted Defendants' MSJ2 at the pretrial conference: 
The district court held a pretrial conference ("Pretrial") on November 26, 2011. At 
the Pretrial and without prior notice, the district court required the parties to present oral 
arguments with respect to Defendants' MSJ2 and Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike the 
MSJ2. See Hearing Transcript at R. 6291. Previously, on November 4, 2013, 
Beneficiaries had filed a Request to Submit for Decision on their Motion to Strike; then 
on November 8, 2013, the district court had ordered that a hearing be set for oral 
arguments on the Motion to Strike. See Order, at R. 5717. However, a date for oral 
arguments on the Motion to Strike was never set. Furthermore, at the time of the Pretrial, 
neither party had filed a Request to Submit for Decision on Defendants' MSJ2. Yet, the 
district court granted Defendants' MSJ2 at the Pretrial. 
In cases where summary judgment was obtained through a procedurally unusual 
manor or oversight, Utah courts have often remanded the cases to allow the non-moving 
party to oppose summary judgment or respond to a motion to strike. See Crossland Sav. 
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v. Hatch, 877 P. 2d 1241, 1244 fn5 (Utah 1994); and Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 
1205 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (case remanded on appeal because the district court granted 
summary judgment before allowing the opposing party to respond to the other party's 
motion to strike in the time allowed by the rules). In the present case, Beneficiaries had 
been waiting for the Court to rule on their Motion to Strike Defendants' MSJ2 in its 
entirety because the court had just ruled on the same issues a few weeks earlier in 
Defendants' MSJ 1. As mentioned above, the district court had ordered a hearing set on 
the Motion to Strike, but no hearing date had been set at the time of the Pretrial. See 
~ Order, at R. 5717. 
Furthermore, Beneficiaries believed that their need to file an opposition to the 
MSJ2 was stayed until the district court ruled on Beneficiaries' Motion to Strike: 
Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon 
motion made by a party within twenty days after the service of the 
pleading, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
See Utah R.Civ.P. 12(f) (emphasis added). Counsel for the Beneficiaries erroneously 
believed that the term "pleading" in Rule 12(f) also referenced "motions" (such as 
summary judgment motions), because without the Rule applying to motions, parties are 
required to argue at great lengths in alternatives, providing different arguments based on 
whether the court agrees to strike or declines to strike certain evidence or arguments. See 
Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider at R. 5756. On February 4, 2014, Beneficiaries filed a 
Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Final Judgment ("60(b) Motion"), and included the 
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argument that due to mistake and excusable neglect 7 of Beneficiaries' counsel in failing 
to oppose MSJ2, summary judgment should be set aside. See R. 6082:ifl. However, 
Beneficiaries' 60(b) Motion w~s denied. See July 18, 2014 Memorandum Decision and 
Order at R. 6435-6441. 
A. District court's history of granting Defendants latitude on procedural issues or 
mistakes after-the-fact should have been extended to Beneficiaries as well. 
The district court's denial of Beneficiaries' 60(b) Motion and the granting of 
summary judgment at the pretrial conference was an abuse of discretion. This Court 
explained that "rule 60(b) enables 'a court to grant relief from a judgment in 
circumstances in which the need for truth outweighs the value of finality in litigation."' 
Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, if24, 263 P.3d 411 (citing 12 James Wm. Moore, 
et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 60.02 [2] (3d ed. 1999)). "Indeed, '[t]he allowance of a ~ 
vacation of judgment is a creature of equity designed to relieve against harshness of 
enforcing a judgment, which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense."' Id. 
(citing Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928,931 (Utah 1980)). 
In the present case, the district court had previously granted Beneficiaries 
summary judgment ("2008 Summary Judgment") on their claims against Defendants, 
finding that Defendants had breached their fiduciary duties and Plaintiff Smith was not 
7 See 60(b)(l): "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect." 
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entitled to compensation. See May 14, 2008 Order at R. 387-395. The 2008 Summary 
~ Judgment was unopposed by Defendants. However, Defendants filed a Motion to Set 
Aside Default Order Removing Trustees and Voiding Transactions, arguing that they did 
not respond in time due to extenuating circumstances. See R. 434-436. The district court 
granted the motion. See July 10, 2009 Order at R. 2050:13. 
Trial was later set to begin on June 3, 2013 and pursuant to the Case Management 
Order, pretrial disclosures were due 30 days before trial. See May 22, 2013 Motion in 
Limine at 5447:13. However, Defendants did not serve their pretrial disclosures, so 
~ Beneficiaries filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence of Defendants ("MIL"). Id. 
The district court denied Beneficiaries MIL. See R. 5556-5559 (Declined to Sign Order). 
Then on December 20, 2013, Beneficiaries filed a Motion to Reconsider MSJ2 
ruling and the district court scheduled a hearing date. Defendants' opposition was due on 
January 7, 2014. Defendants requested of Beneficiaries and were granted a one-day 
~ extension to file an opposition. However, Defendants did not file an opposition the next 
day. Then, 7 days after their opposition was due, Defendants filed an Ex Parte Motion to 
Strike Intervenor's Motion to Reconsider, which the district court granted within a few 
hours, not giving Beneficiaries a chance to respond. See February 20, 2014 Opposition to 
Ex Parte Motion for More Time at R. 6200:115-11. Similarly, on February 1, 2014, 
Beneficiaries filed a Rule 52(b) Motion to Request Additional Findings from the Court. 
Id. at R. 6199:11. Defendants did not oppose the motion within the requisite period of 
time. Six days after the opposition was due, Defendants filed an Ex Parte Motion for 
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Extension of Time. Id. at R. 6200:,r4. The district court again granted Defendants ex parte 
motion. See February 20, 2014 Order at R. 6192-6196. 
Over and over the district court granted Defendants latitude on procedural issues 
or mistakes after-the-fact. In the interests of fairness and justice, Beneficiaries should 
have been provided the same latitude on such a crucial matter as MSJ2, especially when 
Beneficiaries believed their Motion to Strike stayed the need to file an opposition and 
Beneficiaries had filed the Motion to Strike within the proper response time for an 
opposition. Conversely, each time the district court afforded Defendants latitude, 
Defendants had not attempted to comply with the deadlines but were seeking relief after-
the-fact. 
B. Evidence of genuine issues of material fact had previously been presented to the 
district court, but the district court did not consider this evidence in granting MSJ2. 
Further evidence that it was an abuse of discretion not to allow Beneficiaries a 
chance to oppose MSJ2, is that ample evidence of genuine issues of material fact had 
previously been put on record with the district court. As stated earlier, on May 14, 2008, 
the district court made the opposite ruling on the exact same issues presented in MSJ2 
("2008 MSJ Order"). See R. 387-395. The district court, made findings and concluded 
that: (1) Defendants committed serious breaches of their fiduciary duties according to 
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-706(2)(a), §75-7-809, and §75-7-802; and (2) Defendants' actions 
in attempting to obtain compensation for themselves from the Trust were void. Id. at 
R.388:iJ3 through R.395. 
38 
Defendants' actions included: "failing and refusing to respond to or answer the 
lawsuit filed by Smith against Cram as Executive Trustee of the Trust and by allowing a 
default judgment to be taken against the Trust;" improperly giving themselves positions 
within the Trust so that they could get compensated from the Trust, and "taking other 
such actions in furtherance of their own best interests and against the best interests of the 
Trust and its Beneficiaries." Id. at R. 388:ifl-R. 393:ifl0. Included as an exhibit to the 
2008 MSJ was the 2006 Board of Arbitration Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
("2006 Board Findings"), in which the 2006 Board found that Defendants breached their 
duties in multiple respects and were not entitled to all the compensation they claimed. See 
2006 Board Findings at R. 1678-1685. 
After reviewing Beneficiaries' 2008 MSJ and Beneficiaries' 2008 Motion to Void 
Transactions, the district court ordered Defendants removed as trustees and ordered that 
Defendants not be compensated by the Trust. See 2008 MSJ Order at R. 394-395. 
Subsequently, the district court set aside the 2008 MSJ Order for reasons not stated after 
a hearing on the matter. See July 10, 2009 Order at R. 2050:if3. 
Later, on May 13, 2015, Defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment 
(MSJl) on the Compensation Issue and Breach Issue. See MSJI at R.5384-5393. In 
opposing MSJl, Beneficiaries provided multiple pieces of evidence. See Opp. To MSJl 
at R. 5465-5481, and 5482-5539. Such evidence included excerpts from four depositions 
of Defendants, minutes of trustees meetings, and the Trust document. For example, 
.;; Beneficiaries presented arguments that included exhibits referencing the Trust documents 
as well as excerpts from Defendants' depositions, showing how Defendants' admitted 
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actions did not entitle them to compensation under any Trust provision. Id. at R. 54 78-
5480. 
Additionally, at oral arguments, Beneficiaries brought up the evidence of the 2006 
Board Findings, which determined that Defendants had breached their fiduciary duties 
and that a reasonable compensation rate for a trust manager was $19/hour. See Transcript 
of June 3, 2013 Oral Arguments at R. 6581, p.22:11-19. The district court referenced the 
2006 Board Findings, stating: "The other question is his fees as trust manager. We have a GiJ 
real justiciable issue of fact that arise from the board of arbitration, the hourly rate, and 
we need to look at it." Id. at 31: 15-17. The district court then ruled that there were 
genuine issues of material fact on the Breach and Compensation Issues and they should 
be reserved for trial. See MSJI Order at R. 5602-5603. 
Yet, just a few weeks after the MSJ 1 Order was issued, Defendants filed their 
MSJ2 without new admissible or relevant evidence, without argument for why the district 
court's MSJl Order on the Breach Issue and Compensation Issue should be ignored, or 
without argument for why law of the case doctrine did not apply. Thus, there was ample 
evidence of genuine issues of material fact in the record and known to the district court 
when it granted Defendants' MSJ2 at the pretrial conference. It was an abuse of 
discretion to grant Defendants' MSJ2 and not to consider this evidence already in the 
record. 
Ill 
Ill 
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3. Issue 3: Attorney fee award to Defendants was improper. 
Defendants should not have been awarded attorney fees. Utah follows the 
American Rule on attorney fees, awarding fees if they are allowed by contract or statute. 
See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). In the present case, on January 23, 
2014, the Honorable James L. Shumate issued an order called Final Summary Judgment 
("FSJ Order"), in which the Beneficiaries were ordered to pay the Trust a sum equal to all 
the attorney fees that the Trust had already paid in attorney fees. See FSJ Order at R. 
6027:,I2 of Conclusions of Law. Judge Shumate subsequently retired and the Honorable 
~ G. Michael Westfall was assigned to the case. A hearing was later held before Judge 
Westfall on the attorney fees award in the FSJ Order, at which the district court asked 
Defendants' counsel: "[W]hat is the legal theory on which Judge Shumate would have 
awarded your clients attorney fees?" See Transcript of February 17, 2015 hearing at R. 
6582, p.16:14-16. In response, Defendants' counsel explained his belief that attorney fees 
i;) were awarded based on the statute that allows for attorney fees when a claim is brought 
without merit and in bad faith. Id. at 16:17-19:7. This statute states: "In civil actions, the 
court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith." See UTA §78B-5-825(1). 
However, attorney fees should not have been awarded because the district court 
did not make any findings that Beneficiaries' causes of action were without merit and 
~ brought in bad faith. A claim is "without merit" if it is "frivolous, or of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact." Gallegos v. Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, if 19, 178 
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P.3d 922 (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In order to determine that a claim was not asserted in good faith: 
The district court must find that one or more of the following factors 
existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with the 
knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud 
others. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305,316 (Utah 1998). 
Here, the findings in the FSJ Order state that Defendants did not breach any 
fiduciary duties, Plaintiff Smith has earned compensation for his time for which he has 
not yet been compensated, and "[A] large amount of attorney fees, later to be ascertained GiJ 
and totaled by this Court, have been billed by the parties in this case. Said trust stands in 
need of replenishment of said moneys, as they were taken out of the corpus of the TKOG 
trust." See R. 6026,Il- 6027:,I4 of Findings of Fact. Nothing in the findings mentions, 
hints at, or discusses the issues of "without merit" or "bad faith." The findings in the 
Order do not articulate a clear basis for the award of attorney fees as required. See UBDH 
v. Davis County Com'n, 2005 UT App 347, ,I7, 121 P. 3d 39 ("Wedo, however, insist 
that a district court's decision concerning a motion for the award of attorney fees be 
supported by adequate findings."); see also Still Standing Stable, L.L. C. v. Allen, 2005 
UT 46, ,JlO, 122 P.3d 556 (holding that when a court awards attorney fees pursuant to 
§78B-5-825, the court must indicate "a clear basis" for its findings). In fact, the new 
district court judge, in reviewing the FSJ Order stated: "Again, I'm not sure why [the 
previous judge] ordered that they should be paid at that time. I suppose the Court of 
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Appeals can sort through that and then let me know if they think I should take another 
look at it. .. " See Transcript at R. 6582, p.20:3-6. Therefore, there was an insufficient 
basis on which the district court ordered attorney fees. 
A. The Evidence in the record does not support a fmding of without merit and bad 
faith. 
Even if the district court had made findings that Beneficiaries claims were without 
~ merit and made in bad faith, the evidence in the record would not support such findings. 
First of all, on May 14, 2008, the district court granted Beneficiaries summary judgment 
on their claims against Defendants, finding and concluding that the Defendants 
committed serious breaches of their fiduciary duties according to Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-
706(2)(a), §75-7-809, and §75-7-802. See 2008 MSJ Order at R. 390:,r3 through 392:ifl 0. 
Defendants' actions included: "failing and refusing to respond to or answer the lawsuit 
filed by Smith against Cram as Executive Trustee of the Trust and by allowing a default 
@ judgment to be taken against the Trust"; improperly giving themselves positions within 
the Trust so that they could get compensated from the Trust; and "taking other such 
actions in furtherance of their own best interests and against the best interests of the Trust 
and its Beneficiaries." Id. at 388:11-392:if 10. The district court then ordered the 
Defendants removed as trustees and ordered that Defendants not be compensated by the 
~ Trust. Id. at R. 393-394. Later, the district court set aside this order for reasons not stated 
in the order. But Defendants had filed a 60(b) Motion to set aside the order on July 15, 
2008, arguing that counsel for Defendants was ill and was not able to oppose 
Beneficiaries' summary judgment in time and the issues were already supposed to be 
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scheduled for a four-day trial. See July 10, 2009 order at R. 2050:~3; and July 14, 2008 
Motion to Set Aside Default Order Removing Trustees and Voiding Transactions at R. 
434. 
Secondly, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 13, 2013 
("MSJl "), arguing that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties and Plaintiff 
Smith was entitled to compensation as Trust Manager. See MSJI at R. 53 84. 
Beneficiaries opposed MSJI, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact on 
these two issues. See Opposition to MSJl at R. 5465-5481. The district court denied 
Defendants' MSJl on these two issues, finding: "There are genuine issues of material fact 
regarding the amount, if any, to which Penn Smith is entitled for his work as Manager of 
the aforementioned Trust" and "There are genuine issues of material fact such that the 
issues of whether or not the Trustees ... have breached their various duties." See MSJI 
Order at R. 5602:1~3-4 of Findings of Pact. The district court also ordered that these two 
issues "should be reserved for trial." Id. Yet, 45 days after the MSJl Order, Defendants 
filed their MSJ2 on these two same issues that the district court had just determined 
should be reserved for trial due to genuine issues of material fact. 
Thus, in 2008, the district court had determined that there was enough merit to 
Beneficiaries' claims that the court granted them summary judgment. Then in MSJI, the 
court determined that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary 
judgment for Defendants on Beneficiaries' claims. In the brief time between the MSJl 
Order and Defendants' filing of MSJ2, there was no new evidence presented to the court 
that would indicate Beneficiaries' claims were brought in bad faith or were without merit. 
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Therefore, the district court's award of attorney fees pursuant to §78B-5-825(1) was 
improper and should be vacated. 
4. Issue 4: Beneficiaries' first, ninth, and eleventh claims were not before the 
district court on summary judgment and should not have been dismissed at 
that time. 
Three claims of the Beneficiaries were not addressed in MSJ2: (a) the first cause 
of action for a declaratory judgment as to who can be appointed a trustee and successor 
trustee and how to do so; (b) the ninth cause of action for conversion; and ( c) the eleventh 
cause of action for waste. See Amended Complaint at R. 2132, 2138, and 2139-2140. At 
no time were these claims addressed by the court. Therefore, these claims should be 
remanded to the district court and Beneficiaries should have the opportunity to present 
their claims at trial. 
5. Issue 5: The failure of the Trustor in preparing and delivering the lease and 
stewardship agreements invalidated the Trust. 
Beneficiaries asserted that the Trustor' s failure to prepare and deliver Lease and 
Stewardship Agreements ("LSAs") according to the Trust invalidated the Trust. 
However, in the district court's July 9, 2013 Order on Partial Summary Judgment 
("MSJI "), the court found that "Any lapse or failure of the Trustor to prepare or deliver 
the Lease and Stewardship agreements to the beneficiaries of the Trust before his death 
does not invalidate the Trust itself." See MSJI Order at R. 5601 :iJl. However, the 
Trustor's failure to prepare and deliver the LSAs was fatal to the validity of the Trust and 
the court had no grounds to reform the terms of the trust according to UCA §75-7-415. 
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In their MSJl, Defendants cited to §75-7-415 for the proposition that the court can 
simply reform the terms of the Trust to allow LSAs to be issued solely by Trustees. See 
MSJl at R. 5391 :,IL However, the statute does not provide such authority: 
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to conform 
the terms to the settlor's intention if it is proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that both the settlor's intent and the terms of the trust were 
affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement. 
See UTA §75-7-415 (emphasis added). "A mistake of fact" is where a person understands 
the facts to be other than they are; whereas a "mistake of law" is where a person knows 
the facts as they really are, but has a mistaken belief as to the legal consequences of those 
facts." People v. LaMarr, 20 Cal.2d 705, 128 P.2d 345, 348 (1942). 
In MSJl, Defendants cited to no mistake of law or fact that affected the terms of 
the trust. Essentially, all that Defendants argued is that they think the Testator would be 
ok with the original LSAs being issued solely by Defendants. See MSJl at R. 5391:,Il. 
However, Defendant's assertion did not provide the authority to a court under §75-7-415 
to reform the Trust as there was no mistake of fact or law involved. 
Furthermore, Defendants' suggestion that Defendants/Trustees be allowed to issue 
the original LSAs contradicts the Testator's intensions as found in the Trust. The Trust 
states that the Trustor shall prepare and then deliver LSAs to the Beneficiaries that are 
signed by him and the Trustees. See Trust at R. 5498:,I,I5-6. The Trust is clear that it is 
the Trustor's responsibility to prepare and deliver signed LSAs. Id. at ,I6. Lastly, to make 
it abundantly clear that the Trustees did not have the power to issue the original LSAs, 
the Trustor adds the following language: "the trustees shall not be authorized to issue any 
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stewardship in addition to those originally specified except as replacements for other 
Beneficiaries ... " Id. at if7. In other words, the Trustees are only authorized to issue LSAs 
to the heirs of an original Beneficiary after the original Beneficiary, who had accepted a 
Stewardship, has died. 
There is no hint of a mistake of law or fact in the language of the Trust that would 
give rise to a court's authority to reform the Trust through §75-7-415. The Trustor was 
clear in his intention that only he would be allowed to prepare and deliver the original 
LSAs. Therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of 
~ Defendants on the issue of whether the Trustor's failure to prepare and issue LSAs 
invalidated the Trust according to § 7 5-7-415. 
X. CONCLUSION 
There are genuine issues of material fact that should have precluded the District 
@ Court from granting Defendants summary judgment. Based on the foregoing reasons, 
Appellant/Beneficiaries respectfully request that the Court reverse the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment to Appellees/Defendants. 
DATED this 23th day ofNovember, 2015. 
GALLIAN WELKER & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
C . topher A. Lund 
Attorneys for Intervenors/Appell 
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O(?Cept. ·and. ·wl~J:>Sr:fa(:m,. all ti:~ qu_tr~ ~rycqmp~ ~.ppn them ·as· 1RUSTEES of thts TRUST. 
W.hanever n~~ ~r .$µCCE~OR·T~U$~~$l ~r~ eJeci:ad -or .OPf?PlDted_ for thl~ T-RtJSr, the. 
propsr.ty··onhfs TR.UST·shafl be vestac.i· Jri them. ·Jfl a.llodlum wlthqut the need ·of ClhY furtlier 
act oN;l'QnVey.~:mu::~e .• 
$~ 'Tbcit ln ief.u.rn "for the oob.v~yar:1o~s.·d~ctlbec.l 1r:t "'this tn~m$r-rt; t.11e.TRtJSTtES. of this 
~~-usr -~h~tl: b(?: ~rnp~we.@i ijJ~.~u.e.1-~ $~-~~-:i;,:_Kf~(~~~ Al t.§t9.1 o.f;¢~E TH.OU.SAND 1W_O 
HQNDR.EP.· PIPN. {12$0) Un\ts .of _ ·a~r:l.$tldol fnrete.st. .to :fJ& lssved. to TflEf 
Bw.iefl:cldtleJlSTewAADS,ln the:form-OfSftWAtDSHlP.S;-ond~steven E. 'Klrkianct-and .or Sy.lvlb. 
Ktr.¾i:Gtnd:·.s~dl.Lb.e.~~i1#V a:~•fo;;t1.~~~~-G'.1PPP.l?9!f. f~:-~~~: ~~§.T. cj~d.D~- fh~fr 11v~s. ~~se ;uni~ 
eira.mer.e.~y. .~r~se.T1~fiVJ2 -~; toe::~tjijchS~A~PSF11P.5-,m~v retJac.it m,qr? or ~¢s~. ·tho" 
ti~$ p.t.oportJonar.~ Ur.t1ri:=.reptetenf.~at Jit~ff1e.rw.ords; (lfl: UhJt-s ara-not··aCIUcd, 
41 T.hat tfie 'T~USTOR sMO:U e.xeoute ~pd -aetlver to tne· TR-USI.EES of Jhis TR-U5f the 
nsc$s-sory -deeds C?rJvevJng a.ti~ ilfabt,. t1t1e4 :Qnd···1~tef~~t ··1n' qnd :to any teo·1 ptop~rty 
tro_nsfe.rr:ed · to ·th~ musr-and .:such other dboumenis :as -rna.v·.t.>.e·r-e_qUlred to tr.qnsf-et ·e1nd 
con~$Y aff ·rlght, t~e-, and .l11t;-er-e.st· 1rf and -to .,anv stocks, bonds, .mortgqgE1s, notes· 
r-ecefvable., ondJor oiher p.erJiOndl ptoperty \vhion T-RUSTOR grantB or may grant as 
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lrravacqQ1e.~QlW-9VOfte.es fu f.hetRUS'f hereby created ond Whloh said TRUSTEES shall holql 
~n. affod1CJmi · 
5: ·rhot th.eTrausTORcnd.11WST-EES$hcill [Qauei:$1.~WARDS.Ht?S:for onQ among dEas.l_gnam:d 
BENtFtCIARlES-:w.lfli slgt.lad.lEAsg :on'd srewARDSH!P A$QEEMml"$tjraatrv-eJy qs roTI.ow~ 
lEASS & .ST-J:WARP.SH~ A$REEM.ENf ~e :~ NC .. OF UNtrs 
# 1 1St~v.eb-t ~1t-k1cin~, 1.260 
#.2- ~~ '.Rlilfh «1.rt.rar.d) Coqp_~f 30 
~- Stev~n E~ -lt-frkfond<U ;;o-
#"4. .Bet\JpJtlln .Te.mP.1es· .Kfndat'!ld 30 
#5 ll~fon Co1&.irian-·1<ilrkfdnd 30: 
#o Hylaf.\--J:tan~ltn'.~~tilqpd 3.0 
#1 Jo.lm-;14udson-.Kit'Jd<in.d ;ID 
M; !Oqv,lQI· -~Qungite-e :KtNrlond 30 
¥9 i~~v.10 e~~~-i(Jrktt~r~t 30 
#1:0 ~lch~. A~t~r.n-.l<fo~laiJd 30 
#.l ~ ~ltlcSG~ KMdcmd 30--
#12. Dc,n1eLBoff.on :Kir,klan~ .so· 
# l3. JQmes. Hen¢lerson Ktrk1ond .30. 
1.·14 Ephtaftri flortq.n KfM.o~d 80 
#~5 Tarr-esfrla1 :Klngaom of God 860 
~ Thqt. th~TRU~T.OR'$hafl·pr$~re:¢n~de,lJyer ro such Bene.flclorles th~ STEW ARPSHJPS 
P.~~tto··the-:µ;ASE and-StEW~-l<PSHtP:AGR~~ENTS ·dUly l~r!.bed by hlm ~nd-als,o by 
!l:$.?Rt1~~✓-ln91Jootthg the-P,tlltlet.llgtrST.EWA~PSHIPS to•e.q_ch_ Bepe,fl~~ry.--onti-st~~ng that 
~~$T~~D~P:·Jsin P-e.lP&.iUtty. H()W~Y~kJt-lsJ~~ .lnt.eht-offfi~ J"~UST(?R thdfupon iti_e 
q($.crl"h ·,of ,any ofitta-eenr:>-flcl~i18.S, th9 STl;\fvARDSHlP~~haU.rev¢.Jo··th.a T:RU.STEES to . .be .held. 
In trust for the·= to.foot ri'ri~l:e ¢r.4tdf$i 'jf tp$,t~ :~f$JS·'nO adult fOolS· chu,f (r-i ·the fd,mlly, 
..... T' . 
7, Thot the TRUSTEES shalhnot ba,.-9:Ltt.no.rlzed to lssus·tiny .STEWARDSHIP 1n adrlltton io · 
~~ o11g1riclly·apeclfJe.d-•exOep"J:··ets: ~plqcamen~~-for:ofher: ~r=,;h~:fJ~1¢frl~s<its a~ttiorlzed_tn 
tn1s·tNO-ENTU.Rl:r :$icept· when .others cho.o~e toJoln fuls TRUST W.lifl. th~lr prqped.ls.t These 
stiqll ~- orlglnaltS,- l250 UNt-T~: -Of 8EN5Ft<Z4Af. INTERESI".co11verte,q.to,_$fEWARDSHJP$ -In. thls 
T'RUst TRUSiEE$ :~JUj :b$ r$g~1teii t.9:IUqlntotrrto1d provfde for-the. -upkeep of the-set :asld~ 
prop.erfy,,. ~r:neterv. -ttnqFarJ(tfnttfq~-fiqt -~~en.alfocateci fot-_parflc.u1a-r $T.EWARbSHlfa 
to'lfieluoe.-alf-•C(?~t,qr:,~xp.eAsm Jri¥-J~g:, th~ ®oye(e~p$ns.~~-:~ll! t,e :provided from the 
tijb~s.-;QT~Q:.cl) $ts.WA®: pursuGr.tf· ~:=th~tt-=tE:A~l!:.:r~od :ata»tAWSf.UP AGR6EM.EN:r~. me 
T.R~-~t~~t~~~•_f9:rr:n ·.pr-9_pi{i· · :-:-~l't,Q~~fot- th~ ~ult ·ofnappfne.~.-tor_,~~$-'.:qr-td 
~ve~ t\~~~~:tjf9.~g _:~1jiij. ~~----~. ~: 11~ ~d--{s~~~as1b1Utl~-s: =Qt· tn~r- 4~~erltgJ}tqet-Ji:\ ff1~lr 
r.espadf.tv.e·.-~~D,~ -~~~- .. __ 9:~!!4tfU-;aJW~~ r~-ciln: an lnVfGJat.a 1t;i~errtan:c~ for 
t~se. J$.~P.$.blflve mmmes Inf tlaJl'-~~; .·~~e~.¢1:d.n~s: \1/.1ll be_ t:sspO.t'Jtlpje. ·for· 1na1r 
Pf.Qr$>(tt~nafij' $"are .~f QBSls:Qtexpan~s::qn ·iha.Jr.=pl~:1~et ·A_rii;:· t?e:rieflqlq_ry.-willch doesn ·t 
f-l:o\ie· 0)1V lrite$t fo -his Jt-lbef{f.qnctM:;in.dwho W'Jfl :not ao~t·t~popstblUty tor ff' ·shtdl have 
f.lr.st .. rlghfto leoS.s.·hJij thfie_t~foti¢~ :sb'. as t¢. pr:$cluq~:tlle· acdrudl. of""dafouJte.d costs to 
p_q:f?.ri~of heirs.. tA the·ev.~nt·of ·AA)(BensiJ.c,l~r:f-,·-n~gla_q.t tn~-1iU$f~s=:5half"·exercJse their 
r-~§Fiqns~~_lty ._fb· t~qsa ~tiJr,herltcih~e to :e9ver- p~opor:tlon.afi3-costs.i- Any ·.new·_-male heir 
wm. b.$. __ f~spot,;~f P~Jt?.r •ft.~ t~~~rop.pp.q ~f. ~~Y defaulted costs or -expenses, when f:le 
ocs.epts tn°'e\~A'RDSHJ?. Noti,::forb·ny t:o.$i:nbets: are. lnvlfeci ~rid encotirCfgJed to Cldd 
the.J_r ·_(6-r~~~ qn.d·¢0tl~S-cr~fe thar:n +Q· fiitt t-RUSt · · 
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~. Ihetf, th.e T-_R~ST-EeS.-shaU"'-a1Sb\:;lt$e: tbdf. poi:!J0~ 9f. t-h$ ·lric.rs:q$a.pf th.~s. ~~StfnaceSlgty 
for f-h~ Sl.JppGirt -o.f Ste~n · ~ ¥i*-la.'Pltf ~l'.l~-S;llvJei Ktrl~li;md; -and to any :ttn1nb{benefldor.1es 
t-o.r. "fhelr . .edueaflonql, religjeus.'d~qptnel'.'it and -g:enarar weffore at the °TRUSTEES 
cflsor.etfon.. 
CJ, T:tiqt .the toosr££S shall.-. ·?..V Mtnut-e. :Pr9Pf?.tlY \mctlb.e,c;l lQ ths :omc].sl reo:orct make 
~vt~~f,!S-_(2~_t,q._tt1¢ t.ur.ie: ~d-pl6toe i'orhaldlh§-re.gµlar meetings. of•·:the Bqcqd .onru-st~as.. 
A·mqlOr.Jfy._qf~~r~ ~~qfct~J1~lf·:~~reJ a:,-~tttm forjl:)e ·conduct_:o.f.irustbus!n~s-~-qny 
-~egllJ~ :Cir ~pa.¢.l.dtlmeetlt.lttof_:t~qry. ~~·qr4. :$9l no· :de~cfslba· moll b~coma aff-e,ctwe --or 
blndll)tl unJ~ss q-.-m¢lt}ot.1W -qt. qll -P-4itte!\f 'fRU$.~: -~oh~~ f.o tµ[.!>port It~ An srnergency 
me$.fftlQ:tJt~f:ta:;goorcf mt1fbex:~Derfui;,Q.nti1erwdt-te.n -~~~µast0>f ·o_mdjotlty-of t.~esoar~ 
of !r.14¢-~s t0.· 1~ pk~tca-.;at· <:t tJ.me·. oho. :t!>looe;-•speetffad 'In-such. wfftt~n .reqµe.st or :qy-
confere;oo~ oau~ 
W~ In~ the J~USTEES· of in1a :T.RJJ$:T,.¢~-STtWA~~J- mqy. tfo_ qnihlng ooct p~rfbr!l) ~ny 
-dct:, ir-i. cqjigtq~qo~ ~J~iffOhqpt.et:25 .. -of .LEv.mcu~·:sµl~Ject ion1v-+o the :Jcw·ot ttia ,:Jand_ -and 
the-p.rov,tslql)s e:otifalheid 1ni ·-tnJs:-JNPl;t-WfVR~i-tinq thgf by. thelr-Mlnutes. spread-upon the 
reco·r~ ·the 1-RttStEES" .11:,lJitY= s~t. i:t?r:tl1· rr.he.l_r :~WM :gafu~td.l' pov.✓$,rs:t:tlid 9U.th~rffy as confer.red 
up.on. fh~ Jr:i th~s ·0~1.ARATION ·O-fT-RJ)ST. 
n.~ Ulm -~~- Sl)<?t-il :9~ ·pet~· ~rnw-~~tlan. .. t~: :'.·ooy efflo.~s.,. or_ -Qtg~~ts, to. inc(.µde 
con~··wt}lch snqll P'.t:f1~eq <:tn~,p~J~t.it:-~·~-tfilS$.f~qh· ◊.fJhe if-RUSTEES_-of thl~T.RUST,. 
tacludlng :~1rnb;ur~em~ for. -~11,f··-of"_;p~c;'k~t ~~~1:1~;s)h$Ur~~ -by ·:th~ TRlJS¢EES-qn 1?,ehalf 
o~ ·tf'f$ ·r@St and p_etfor~·ed, fO! .tt.\e ~ar-,effl eJ tnts: ~USf. T~\fS,;EfS· \VlU· s~tve -w.fth9µt 
eornpen·&aflon. Any:-corn:pe.n-sotJo.rt prlfd·mtrera ls rob$. th¢ dsuaUy p¢11d·for $Uch· work, 
12. ThQtany lncieo:se.,-a.cc:r;Ulltlg to_tlJ1s TRUSr-subJectto.~paragro.ph three (-3) .obpve, shall 
b-e. ·for the .worsl:itp ,of A1r,nt,g{1fy ~o°'· ~har.11y· ·¢,·1.i1ra ~Pve of Christ) l'o mankind 01,d for 
ptomotJng th~ gs.nerai weff-or.:e, the -t~liglous be11.afs qnd higher educdtlo1i, or icultural 
p~bgre~s-ofthe. 'Benetlolcr1es.:and. the '.comA1uhUy-.of-niqn, 
. lS J That tht~. tRUST0R-Qf any 0.lf)§)f. l17-q}vJq0armtrsr~- 9t atw ·f.lnle ,· durlng the-.durGiion of 
thls TRVSt. odd ·-to, •. Cl-n91· :thqs lnor~os_e·,J_ts· ¢qr:piis PY- mgklnrJ Q1fra. thereto .. sud, gifts. to 
co.nrorm. fo -~xisf1ng law. · 
itf.;_ ThQt·the rRUSTEES-~aJI -hov.e·r:he:·rlgnl:qr.tcf p~we.r- qs s~t tqrth :tn fhls· inde.nture. to 
r.o~nage ·tf1~,~U_$r·pt~p$:rly·f~rtha-~e_nelftof·t.he:B~neftplorlas tn ct manner 1.PJ h~rrno.ny 
wlth ·t~~ ~r.g®.rG Co.1,-&tlfqfltjn;;qp.¢j ~m:.p.t· R~~-~-:W Wt.it~h -~e.emsto: 'them most des.trab.le ar.ld 
bern~flok:n .. · 
}5, tn~t ~~- J~$~E$-1nav--esr61?"fls.~=~s'?~r~t.e;J~on1t .. <itC.99u_b~ fAr if'i$.1.~~$J}-l9 w~_c{f~.-1~ 
fund_SJOA0-b'.Ei (i_$]Sd$ft~dlt ohQ sndlh¢etetm1AS;·'fh.e ·gui;lt,}.ordty by .wntch•_¢µrt~rlt-:ptjyt.rj'~nts 
may ·be dlsours~of qt· ·W.lth¢lrqw.als-a.i_o.d-e: ttom:fi.:fptj$ '-'-:~lon~n9. ro.the:TfWSt 
_1~, ·Tf.lp-r tt)~··_!RV~!E~-sntitf :m=s1tit:G1t11-wan~k~Pfb$Q!<S~-:dc.¢~.¢i~~,:Pn_ct·l'?-C?.Qn:~-?t9D~- ~t1qtJ 
PI~e~· pt:tjp~~f fl.'ll~~f9f"_~f _($~µ1¢fr-·.~~t!~~~·-:ct1;3d.i-rss·e.rd.~U~de.clslo.n~itl~t$In relqt-Jve 
t.o .fhe,:must.At.t_ ~~9f1/~r<GIS.ffi.~JL!D$~gff~(¢.1?¢f p~prft~~t.Jy;be. ovo.Uable· to ·cur.tent 
Of.ld:'S~~'Q$.~.sgr TRUSTEE($) and fue. B.en~fJofode.~,<;tl··\J(Ftl~~s ... 
-i-7~ That the: t-RUSTEtS-bff.his.iR.USf:S.hd{I o.rlQll'\ci.ily COQ$l$t·G>f.°:riottewer- thoA THREE or-AVE 
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nalupaI- p.ers-ons who ·shraH. _oonslitute-!ha-Seordto:f +ruie:es;.:~µt tf.~mqy .consfs.f of 9s mcmy 
gs_:~c;t~·:b'~--d~~m~cl lq.Jm b.)l ·a -~or.iimt,ijS: decis~q~-- ofs!J_C.h .-B~grd duly ~te!~d Jh th.a 
r~unut~s.of.sdtld ~oarq,: .mqs.r,ees ~hall .sarvErfor,dm lnltrct1·par.tQd of tem-veara~ SUbseq1..1$!At 
reE~cil :snQ!t-be'¢.Ji.tqrffdflc;; p.1;>h9'1:1g.:tirto~1tr-lPUS ttppro\1C;ll ot·the Bod-rd of Managers~ 
obs-ent-op.prov.affQr.ir.enew,af -cr:risw0ciPP~lniiment .shci11 be.-made-at. "the discr-et1on of the 
'trustee~. 
lS. Th¢it !he JRUSfE$ ·Of thls ~l;JSf :rna_y:-$le,cf 9ne·~rtheJr-n~betas .EXEClJT{VE-TI?UStEE; 
oRd ,appo.ln"t a TRJ:A~. Tn~-TRt.;$1~-$. mQ'f.'~1ec.r =_ope ,of .their -numl;>er :or ·onother-d_uly 
quafffile.d :p:eraor.t .qs M.qnc@.tl wrn¢.·w~l ~s$\7~-:and~.ov-emee tha,-properf:f.es dftlila TRUSL. 
thqt ¢tre.notit.i.:ST€WARDSH1P~ ,an:dfs.ceh1e· rads0Aaole.c_ompe.hsqitlon fdr such ,sfJivlc_e-as 
defen.nine~•by fha · B(::!drd.-of: T.r-iJste·es; 
t9. Tb¢., shoulC, It b$~e-ob'.t/loos ·a.-t qny.'fJme.to th~ maJp.rliy of th'e Board of'Trustees 
thc;tUhe--9q_nt.1nuonce in sucn -~"o"¢l1y Qf.-:cin.e of fu.~fnµIJ_1per wolitld_ be ln1mlcctl to this 
t-RUST dt~d tts Beneftoror;iesl, such 'fRUSTE·E m-G.JY be .reF.Apvett:by the ·unanlmous c;.ledslor:i of 
the -other ffltlST6ES,· for' sxttarrl°ef oouse,, .. af:1-er · -on. independent :Board of. Ar-bltroifon hos 
concurred wlt.htha decision· oUh:~ -~us~J ~ny TRUSTEE-may res]gn .at his-.elsorei1on, 
20J Toot Q B~ord. ·df.Ar-~t.rcdl&.n:~n~l~b~ $llc>:mt~q: W:~:~n.>1:h~- r,R\).STE~S .ate; ~1::iA~~ to 
come to Q maJotlfy decision .or·knat~ .their dectston 1~ l?• ~ove::. _-Eqch TRVSfEE shclll 
appolrrt on~ dls1µterested member <md the new~y .qp·pQlnte,d ~oar<;i :members wUl-se:le.ct 
fyjo more d_lslo~rest~q- m.ei_np~rs.. 1he$e·. ·flve lndlv.J~9Js. w..m -comprJse t-he .·aoard 01 
Arbitr-crtton. theJr majqr1ty V(?~ W,UI 11.iJ~_-o.nq._res.olve. '.qtLdfspUtes, 
2:l , That ·1n toe .-avant: thaf arty T~~s.te~· -d1e.~, -b:e.qomes 1~cqpoclta.ted, r.esrgn_s, or -Js 
retr.\ovsp., tn~'.!~-~~i~lpg flil·l?mbera o.Ube :1roau:d Qf Trust~es~-sha.U ·ctp point the first named 
succ$ssoPIJ.ho $h~n fiqvs agr<;Seq to· .serveJn su.~ cap:oelty. · 
22. Thpf no Ben~fl.daiy .,_ -as ~~CO:~ -shdlJ· be. e·rnp~werecl to -control the musrEES In a.ny 
way or dtctate man~gemenf p:Olfcles ;to,·tne TRJ)ST,. 6(de-~rmlne the disbursement of 
TRUST· lnoreO$Ei, 
21~ Tho_r D9. qredltqr o.f _-qny BeJ'lefic!aw -6.f -t~s TRUSJ shG1f be ellg•ible. to sue, .or obtatn 
from, 'this TRUST any of.the dlstribl.:ltldf\$ made PY/Of auefr$'nt'l-, 1hls TRUBlto dny·Baheflclary 
the.r$0f. 
24. Tool:~ altho~g~ tha:_lRU$ll;ES· mqy nofba he1d--re~ponsfbfe, Whfle .performll'"\g their 
dtl~e.s .. a'ecording_·t.o. -~ 'rnc:irid9t~~ ~f ffi.fs ~ST., for any. Jgsses r.esultlng. from no fau1t or 
their· ow.rh they we «cib.le. ip_Jetr:\~~Q) ~no J~tts fof p~r$p_ndf .:gomag~~ :ln1t!at~'d !:>Y. ooy 
B"~ITf~~ry--~t ~ny losses w~teraal Qt :t~e .~Si be.c®se _of-ftau_¢ ~onve('.$lon qt T~V$T 
RIQ~#Y ·to P~t~r-iql ~s$;J;,irQ~ -n~_~i .df .d~fv./Of _.brea~- ;p.f T.RUSr, Q.r\ thelr- ,port.. Arlt 
b~n.sflpfi;fiyrt)gyJ~fflqt~~eh:~Qlj~\t~lJOO.(~t~$.C$,tit;>fAtbli'f:tafto11-to:~.e.·f.0rmed:py_ 
\wltfn:g ·to. the B?Grd= .Qf T~$.fe.e.sj~A.ol; $.t.ml fl$lo.b]st1ro~t OtRTPPt/fote$ the t~q.yol· of 
ct culpable. r,riust~ om;;!~ m i:ut01t1011;-.eGmp.:eJ ~~ •.to,.mof<e.:-re.sfltutm fQ Jlie.~USfJot-dt1Y 
fund:s.stofen,_conv~~:~. tg PffSOQAI use~.d.11 f~sM~sq,gU_s~:0 ft;;toss ne~}ect-of dufy, -
~p. Tti<d '.it. OflY: .B~11~fldary-hereunder dles WlthQ\4t ;Q_:ndm~d "tielrt'liS STE.WARDSHIP ~hall 
r~1/~r.t to· Jh'?- _·aoQ.r~I: ¢ ·rrusfeea~ Who jhaU.· fheraup.on r.,amt~r a :repiocement 
BeneflGJaryJ.STI:WARD·, :pursua_nt ·ro. pdtngrap'h 6, an'd J$sue to htm or each of them a 
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STEWARDSHiP- bearlng dlfogefher fl'le ~etmaSTEW~ROSHlP as ,prevlously-belonged to Buch 
decedent Beneficiary. · 
_lo._ r~at th~ ~sm~ Jlf·fl;)t~ -r~$! ~h~ hwe power·to ler1c! fT)Onev, ~ttt1out usu,y, to 
tt:i-e i~nJ➔.f!C.lart.$8-_qr -~q:b.Q.f~,1µl}idS:; -~~~at,no:t1m;e.·ff-1oV T.RU5f real p~openy .asse't$·.be 
usad -e;,s_ p~ame.TQ& :an¢fihQf..-!11$V :~Pol! tltmt-e no. outb€>rJiy to per.form an\' actions except 
those set- forlh and pa1mli:tetil ~-t.1 ·inJs -tNPE1~~ 
·27_._, that the."T:R~STEES O.:f-thls iRD.~·sn.Gql oorrnctlly hlr.e no -9~~ on o -$dl~rl'?d .ba~1s_, no 
seMo~s·snall be.pe.r.fotro~d·ror·fl111RUSi"";Lfnless on. a c:ontrqctudl bas1s;t .Unless. such an 
arr.ang-ement.1.~--~n1awfu.J cf ~r.ripo,.stble,; 
28., Thqt th1~. D$.clorat1Qt-l of trust· -crest.es oni-y cm '.-lrrev.o:cobia ~UST,. arld not a 
corprncfloh-, ·portn.ershtp or· assoclatlor,. 
29-,. That the TRUSTE6S of. 'tl;\ls..TR:lJST he:rel?V•-OQl'ee to accept "the· responslbllliy over~ and 
the· wJse prese.ryaflor1 ot the :~~ts: 90nvey.1;lQ to th'l.s TRUST for the benefit qf the 
Be~.fl¢19f~s, and lhef{: posterity} tnat-·'fti·~ :~xe,9qt1or, .oft-he .d4tles:pursuant thereto.,. by 
w.n1qh ~~1/ .P,led.ge: th~lr .best efforts ,q1:.l¢I {nter~~ :·1f\. prot:ectlng:_ cind preseMn~ .the aS$ers 
of thls· T.RUS~:- Q.t\¢1:. t.h¢t ·!his. .TR~Sf ~OEiiilTQ!~:e· 4hotr const-rtute. ~ ~ffi91ent ;Ql:i1d~. 
suppte.m.e.nt.ed ntm" t1rhs ·toJkrie.-~wly ~nter-$d ~l'?ito the• .records at t11ts.lRUSt: such :rn'.ln-utes 
td ·oonform:to fua. guict:alh)~Jf:~:f1~rttf~fi'fhls ·l~QEhJT{JRE~·rot the Board of Tr-usiees:-tn th:e 
p$.r:r.ormonce Gf tnefr -duties,.. :4nd. sb,all t~e . ipltjdn1g· ~p~1t ~1~ porr.t-lss thereto. The 
1noer1tan~a-.-w1U ·olwoys·be. matnto1h~d--ror tba :M~e tie.lrs.qt th~ erl§lrjpi 8eMeJJ¢.fary-. Scud 
Bo~d:shall hove_~~n powa~·r.ae~ssc;.try._iq carry·ot.Jt ¢1'Jd";1:,e'i19rm. fne·dufl:e,s.-rndnd¢1red to, 
-and/lnci.:ur:ibent ·µpcm:.: fu~m. ·as"- TR~Sn:ES.:oi thls. must. 
30, ·That; s1r--ce. t~ls T:RUSn;~onfers l1Ml!EO .llAi3lU1Y L(pcn -the TRUSTl;ES., TRUSTOR. ond 
~er.rE?fi91ode~ tharet~ .. ·a ~tcifem.enf-d.eeiaiQ~JY. _of ~t;tch· Umfte_q µablllty- shail be -prtnted 
de.¢.Jy p.n. a11 :qo.nto~s ·made by anel. -~etw·een the Y,RUSTE~ .of inis. TRUST -0r .:a 
re¢fese.ntqtlv~ _the(eo;f d.pd qny. thtfd po.r.ty of parf.tes t-o .:such ·ooniract Furrhe.tmqr-a; fhls 
1RU$hho1I ~~ respqnsJb1$.:~n1f f:or u-~·.own .091lQJaf·lon~:and never.for those of :onv TRUST OR, 
T:RUS:TEE, :or Bene.flcJarylS:fEWARD; 
$1. Thptthe TRUST cre.qt.ep.he.r:~lhJs·ct·s$.pargte .and independent ~ntlty and, .as such, 
·co~hol ;~s held: ·f~gq-lly re.sp~fb.le. f$.t -qfw debt 6r obUgatfon lnctirted per.soncdly as an 
.indivkrual -by~·ttie T-RU$f.QR or -o;ny TRUSlEE Ot Bi~neflt;)Jdry/STEVi{ ARD ··the.reot". 
3_2\ Th.at the-·T.RUSTiEES·,of"ttiJs·TRUST shell sel\f.e wlthowt bond.,. ·and that, as lndlv1duals., 
n~n§,_of' fh.em ·shcill e~t' ba.-heldJ:~pot!:i~b.Je ·tor:-ar:iv.-·-debts or-obligations· Incur-red by the 
must · -
~a . .- V,fqf.~s !N.t;>.E.MJ:UREOf TkU.&'f sholfser:y~ .. '.~~-:oornp1at~--<:in.d ~ffJ.clqJ guJq~:.fQf th,e 
T~USf.Et~)a. tt.e.J~~r~tJJf ;:c:tt-)~ p~qt~¢trtce offheJr.dut.Ie·s h~re.uryd~r; Q:n·d fb9Hney:~hall.: 
~a~a-0rn1y,:Sucr.rauthority; -powe,i$~ ah¢l-dutJ~s:-o$.;·gre_ :0$nf~red:ner:e.-18 and hereunder. 
3tl~- 1h~fth_e ~utte~---of·ff)e..T~'t:ilSI€ESofthis.·must shoil·be·._slrfyllqr:to fh9se-q1 a STEWARD 
under tne lAW Qf. $fEW~D.Sfl}F~ 
3&,· That· ~o tfe.blslon· =bf tbs· TRUSTEES; o.r -any dfabtJrsefnenf of funds' :shoH be _effective 
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Clhd-,blnd~ unl,ess ·1t ls· supp.anted and:_pqsse~-_by d.-tnaJortty of the Bo.ard · of Trustees and 
~s.pt-~~~i;ty ent~r~d-as. ~ MI.Aui:e:lr? 1he :P~rf.rj<21rn.eJ)t·r~d o'f'tha· $dk:!l'B·oord However~ the 
TRU$r~~?--~~ ~nfer-upon-a-l:RUS:TManager;:ceJi'O.h1 .ttm1t-$d powers w make day~tp-day 
neoe,S$pry _.q\spurss.m$,lits·=fi:l:1he·:qt~e~e-otortjln01Y~U~l~ess., such dspu~menis tobe 
subJect to .subseq~trt rev.I~ dr,>d q~var=py::tna muST.EESf: 
.3.6~ Tnqt :rielfher ihe,- death ~or lhs~lver:icy· or bankruPtPY of arw TRUST~~ or 
Beneflcfar-yJSraNARD-is11cdf~:ln o.ny--wav affect tbe-~perat.loJi· or cionr.lii.l:ilty or. thEs JRUS-l 
'37.. That-no-;tjlsburs~me.nt ·Or -0ffiar b~n$fit~h~U oocrue ·to· .. ar1y BaneffcJary/SfEW.A~b or 
,other ;fndlvldudL ex-capt as sat forth tn fhls iMD'EMW~B. .Qf·musr. . 
,3$.. lhcrtif1s. TRUST shaP oe ·-qothl¢Hed ·Ih, .. -and.-:$ubJect to the.Jaws of the Utan.Re.pub.lie 
that me C-OJ181~t-.u:tlonq!. Wh~rev$ ~~Ch,,QWS .ore p-ert1nent or opp(fca.ble tq th.~ :o,peratlon. 
of th1s trust. · · 
39. that this rRLlSl'":.~alLnot.h_e::consir.0~.d to:hav.e atW-cormecilon., .tmpJted or- actual, 
as: to ·qny $UPP.o$:e~. r1$~,- with ~flY co.t-P,,o.to~, stqd:e· govemment or oorpo"rate federal 
govemmer.lt. 1hlsT-RU~ J$ .. ·n0:rtirS:sJrJ~n\ :dJl~rfGnd f-Oretgn to dtl-. corporQte:. government. 
40~ Th~ qbJ&ct of :fhls ··musr s1::io11 'b.e to--t~~1ve, cicqµlre., hqlo·_iaiid tr.lifnsfer 011 manner 
of pr9-pecyf$t;, co.j.l$.9¢r-ated qod c..onvey.ect for...the _wor.shlp of.Alrnlgtr(y. ·God1 chorliy to 
mqhk1btj and f9t :•it>tbn,o:tmg ifhe. general weff-are., the relJgl~~ _.ballets pnd--educaftoh of 
its-~.e.neflc1arl~.s/S.!~A,~OS:tn':lcf the comml:.lnffy of man. LEVmcus·25·sholl be the p1ima.ry 
gu)de OT- the TRlJ.STEES,. i 
4·:1, The;(fRUS!EES··and a.tfAgec'\t:·Ofr~C.E~S-d~lar~, ang_ (;lckl)9wledge thelr lnailenab1e 
rights ·secured.~bY the. tJ.;$, Gohstrtuf.lon-cmd· Uta.h-C6r:lst~Mior;b .No .¢.resum..Ptlon fs to be 
01.ad&_ fhat ·r-lglits: .r:et¢fri€J¢J ··¢fr:~. :1n: OAV W1!J._V .. c.11/!H dgnta P-1,J~Up_nt tq th.e .fo\rrte~~D 
Amendment. of ::the.·.u .-p~. G.onstlh;ltlan, Afty:,qn:d-a11-compe,ll$.d-a~tlo.ns -of the·T.RUSJEES or 
OFFlCERS by 'federal· -or -stqte· =government fs ~one 0 w.flihout" pjreJudlce~ and·wHh -explicit 
reservotlon of .f1ghts .. 11-
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TmRES~lA:l =JCtNGP.0'.M OF ;GO:D 
. SOHetiUEE OFASS:ErS. 
l, Tro~ of· Jond.111 ·w~sblngfurl o.oun1y., ~~GPk· 163.1. f.Soge -404~ .Reference #16455:3~ 
d~scr.U)~:t,&~ $.J:(S~NU\lG'. l l9.~5'fij:S.t W~s~-~f1:ll~ l~qr:tt,aasH~omer·of lot-'Elght 
{8);, a~,e~·.:fo~4!1re.e £4~#,r P.kW~~~; '$t~-:·$:ept~_$: ~(q.lW ~urvey., ~~---~~nnlng thence 
sour-1:i :8'2.5:t~eh-thanoe-:East:~itfi :fe°t?rr th$n¢.$:;$0tith B.2-~5 ·feet:tnenoe West 204}5 
fee.:trtr,t~n¢e 'Moffh i'B.S -~et the.f'~e.-fosf fatl-f~t ~to -~:he p:0tnf.qt b.-eg1hnrng;· :lsi~ihg 
P~·.oflQiis 6~ . .7- o~e1·a--6! :Sald ·Bloo.k-43., 'f.OG:ErttER·wtth 011 :Jmprover-.nehts and 
.ap,purfer.lo:nces, th~e,:o. befong((iw, INCWDING- lhr.~.e .(~)·-houi~s of'JrrJgarlon water 
In flie St,. $.eor~e- Wesi• Oliy ~r1n.Qs:. 
2. Beglnolrlg cit·a.potAt .East 5 ch~l(is frQm. the NEcQmer of the SW 1/41 ·sec, 23, Tp. 
42 Soutfu Rgng$ la West_ SLM.,, :and rwnntng tl1enc-e -South 2s~ East 4 ..9.6 ·chotns; 
th~h~South 4lt50~ E-ost5/2.7 c~aJns;thence·southw:~stef~y 1..24-rods, mqre or .~ess1 
to- ~e- ~pi~t$flY- boWidi,fy Un~ of the .. Coufl1Y •r0Qd;· the.nee folloWfng saJ¢ eas1srJy 
Jina .. of -sptd· 09~ntt ro:cd Irr ,a· t10.tthw~terly_ cUr.ectlon .. to a. point of• ffi§3 $outh 
boundary· nne pUbe= NW 1 /4 of sciklS~. ·23., Which po.t11t:lles. l 630.2. feet .eost o-f 1110 
SW-comsr,.of sold NW 1 /4; thenpe :.east of-sqld b9-t.mdary llhe l$39,B fe.e.t, more: or 
less, to:polnt of b~glnnlng,.-ce>nt~hliig 30 qc:res) more· dr1e~s; w.l'lh 9:shcires· of waler 
from Mfll Cree1<.Jrrtga.tiort C.ompcn:r;,and :a ,fifing on the·= waste water ·nq~ used ·on 
;sdfd. l~nti:. <:tl~ wli'h lmpr.~vaments and. oppµtfena.nc.es. A!so., il3 _of the .runoff· 
\1/0fei ·froh') the.- .¢r:JY of Washtnglon .conscted In the east ditch of the M111 Creek 
lmgcitf on· Corapqny.. 
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-JN_ \~T.NE.$:S 'WHERE-0.P, the -sa1d TRUSfOR, Stev.ah. E. Klrkland, has ·hereunto and t.o a 
d~IJcbte -hereof set hls_ hand .artd seat;-qnd the s¢d TERRESTRl-AL :[{fN-$00M OJ= GOD has 
cq~$~:d ~his irr.s~urne~to ~a. ex~caj~-!n·:~\i_pU¢ot.~ -~~ !ts duf.y :authorized ·oFfiCERS and 
TRUSTEES ,as- of the .atP-: dd\1"-ot ~tn"P« ., 19.98. 
THE TRUSTOR .(Slgner:-and Seater) 
~~ 
· stev-en: E Klr-kland.~ rrustor· 
rae.es~IAt KINGDQM·O;F ~OD 
WffNESSEO. 8¥: . :;FORJ'f.H; 'i'RUST:(Slr;;("eis,qnd Sea_lers} 
U.~an ~,epubiic 
Counfy-·=~f:Wq~}:l-Jngt_cm 
Qn lt!Jl~, d9')' o~~. l~9J; belpf~ [1'.'19 th1e1unders1gned, a Notary PubUc 
ln,ond.for-s.~q--CO:t:f· 7nd.Stq1~-! perso.hq:Jly·~ppectre-ci St.even.--E~_erson Klrk1and~ Vafdeh 
Or.Q'Jll,, -Pann:H-~--dhd. £-dwar<fQ •. :B$¢kwJth .proved to.-me on the ·bGJSls of-satisfactory 
evidence to ptl ifi~ psrsons:\1Jh-¢s~ ·-names cre··subscrfbed to t-he.--wltt"iln -lnatrument and 
qckAbWfeqg~c.1 itiaf tne1r exe9ut-ed. the same.. . 
N6.rARV'-~Ei.\L 
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ADDENDUM2 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA 
( 
GALLIAN, WILCOX, 
WELKER, OLSON & BECKSTROM, L.C. 
Russell J. Gallian (1144) 
Jeffrey C. Wilcox ( 4441) 
John L. Collins (10790) 
965 East 700 South, Suite 305 
St. George, Utah 84 790 
Telephone: (435) 628-1682 
Attorneys for Intervenors 
( __ 
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FILE·o 
MAY 1 It 2008 
[flfTH DtiSlP.r.CT OOtJRT 
~~~moo rotAm 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PENN SMITH,. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
V ALDEN CRAM, as Executive-Trustee 
under the DECLARATION OF TRUST dated 
11/26/93, operating under the name .of the 
TERREST~ KINGDOM OF GOD, 
Defendant. 
JOHN H. KIRKLAND, et al., 
Intervenors. 
ORDER REMOVING TRUSTEES AND 
VOIDING TRANSACTIONS 
Consolidated Civil No. 060501773 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to Intervenors' Motion to Remove Trustees, 
filed on April 18, 2008, and Intervenors' Motion to Void Transactions, filed on April 18, 2008. 
The time for responding and opposing each motion has expired, and each matter has been 
submitted for the decision of the Court. Having reviewed the motions, memoranda, exhibits, and 
1 
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pertinent affidavits before it, the Court hereby grants Intervenors' Motio'n to Remove Trustees 
and Intervenors' Motion to Void Transactions, as set forth more fully below. This Order is based 
on the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Penn Smith ("Smith''), Defendant Val.den Cram ("Cram"), and John Miles 
("Miles'') are currently Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust ("Trust"), and Welton 
Myers ("Myers") has executed documents on behalf of the Trust and in conjunction with Smith, 
Cram, and Miles, representing himself as "Trustee/Manager" of the Trust. 
2. Even though the Declaration of Trust prohibits any Trustee from being compensated 
for service in such office, Smith and Cram appointed themselves as "Managers" of the Trust on 
or about February 15, 2006, and began charging the Trust $50 for each hour they allegedly spent 
working on Trust matters as Trustees. 
3. A Board of Arbitration appointed pursuant to the Declaration decided on or about 
September 12, 2006, that by appointing themselves Managers and paying themselves, Smith and 
Cram committed a breach of trust. 
4. Shortly thereafter, Smith filed a lawsuit against Cram, as Executive Trustee of the 
Trust, for compensation he allegedly "earned" as a Manager of the Trust. The suit was filed in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington County, Utah, Case No. 060501773. 
5. Neither Smith nor Cram responded to the Complaint on behalf of the Trust but, 
instead, allowed a Default Judgment in the amount of $25,498.00 to be entered against the Trust 
on or about October 26, 2006. 
2 
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6. On or about October 30, 2006, Smith recorded a Notice of Lien, purporting to be 
based on the default judgment, encumbering the Trust's real property. 
7. Smith and Cram have resolved multiple times to borrow money from each other in 
the name of the Trust and have executed promissory notes in favor of each other and against the 
Trust, and such actions have been ratified by Miles and by Myers. 
8. The Declaration does not authorize the Trustees to breach their fiduciary duties of 
loyalty by entering into agreements or promissory notes with themselves or for their own benefit, 
the self-serving agreements and notes were not authorized by the Court, the Beneficiaries did not 
consent to the Trustees' conduct, ratify the transactions, or release the Trustees in any manner, 
and the transaction did not involve any contract entered into or claim acquired by any Trustee 
before such Tmstee became or contemplated becoming Trustee of the Trust. 
9. The Beneficiaries requested that such self-serving transactions by the Trustees be 
voided in their Complaint, which was filed in Case No. 060502132 in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for Washington County, Utah, on or about November 14, 2006. 
10. The removal of Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers best serves the interests of all of the 
beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable cotrustee 
or successor trustee is available. 
11. Each individual identified in the Declaration as a Beneficiary or Steward, still living, 
has executed an Affidavit requesting that each Trustee be removed and that Hylan Franklin 
Kirkland, David Rountree Kirkland, and Kevin Barton Kirkland, be appointed as successo_r 
Trustees in order to prevent further waste of Trus! assets. 
3 
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12. Hylan Franklin Kirldand, David Rountree Kirkland, and Kevin Barton Kirkland are 
each suitable cotru.stees or successor trustees and each are available for service in such 
capacities. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The "qualified beneficiaries" of the Trust, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
103(1)(h), include only the following individuals: Sylvia Kirkland; Mary Ruth (Kirkland) 
Cooper; Steven E. Kirkland II; Benjamin Temples Kirkland; Linton Coleman Krrkland; Hylan 
Franklin Kirkland; John Hudson Kirkland; David Rountree Kirkland; Kevin Barton Kirkland; 
Richard Abram Kirkland; Kirk Barton Kirkland; Daniel Barton Kirkland; James Henderson 
Kirkland; and Ephraim Barton Kirkland. 
2. All of the qualified beneficiaries of the Trust have requested that Smith, Cram, Miles, 
and Myers be removed from their offices of Trustee for the Trust. 
3. Irrespective of any breach of trust committed by the Trustees, the qualified 
beneficiaries have a right to remove the Trustees because removal of the Trustees best serves the 
interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and 
a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
706(2)(d). 
4. By, without limitation, failing and refusing to respond to or answer the lawsuit filed 
by Smith against Cram as Executive Trustee of the Trust and by allowing a default judgment to 
be taken against the Trust, Smith and Cram each violated their duty to "take reasonable steps... Gv 
to defend cla~ against the trust," as required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-809, and such conduct 
4 
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constitutes a serious breach of trust by both Smith and Cram pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
706(2)(a). 
5. By, without limitation, appointing themselves as "Managers" of the Trust and 
agreeing to accept compensation from the Trust, filing a lawsuit against the Trust to procure 
payment for such alleged services, recording a lien against real property owned by the Trust, 
resolving to borrow money from Trustees, executing promissory notes in favor of Trustees and 
against the Trust, and taking other such actions in furtherance of their own best interests ·and 
against the best interests of the Trust and its Beneficiaries, Smith and Cram have breached their 
fiduciary duties of loyalty to the Trust and its Beneficiaries and have failed to "administer the 
trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries," as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802. 
Such conduct constitutes a serious breach of trust by both Smith and Cram pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann.§ 75-7-706(2)(a). 
6. By, without limitation, executing and passing resolutions and/or promissory notes in 
favor of Smith and against the Trust, Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers have each failed to 
"administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries," as is required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-7-802. Such conduct constitutes a serious breach of trust by Smith, Cram, Miles, _and 
Myers pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-706(2)(a). 
7. The conduct of Smith, Cram, 11:iles, and Myers, including the self-dealing and blatant 
violations of their fiduciary duties of loyalty and to defend claims against the Trust, and the 
longstanding and ongoing waste of Trust Property by Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers indicates 
II 
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that said individuals are unfit for the office of Trustee or have failed to properly administer the 
trust. 
8. Because Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers have failed to take reasonable steps to 
protect Tmst property, have failed to administer the Trust as a prudent person would, by 
considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the 
Trust, and have failed to exercise reasonable care, sld.11, and caution in the exercise of their duties 
as Trustees of the Trust, and because the services allegedly provided by Smith, Cram., Miles, and 
Myers can be obtained for less money than is currently being spent by Trustees, and in order to 
prevent further waste of Trust assets by the self-dealing of Smith and Cram, removal of the 
current Trustees, including Smith, Cram, Miles, and Myers, serves the best interest of all of the 
Beneficiaries of the Trust, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-706(2). 
9. The resolutions and promissory notes passed and executed by Smith, Cram, Miles, 
and/or Myers involve the investment or management of Trust property entered into by the 
Trustee for the Trustee's own personal account or is otherwise affected by a conflict between the 
Trustee's :fiduciary and personal interests, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802(2). G) 
10. Because the Declaration does not specify an individual to act as successor Trustee in 
the circumstances that present themselves in this case, and based on the w1animous consent of 
the qualified beneficiaries, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-704(3), the Court concludes that 
Hylan Franklin Kirkland, David Rountree Kirkland, and Kevin Barton Kirkland are suitable 
Trustees who have all agreed to accept appointment as Trustees of the Trust and to serve without (6;; 
compensation. 
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ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, and after consideration of all evidence and argument 
received, the Court hereby grants Intervenors' Motion to Remove Trustees fil?.d Intervenors~ 
Motion to Void Transactions and ORDERS as follows: 
A. Bach of the Trustees and Managers currently holding such offices on behalf of the 
Terrestdal Kingdom of God Trust, including, without limitation, Plaintiff Penn Smith, Defendant 
Valden Cram, John Miles, and Welton Myers, are hereby immediately removed from such office 
on the following alternative grounds: 
a. Each Trustee, by allowing the waste of Trust assets, by entering into 
agreements serving the best interests of only other Trustees and not the 
Beneficiaries, by failing and refusing to protect Trust assets .against claims, 
and by breaching the fiduciazy duty of loyalty required by Utah law, has 
co~tted a serious breach of trust, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-
706(2)(a); 
b. Each Trustee, because of the long-running, persistent, and continued self-
serving and breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, is unfit, is unwilling, or 
has persistently failed to administer the Trust effectiv~ly and removal of each 
Trustee best serves the interests of the Beneficiaries, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-.7-706(2)(c); or 
c. Each qualified beneficiary has requested removal of each Trustee, and the 
Court has found that removal of the Trustees best serves the interests of all of 
7 000393 
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the Beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the Trust., 
and a suitable cotru.stee or successor trustee is available, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann.§ 75-7-706(2)(d). 
B. Any and all transactions or resolutions entered into by the Trustees on behalf of the 
Trust that involve the investment or management of Trust property entered into by the Trustees 
for the Trustees' o-wn personal account, or which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the 
Trustees' fiduciary and personal interests entered into at any time on or after May 14, 2006, are 
hereby void~ Such transactions include, without limitation, the following: the Default Judgment 
entered on or about October 26, 2006; the Notice of Lien recorded on or about October 30, 2006; 
the Resolution to Hire Reed Braithwaite as Attorney to Represent Trust, including its resolution 
to borrow $2,000 from Cram to pay attorney fees, dated November 17, 2006; the Resolution and 
Promissory Note dated November 30, 2006; the Promissory Note dated December 11, 2006; the 
Promissory Note dated January 8, 2007; the Promissory Note dated February 12, 2007; the 
Promissory Note dated May 14, 2007; the Resolution and Promissory Note dated May 14, 2007; 
the June 2007 Resolution to borrow money to pay Smith $2,160; the July 2007 Resolution to 
borrow money to pay Smith $1,705; the Promissory Note dated September 4, 2007; the 
Promissory Note dated October 24, 2007; the Promissory Note dated November 14, 2007; the 
Resolution and Promissory Note dated December 3, 2007; the February 2008 Resolution 
admitting that the Trust owes Smith $74,116.88, plus interest; and any and all other and further 
resolutions entered into by Trustees purporting to create a debt or obligation of the Trust to any 
Trustee or any insider of any Truste~. 
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C. Hylan Franldin Kirkland, David Rountree Kirldand, and Kevin Barton Kirkland 
(collectively as "Successor Trustees") ar~ hereby appointed to be cotrustees and successor 
trustees of the Trust pursuant to the unanimous consent of the qualified beneficiaries. 
D. Smith and Cram are hereby ordered to provide within two weeks from the entry of 
this Order any and all records, minutes, resolutions, documents, records, bank accounts, 
checkbooks, or other information related to the Trust to Counsel for Intervenors, who will, in 
tum, provide such information to the Successor Trustees within two weeks of their receipt 
thereof. 
DATED this __jL day of May, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable James L. Shumate 
Fifth Judicial District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct, unsigned, copy of the above 
and foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this ~ day of May, 2008, to the following: 
Reed R. Braithwaite 
REED R BRAITHWAITE, P.C. 
50 East 100 South, Suite IO 1 
St. George, UT 84770 
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ADDENDUM3 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA 
CM.LLIAN. WiLKER & BECKSTROM L. C. 
- . ' ...... ; . . . . .· . . . . . . . . . . t 
~. F.-R~mm1et·(tS.(i~} 
r:.!h:¢istop.h~ A.-4.m.~ (l4074)' 
9~:~•7{)0·$?~---~e-:~'M-
St :G~, Utah 847.tl . 
Te~~6n~~ {43~-!ii$~1_.-682 
F.acsilmle: {433).-K,2:8-956~ 
Wlr:1:m1mfoF~ca:se.oom 
elund®.n:uib.oasitcom ·· · 
OOE&v.ENOns,·.1\ml\iORANI>tmi IN 
OPPO'SITI.ON TO MUTIONFOR. 
st1A1i\URY ruilGMENT 
vA.tPm~ as Exec:utiv.e-Tlttittee \ Cori:s.~li&ted Civil No. Q$Q.S:0111~· 
undertbe D£CLAR.Atro1~fbft.ItOST. 
da:~d ll/2:fi/93~ =aper~ unded:µ~::~a~e <if · fudge; 1-arn.es.L( Shuinate 
tne·TERRESTIU.A:-t KiNGD.dM·bF 991?~:-
JOHN Ii.. ICIRKLAND~ .et·al., 
... · . 
. . . . . . . . . · ..... 
~
1¢p0.t$, ·1,1. ~ndJ~1tQu~-th~)$V-.1Qffi~s o.f'.Gijli~ W¢lker. & -~kstrom~ LC., herebr 
·submit ~eh-·J\tmiorandu1:1:1 in .Opp.0Sltl.on::t.~·Motion.-fu1~ Summary fudgmenfas follows: 
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'Ilµ,-s c~· C.elite.rs .qn .a Trust.-ore.$d bythe-d~ea:sed $~vei1. Kirkland it11e T1ustot") Bit the 
eJid:,Gf 1 g93· .. P-Iaitltrff and intei~:m:'1on.Defendants-(~llecti!s/e1y '\Defendants'') are· all trustees .. -0f 
the Ti'I:mt. Plah1tiff Fem-Smith .("Smitli'')tse.eb:pl!YJD.ent·of $251,:749.·.f.or ·serving as ~e TrU$~ 
Man~o-er; The benen.ciarles ·.of the· T-~st e~tet.¥eni.ctti'}1n'.~,~<~-intetv~hed to:_ (l }.stop SD;tjth .ft.om 
obtafilfug .th~ ~~um he· ,seeks .as Trust.M~ager.,. (7). dis.s_olye the. trust, G>r (3) r-emove·.all 
Def-end~ffroizj .:therr pqsitio;Q,S:~s b.:11s.t~. mefen.~tS·Qpp~e.--.di.ss.ohmon •-OC; removal :_an,d. 
support Smhh1s ea..nnings. 
Defenii.a.nts· fil-ed a Motion.for.'&mmiary\.tud~ent('!'-Msii'). 21 day.s b.efore'triw is 
seneck1le<t' to be~i)t fu-Ab_efr·MSJ· D~~nd~M·in:*-6:·~ ·m:·mn··;at~ments'· ~e~~g ~lf their tii-efu.e 
that: :any fai1ures· ~ ~xe~uting the-trust .doeiltne~.-shol;lo he· ignored, the Pefendants/Trustees-
sho-uld not :P~ :remQved ·-~ecaru!e the Tr~sto:r. wantedtbem to. be u1:1stees and they have not 
'!:>reached theirJi<lu.c~ary. •tiutjes; a.1:1d.: ti.1e:Trnst .aUn-ws .fur:-Def.endant S'mith to -rec.e1ve th~-p.ayment 
be seeks as Trust:.i\4anag~r~ N~~eless~ suntmary:juq_ginen.tis only :&pp1~pruite_,,;hen '~ere.is 
no ge.m:tifie lssrre:as ·to ab.;!)imatedal .. @lcl't; ~t.nfqfu mov~-palfty.'::is,ent1d.ed to a ·judgi.n:e3:J.t -~s 8:-
matt~ of1a,,,/·,ut$:;E{.q_~,~~~ s~~c), 
ill.•tl~-p~es~nr ca~; thei-eiat:~JnullipJ.~~~~~tm.a~~- faqt; Inteiy¢Q,1;~ ~ert~~t a 
coriditio1a-pre~~-W.-·~e;T111st .fil:t'led :~.~~ f~.~-m pia,-c;~in-~~t the )A~~ aiiut$~~rdship 
A~e~~ .. ~:cli.wer~ :~~ w.iwle ~~r$.:<t-dftb.efTu•i S11ch:fh.aUhe 'trust is. inva1M:. liowe-v:er:~ 
. -even :1f·the'T~:,~:gs'1ra.1id> ti.etendants:naw.ht:eacbeli:·atlimst 11du~ ·.bw.ed:tc:t.futeI"{eliOtSr"BS 
fiduciaties; 'tt1.elu~g.-1!ll~wili~-:Sntlth/to.nbtah.1: a d~ui~3u&-~1eht~samst the T1.ust ,vithout:even 
notifyn\g:I.nterv.enqrs. of tho litigation. Therefo.1·e11 the cburt hair ample ·grounds to ~ove 
2· 
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D~:as ~~ ~~~i,; Snntli-'$.!Cl- f@t· '~.ensa'litm.,asTiust Msnagerave 
Qutta~"US·i•inoonsist-ent :w~-1be tenu.-.:affhtf Tffls; .. w thet $~ ag~inst 1he imerifnf fl:le TntSter . 
. ~. DISPUTED· FACTS. 
' ... ·.. . 
Inl'ffl!~~ors.~ ·r.e.sp_onse1·p:en~ .. Ct:a.m 1·s .sfutem;enf ~Qntvadicts·testimon.y he.provided 
duci11g ms ·depqsititra. in.-whfoh ·he·staied ifut.the.=o.niyllad..ihdke.ct involvement in drafting the 
trust: 
tt~: -bid fail lmMe an~t·tt'f<I~ w.1$-;t-he:~ .~~:th:~:~ ... rtust~ 
k Prom$iy·iJ+au-~~(~m J :@~~f.'fhiti.;k dir-ectlji. Fr1'!!lfA~fd·n,is. !d:eas., a.nd It~.he._prpsemed 
them w_.S~ and ~v.¢-p~~~. ,/f$:~,C....P.~I?:o~.YQlµ,n;wJ. at 13:l7-23j .attached 
he1:eto as Exliihit,A. 
"Q: .... can ·you tell me whatpatt .ot'tbe 'trust. that y.ou ·or.eate.d1-
A~ No,.t:ctUmot, r~I-don.'Hmdkit·was aµytbing.qirectly .. Ithfu.ic-itwas inditec.t .. :.I don·'± 
lffmtremb:~~¢1-ia~v~g-~~~ fufl\ieQ.~'gn·I1;Ji~1 'ftµstt' /.d.~· at21 !5;:;23'; 
A~t~ q.f'V~l~ e.!~ f~agr~m:dJ.~ ~ pai1fcip~te.tf).ij::fbe-pl~mg;and:~x~uti6n 
of.~{J)e~si:·~nd~st~rp~jr:H~:At~etits li~fqr~Mr ... ·K.fr~~iand'.ts:li.~mh/~ 
fnt~~en..or~ r.e&f-10.n&e.1 .~ny. •. •Cra.n:i!:13_:statern:enf.cqutradfots-testimony he pr-ovided 
durin:g hia/depGsitkm•.m·-wliifihhe. =stat-ed·.-fua:t :the t:mistees had:to: fi~;e:out $:o:tn .scratch .what the 
Testatotw@ted~in th~--t~1tf:ait4 St¢W~~nip.:~gre~m:~4j;s:h:~~S¢·$~th~d-mj. dir.eclion;:n;tm1· 
tJ.re·Te$tator.hefbre :his.death~: 
. .. ' .- . .... ... . ..: .. - .... 
"QC. •:•at~.1$.(say.m&that. Y.Pii~.-n~etle.4 dfreetion fr.qrir]fmi ~f tli~fr,o:u ¢id .riot? 
3 
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A~. I'm·,•g we wse.d ditectfon frmnbim. (ih~ Te,Stat{)t}:.-. Jit v.i~O.uld be.much :easier than to 
strut from-gri0und zero- an-cl bui1 d your awn. ~•.IrJ~ at .57~-9 -1.S. 
-Pai1~p"h 4>of1\fSJ: ''After said-cemr.ey.a:o.:ce; ·~~-T~f dintat:C,4:'tliat·'";.Ahe TR.l)STOR 
and=TRVS'T.pES sp:aj.i :issu~ STEWARl)SF-D.P.S· .fot:a11d ~~)lg;rd·es~t¢:]?-E'.NBFICIARiES 
w#l1 signed LEASE and.:SIBWA:R[J~_f[f:~'AOR;EE~NTS .. /' .Said ·a:greements were !Ssued as 
d~s~d.aho¥.e1_aoooamng tQ th~tesm.11:on:y:QfD.~naleneBr~dy, who 'helped .. Mr~Kir-lcland 
Ln.ter.Y.eno.rs··, Resp-onse: · Deny~ lnre1,1enors dispute that Leasefand Stewardship 
A.gt~ements were-ev~r tSsued·. Even if:D-0J1aj•~e· BradJr's tes~ony is-to.be believ.ecr and the 
cir-culating, .distnbati0:g~ -or ~ubli&hing/~ "Issue.&' is~rle-fined :as. #To= be. .. circuiated or.~ublislieii.'=:t 
See F' AfU.EX, The Fre:e 'Diatio.nai"y (i:9~9), .http~/lW\\ilvlthefr.eadlctio11acy.ccnw'issued. 
Patagi.~apli':;8· ofl\tsih ~'In,ad~ti6ti:to·t1le.-afore111-e11tione4 autb'britY. :gtiven to tJ:i~- Trustees 
(see p~tagtaph.5~.-~upr~), the 1\i-istg~-vo ~<fT.ros~<l?~tld ~n~·J;weepfu_g ,1,a'\3/ets •.. "I'· 
p~v,ef$. of-t4e:·tt.qs1~e.e.S.-.-~-~-1n10,a4l andJrwee~gP · 
'.P:at~~ph--·8(e) -~f MSJ! *' .... there. -shall be _paid .con1p:e11eati.-0u to~-~.:.offloers, Ot 
agents., •• whfoh shall. b-e ned. and paid at :flie d.iscr~tio.n of'1he: TRU'STBES •.• jhduding 
reimbursement for ~mt 9f pock~t.~xpe~ses ihc~m.~~; ~y. ~~:' ~irS7'.EES ·~· ,; {Paragtapl:11 i). ,-,. 
fi!ti~t,'#R-P~:'· Re.sp9~e.r-mtet1j~qr.~Jobj¢.~t t~t$.~. ~p~{l.~4 :~p~atjtjn 9f f-l\rati.~h .¢.lJ 
of the Tri.i_st'.siriee.Jt -allischaracterJ,zes the.-.di~cietfonJ:1;J.1~·tnu~Ji{iv.~:;ip,'.p~~-oiieer$~ 
4-
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GO~~ns-aiion}J" mad .t~Any-:o.e.mpensatioo pailo.th-eriis:to b&-that:us.ttaUtpaid f.or .su.cli v.iTOrk. '0 See 
Trust ·at -,rl l-t attached-.hei=eto aa .&hihit B. . 
Paragraph 1~ -0fl[S_J~·-Q1'i~ the 3'~ -0f ~i?°eta~.n,g:~.e-1Jrµ~, ·1;rustee P~ Sinith.was. 
~p~futed ri1:t¢gg~1~ythe.Baanl i>f'f•~~~~~d-~~;p:erlmttoo. t9-.~epa.id_:$;S.-O ~ hour .fodtls 
s.e1i~ries.;,,..,~dd,ifi~~Y:, l.Vl,t ~ithJi;i~µtr®.~)'-~ut"":0£-~o:cltet~e..n:s.es. fur hiswqrk>;pq~ .as a 
Trostee··ancl.Manage.r.~.,Said wages, Wit:llmter-est, --totafti52;J.49 . .and said.out-of.;poeket~penses. 
total .$6,S'OQ .. ·H 
"in-ter-,reno•ts•i Res).>~irs·e:-·1\~~-'fute&-etio!$ d~ not den.i that D.efe~daut &pith. ~~-seeltiog 
reiml:iu.rs~.¢rrt for _oµt-.of~ocl~.:,~~~tis~ -oi~ ~4$.~~7,49 fu-wage~~ Inle~.·v~Qrs deny that. such 
sums-are ow-ed tQ .iJefep.dant Smith. 
1. the Tras.t · states that the Truston·aod .Trustees shall ''is.sue .s·trevlardships'~ -to the 
Beneficiaries. when. the Beneficiaries have sig11ed·i.e.as-e BJ.id-Stew-ard.$hlp Agreements ~(''LS 
t\gre~nerits1: that ~ere._:preptged:¢.ld ~v.et.e~. ~}ao~~~.with P:a;ra.gi:apli -6- of the Trust-See· 
2.. +bl.i~i:1~t~f!i~t.tb~ T1viJo1:-~hall'.:pr~p2l:[e~~- deli.vet LS A~eem¢g,ts to .fhe 
B.en.:efici,arl~s • .&_<!._-e ~-a{ ,to~ 
3.. 
trustor·ruitt the T-.mste~~- Id. 
005469 
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·Qt .Ama . .did :~iu kna.w wh-e'ther ·or·not ·he nad·ts· AgreementS·plq,ared ·and:rea.dy? 
A: t belie,~elie:did ·H:owever~."1 oi<i,n-o.t--mter :See th$1Jil.. 
Q: Okay.. Y:o-n -Qever ·sigµ~-- th~? 
A:N.o. 
5. ·tiier-e-is_.no evide11oe thatthe 'r~cr ,deliv.ered .LS. A~reemen:ts ttrthe 
Reneficitlries. 
6. ·tdsJuil~ted i.ssu-e,het\\"'e~n?tbeparties :as-tc(v.lhetlfer the T~tor ev.ef even 
pr.epar«i LS ~~ts,.befnre ~s d.eath.. 
.. $ee Smiili.-Depo at 8.1 :5.-ll; a.$che<i:ht~J•e.tG as-E1e1i'ibit tt 
·g. Ctam -adinits tha.rh~ .dfd· not.fuforo1 J:arerve11or.s_ t11~::Sini.th had filed a lawsuit 
Exhibit A a.t 17-5~9-1 S. 
mr,ca.ll•ai}~: $ere:Ex;hib,it:J3-:atw,$.~ 
fD., JJefendatn:S -did: .®t~1it1islul or-aft~f'.a-.LS:1\~-eement un:ti:f. at least :2{i0'4, y.~ .after 
tlie-cieam.·iqttha~Ttj.i.s.lQ:i; Sfeve:tt'Kiiktand~ SetfMmutes:ufti1e meeling:6tb ~ gt\ .. and 9-tb 1neetmgs of 
the Bo~4. qf"T~,.·~ohe~ h~~~-1i$. ~bits:E/L.?; a114 ·G:·.~p~6tively.. 
in mtmaiors~· Amended Complaint, Counterru.a:im., C:roBS-Cl~ .and Third-Party ·Complaint 
6 
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e'lntenreme-rs' ~m.plamt'~}- $-ee lnt-ervener~·! t!Qmpldnt.:at191Ctan.d Defendants' Answerto 
~ended -~mpl~infetnm:t-er Clain.\ Cto.ss~Ctiilin, ,aru1 Third.-Part.y <)o~pl-amt {~~cram ·and 
Sm.i:tli't Answer'') ·at 9:122~ • 
2013,just.:1:lir.~~ weel.ai·b:~~re. the:tdm ~ -~cheduled tQ :001~enoe~ -~s_, instead :0f:i;~1:eparln:~ for 
tiw~ Interveaors Me~forccil i:o:.addtess--·thi$ .MSland take time:away. fr.omw-~axati,Gn. 
Compo:rmd:mg the trtal ·prep arafio.n issue .. is:that Defendants .. s:til1,hav-e not produced. pretrial 
-disclosate,f(whioh wer-e.dueJm·.Mfey sj 2.:0l3). j®.lt1~g.Iutmv~n0rs in: ~:e: da1t:as te the e.1ti~enc~. 
and ~vitnesses D~feru:lams· fo:terid to-rise'. lttrid 
• ,! •• ' •• • ••• • ..... ,,. •• ··-., ";•. • •• 
Seaond1yJ there ar~ gentJitje is9*-es:-"?f material fact· regar4m.g .eacli is~_e. raised in their 
MSJ. See Utah R.Civ.P.-, 56{c). Def-epd~ :provide.~ix.main-ar~ments in-sup.Port oftb:eir MSJ; 
(A} the. _court can-·refonn. a tiust and· ~or:e an-)'· ~ures to fulfi]I. -conditions ·o( the trust if it is 
wh:al: the Ttusttfi .. w.ould want {aj•·fl·ie. Ttustor intended his trust to-continue after his .death:; -(C} 
there is no-~ause tot -~etnov.a.i ◊f~~ tr~~~es, {P}:~~~ ar~ :t:ltre.e ~om ~-Ifl~ be-pres~~t. 
f6r:ren10:v1i:i,f a~¢. »~r llCA-:§J.5 .. 1~1.n~., ·bu;t thes~~~:er~ti~. ha~-~; b~ ~ {E).J;he 
frus.teeS:sho.Jllih16.i:b~ ~.ay_ed ~ecaµS:e .. the T-rusfur wantea·t}l~. fo )e trustees; and."(Fj..M(. 
Smith'·s:wage c1aiin-is•vali4because,t.he-ti:u~t-alk)w~: the_p:aym.:ents.he·s:ee'ks-. As.the:&f10win_g 
sectio_.ns. oottmei each.-of De!enclmrt.s~ ar~e.nt;S in favor-o.f summ~rt judgment. faiL 
Ill. 
Ill 
Ill 
1 
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i Tn:e.:eoin:~f may·i~fu.r-ill tli.e;term.s·.nf ;a.tnits-t ·ONLY ifthere.wJts ·a mistake of 
fact·orhl'1V. · · · · · · 
D~fendants•clt~-rp UCA. f~:S~1·4,1~_~jqtt1i~Jjropo1;uipn -~_the c~rt c¥1-~p.iy ~fol;ID 
the 'tetnts-•Offfi,e:'Ti¥:$t_i~·-.~t-ow L~e. ~~J~~~~t-4"c.eril.~11t~Jo ,b.e-~1ed- $Olelyby-T1ustees. 
See MSJ at &4lf1 ~ However.; Derend-ants .m.-e,-ii.1.-cqrrect.in. t,hejr jntei:pretatfo11 of the -statute, which 
s~tes: 
The. :00ui1 may refoim the nm.ms of a· tr.11St ev-etrifunambiguorui~ t'O conform. the 
fut1ns:to "the· -s.~l~.t's inten~on:jflt: tS.· pr-o,~ed.-.by c1ear- .ano oo.nvincing evidence that 
boili the.;9.ettlor!s. fufent and -the.·t~rfu.s--0f-theJ1u-st \\'er-e -aff e:ct{¥d by ·.a ·mis.take of 
Qiet. o.r· l'aw, whetlrer in exp:fe~~11 or inducemin.t · · · · · 
§75-141 S {em.phasis :added}. ·«1A mistake of fact' is:where .a.person understa.rids fue, facts-to be 
other th.an they at~; whet~ a.in.istake of Jav/ is where.~ pen;on kttows :th~ f.acts .as they really 
at(\ but has.a ·mistaken -beiief as to theJe.g-al' :eonsequ~hees··_of tli~e fac~" 'People v.. Lali{arr) 20 
C:~l.Ztl 1QS~ 12g·p.24 ~~:?°> 34$ (1·9_4f). 
In-tl1ip.i~~~,.~~ pey.~n4_nt$~v.~ -cited to no,tuigtak.e·,o.f fow· or-:f.adt= th.at.ted.'•the, 
t~!:$S-~t-the;itnlsl'ESS$tfaUy,. all th~:n,~fe.udd-have.arglledii.that ~ytbmk tlre. 'Festator 
. . .. 
ir;sued. -selely by· D:~fetidants. -~-.MSJ at-$;,rl .. Hb'1{-ev.e;;~ .D~fendant' ~ -~ssei-tion _doe$ p.ot 1,ro:vid.~ 
th.e Juthof$ty:1o.: ~: eourt)iµ~r § 15/( ... 4J::S tg -~~ 1:be Ti-:g~fas-tb.~re ·was::nq ·a;nistake ol':faQt·-o.r 
Fi)tJi1~m191~,, ·wm.:¢ De£enaan.ta,are. sµg~e@n~ .contradfe.~··fhe. Testator! s-mtensions i!S 
fo:unti-in .the Ttus't.":ll.1e·Tru.st: sta.t.es-.t.hat the Trustor.·.sfia:Irpr.epare. 'and -then deiiver ts 
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Agreements "to ·'tite~beneifoiari'es: that.-are· .s"{gned ily\iin mid. the Trost.e~. See -Exhibit B at ~Yts-.5. 
The Ttust is c1ear··lbm itis:the· TrnstGr.'s-~o~ibi~1fyfu.p.~are and· d~li:v.er _signed LS 
Agi_e_em."~1:it:at;·~-· L~~-to roakeit~hundari:t!y-tjearth.a~fher~s;ees did~t-have_th_e 
pPW.et re. issµ.e,ih~ ~rlgiha.tL.S A-greem.epts, ~:Trustor .~dds the following language.: ·"tbe 
-tr,ugt~es •alt llQt l>e.·t\Uth~e4 to··issLJ,e ·any-stewardslµp.Jn addition-to ·flrose originally- specified: 
ex~ep± as r.epla~en;ts fuv oth'er·l3.en.efici:anes .... ~- Jii:. at ·1]. Jn other words,- -the Trustees .are only 
authorized to issue L$. . .A;greem-ents to ·tl1e-heits of .an..o~afB.enenc~ aftertbe on·girul]. 
Beneficiaryl 1'tlid bfld ii.O®p.ted·a S-.tevta~dsh:il?, ~P~ di'ed.. 
cl~ar. in his inten~~ that~n1y-J1e~w.cm:1t b.~ .alfoW¢4:tP.·p~~e ~.d .d~er th~ origin.Erl LS 
Agre.ements. Furfuerm.-ore;. Defendant .Ptam.'s··eseruons in hl.s .affida,.,itr-egaraing wbat·tbe 
Tiu..i;tor would hav-e·w:anted··at-enotlnn.g:.more fh:an sp.eeu1ation b.y an interested party. 
~ .. The Trotor's-des1.r.e~o:ha.ve .. a tias.tendur.:e be\1,0:ndhis death is'frr=elevant to the_. 
que~~~ '.6£ lliieth,er ther-e•.is_·,a v:alid-~m;~ 
D:efen.daais ·esSe.ri1ia11y argµe:'.tb.at tms.eomt-sbould. ignore .,any failed 0011ditions _ prec.e.dent 
beeause-the'T~t littiiis:·ease.wantoo -'th:e·1n;ist.to::ne valid::and :oontfu.ue afh~i' his death .. 
If.q"~t.~ it-is im:tp~m.ita! ~1h¢'$.e.t or~.t:~ T.~Wt·Wanted"tP:etrust .. ~-cqntinµt}a~erhis de~l~i 
A~ <i:o.es-n~t :b.e¢ome-~d.:in Uttila)S1t;bptfb~¢ .;tlii{trusijr" int~Bd?¥1 iU¢.'h~.\~µ.q. -A ~ 
in utali-is. \1alid .only when. th~ statnto1;y. requirem~n~··a~e m~_ 
In :th~ p~seut.:case, .h,.te,rvenon;,.asse.ii·tbat.a C®.ditfon :p:r;ecedent filited;,· 1n;~-th(}. :trust 
m1;ralid.. Nmnely:, llit-erYenm-s ax-gue that itw.as.:a material p.r-0:vision?d.fthe T:r.ust that the TI.ustor .. 
. . 
1 
•Get:taifuj}\ wlieli a ,pers.-cin atte.mpts-to -set:~p-,a,1fust-it is ·because.he wants his proP.ortyio .be mannged accordingfo 
tne=·teJ3$:0ftbe;1rust 
9. 
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~-d··fl~ itllsi~S·-.issue.LS A:w.eem.eats tp: th:e~4~~ed. b-eu,.fidarJea. .,, id~ ;Bl; 11,rs:..16. 
F-u,rtl1.~0.r.~t ~-e :Trust siat;es ht the "'T1":Us.t<,t -sh.-at:pvepare an.tfd·eli~er1,··the LS ~eem·ents to 
the benefidaiies- tnat. wer~ -si~d by toe· Thilslbf;aru.l ~tees_~.l,rl.. ~~-,t,4 Y~t, d~.pit~ these 
requirements,iit isim:~i.sp:a~a th-st.; :(lltlle:'.ri11S~e.s-~~-sigµ_ed.L$,Agr~e#.1~ts ~h.!it.wei.-e 
Agre~m,etits: to ilie-~~a,1,i~s. -~~r~it~.i,s-,:a.:di~:g:W.i$$n~ "t>-et.w~e1i. file parties. as to 
whether &~ 1fi:us.to,r: e:v-er-e:v~n :pr~ared.'I.$ A:gree.ments .. bdor:e-.bis death.. 
-C4 'tnta.wn'O.ts .have abun.dant -e-'rid~n.:ce diat,Defencbnits htve brea.choo their: .fidu-ciarv 
d11:tles as ttusteei · 
Def-e~t~ nJ~e .. the::'bald M'.S~rtl:on withmtt-.aay :explanatien or .support ±hat f<Jnterv.ei1ors. 
hav:e no evidence" tliat .. b~fendants b.i~-chal~aridia.ciar:1,-<luties. See MSJ at 9:,t2·. To the 
contttaty, Interv.enots ha,~e abundant .. evi:{!:ehce lha.t'o.er~Jidiw.~ b.t~1:ed :their-dutie-s~ .cteating 
gehuilie imies of ~aterlai fa;~t.· Th~:-fo11o~iing_B:f~ ~-~. few· ex~~ples: · 
Judgi~e11t to .~:e.-?ntered ~~~t tbe· t-11l$t.fqr$2~;4~$-l)th~ ·or·.a'Qout0$tab..er .lo; ioot .See' 
~nors·~ Co-mpiaint.at>1(:ii; .. a.nd :CtlUUJ1ru.f'sw&~a..Answ« at ·9.:¢i: .. 
m Uiaht :trusteesJaaw.e-~:duty.to.xlefanti:ff:wust:ag~taw ·$11its •. UCA §75~7 .. 809. states: 
S(A Ir-UStee,=sliaU ~e:reasonab1e,l3t~ps ~ii .. ~f~r~ :eJ~11n~ iof~ ttost, and ·10 -¢efelid claiib.$ a:gamst 
~-trust/' S;ee ~Sp SNO~ CH_/{1$TJJJilS!J}f-4~lJii .. Lin.~et.W, ·ZO 13 ·\JT 15.ijf67 (a 
special fi-dil@.al'Y. ha~=-8/'¢ontiµm1Ji:dµty ~:d~f(md tl1i tr$t i\gah.,1stlitigatiort")~ In.fue :Preser,:t 
ca.se, l).~,xdants/ttus~es -admit.that :\Uey-cho~ not_t:o defend the Tolst agftfast a law :suit br0ught 
by P.eni1 Smith fat $25!49.&'00~ ·there.fore. titey-ha.ve breach«l th~w dtitr to '4efend. 
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Interv.enots elte~e:.that-De.fe11d-ts. b.re.ae'he.ci.ihmt -dmy ts- keep·-the.::i:teaeiidanes.·hlfo.rmed 
h~ ~g:-othett!lin;gs, ~.to tell fhe,B:mefioiaries.::ihatPenn SmitbJiad file,lsoit.~~-the, 
Trost.Ufitrl aft:er P-.enn Smnt~:~tainett .a de~~tjti~nt an~lpla~···a::J.ien. on -~~·Trnstpr.op:etf;y_ 
See·'I11ten1e1iers~ ~mpiaint atffl4"•.S5-8~. £?efeadan:t Penn ~-:idmits. that he :did not infonn 
the .B~eijci~ tµaU1e:w.afgomt ttr~ tlle ~ . S.ee J⇒.~bft-D. ,at 8 f:5-12. Defendant Crail:l 
a4Jnits,·that he -dld·not mfQnn ~e .$'ellefioiaties. that Smith had:Ghtafaed ·a defitult judgm~n± and 
pfucecf ir.li:en -01t the:T:rust l)topert,-. See-Exhibit A at 175.~9.-Ht 
futervenots al·so.allegethat,Del&idants breached'-their duty to protect 1lust property per 
Uc-A P>-:1:-&0:?t QA f:tJ1~~-shail)~ke_r~9jlal}le '.steps to take «)ll~O~ ,of-~d p#>fect ·the··trµst 
property/'' In the pr~s-~t -~am(Dereqrf@is.~low~~ .a .d~aµJt j~dgQient against th~ Tr~t fqr 
$25,49&00-~d then De~~dant fenn ·smith :fil~ .a. li-en against the Tiust property for. tbe BPlOmit 
Yet, .-th~ Trost expUcitly s~s!.-'iilie·Tt.ustees o{tllis Trust shaU 1iaveJ,011i1er to. lend money 
. . 
withoat:usury. .•. -o:r·w b<ltto:w. funds/but--:.at-ll:o .. ti:nie·mar Trost. real property-ass·ets be :used ·as 
. eoiiate1~~"'-Ss-e .Exhibit- ·:a= •at ,iiK Th~se,~e j~t ,a-:(~,v-exanw.I~s-:of befen~nts" bteaohes .. 
Itji~efy.eti9*~~ ~~.g~a,: ~ight Of#.:~~~$: ~f t¢o9n_'iel~g 't(>·f~¢f.¢n.d)l~-' 11t~aches .of~ir duti~ 
an.c1.n~\(e .. t;~ijen9¢.~s.up1i~rf:'t;h~-~~~ Th~r¢.f~t~ this. ~~e ·is.-.nQt:iipe·~r-~umm~ jildg1iient. 
D~ D·efoodattm:M·tb:-a.ddress a1tconditlons,.11nder ~,.hiclt Utah law· aUov.1-s fol~ removal 
of ·idnutee:,pe(m~1.~1U.6.r .. . . . . . . .. . . 
Dtf¢n4:a$:~g~~t1ilii~.a·:~ateP.:.can: qn.ly pe~.r~mci~a..jfthe:three 90~-oitjoris fu1.µ1d -in 
UCA ~:7S.-c7 .. 7:Q~(2~dJ.~e:$_atf.sttimf:l1qw~vers: Uefe11.~tiu~pl~it1y fails t9, mentioq. that-§75-7 ~ 
10o:pmi1itles sev.ei.-at :Gfller·~tllls-fu.ritlte-. .r-.. errH,\t-ali),fi-tr.us.tee: 
11 
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(1) The-settler, a rob.ustee, .or a qualified. bencllciary may.request 1he. -e.o:urt u:;: 
reiriove. a~$~~; -oc. ~ ira~te~ n·uty be temoved_ by the 100mt on its 0wn initia:tive. 
(2) the:.eourt:may tem0~tea trustee.if 
{~) th~ •tru~tee .has ,eo~d. a~~riGlfS br~p. of tnist; 
{b) laclt.-of. ,po0per~·1i: f$m.Qng-~otmstC?~ .s~h~ti:ally .. Ullpairs the 
admmistniti.ou-of fue trust; 
{-c) b.~.ause of ~tness.;. $.Wil:{¾.~i:}$$~ qr persistent :fai'll:ti~•of $~_trustee 
te ,adm:intstet the,trust ·eff-ectively~ the -c-oun.-;d:atermmes that remo-vatof.the. 11-ustee 
best ·ser,iei 'the·'i:tit~ests-ofl:he beneijbiarles;-Qr · . 
{-d} :there has been .a substaima'l° cha:itge .. of·eir6tlmstances .bT;·femova:l 'is 
requestel by all -pf the qualified b~ficlmi-es,. fh.e t'Aurt. iiQ.ds thatrerooval .of tne 
ttn~tt?8·b~t ·serv~s ilie. interests of:an oft1i.e b'.en·e~ciarl:e:$. a1:1a ~ ·not in~i.sfonl 
with a.matmai- purpose of.the trust; .and a:suitab1~- ~oh:u:$.tee or :suueessor .. tnlstee. as 
.availabl~... · 
i. Defendants have committed. serious: lbreaches offol:1.St and. have. persistently 
failed to administer ~e ~sf -~ffectlv.el)C . 
As pte?\ijously indi~~t~, lrit-<?IY·e1iors lj.a,,e.-.a,UegetFa~d p.ave· eviderice. t11at the. Defendants 
have committ~ seriqus breaches. of trust.related· to -their fi4uc-ia:ry·d.uties .. 3 Also,, Defen.dants.have 
persistentlyfailed to- adln.ini.st~r the trust ~ectiv~ly. For :example, fur the Trust to work there 
must be LS Agreements m effect. See ·Exbfuit B at 3:15-6 .. Yeti from. its creation hi 199'3 to May 
22;_ i.001,.Defendants_fail~ to· b~in draftfalg LS_: A>W,~~meil~S. $ee,~o~t .B. T.hen fa Ocio.ber:of 
2~2, D~fe~~ repoifthey ~e. -~t.ill:··edWirig ,tl dJ;afi~·.$¢.c{Exhiblt Ir~. Fi~UY,j_, ~ 2~04,,.-qver t¢n 
y~.miei ~~)rust. d9~;11~t-~~:s-,igiJ~t1~e¢i.u:a'.t¢~ irJ,qj:c~~-~~tLS:Ag;ree~¢n~·. wet~· sentt? 
th.e ·aeneficlzjes, to' ~}"}e)r/: 4 s~ ~,rnj'.b,ii {t 
Ill 
3 This ·me~or~duin w~iild·~~ ~tteinetfieng~): if1:mer.Y-enors· wer.-e:to:-fuuiimcrate.·aii 'Im) e-v1dence. in. suppGtl pf 
their daiihs for:bf¢aokes .bf.liuI)(_. . .Hb"..,e~ier, ltiten1eb0.rs•~y~ alrt;atly:pfo\Plded. tlie co.urt:willf.son1e-eYid.eri~e 
regartlin,g'l)efundants., breaolies-·of-theit duties tG-defe.il~ ,ulfollll, liiiii #0,teci·tli.e TlilSt pr6J)eay. 
~ It.fa iti1_p~nt to note-that Intetvenors do nnl b'eHeve-.that 1li-e.1:niste-et hati ·the_auf:hbdty m-.Jssue :orlginai tease snd 
Ste'.\~~~ A;m-~memton 'lli:eitio:,,m. ~~puUhe·T.rtwtor, Howe~~~r-; fwthej;ake of1.hWOp_pdaiti0it lnte~i~ors 
:\iay~-lu~g\t~ Defen<i3nts:' .fi.u!u~e to. :_dtaft ~- te~e-.ancl Ste'Warqship Agreement ih ·a-tim.ely· manneir as .evidence of 
Oereudim.ist ftii'ure ttfadm.mister tlle -tt:us.t :effectively.; 
t 
{°·' 
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Cona.-aryto Defend~: obrutrt.all tbe..B.eneficiaties-.have;vequested tb-e~em:ova!l (lfthe 
Tn;istees.·fu.lniervenorsf ~mpramttb.et:al1-ptay '1~lhat:.·s~th, :Cr.am, ~1i1es; M¥et$., and .any 
Gther imiw.iJuai or.-en.ntt ·clam:iilig to-l>e.apPQµi~ by the 'Tmstee ~ se111e .as a Tmstee, or as a 
Suoeessor·Trustee, be-r-ein:ovea.. 'n..!.0$ thep.ositiou·-ef'f:ruste~ oftl~:Tru~t:''·.Se.e Inte.rvenors' 
Cornpl~t-a:t 19~,c'! Ifis hard to in;iagine how much. C.1earer l11e-Benefi.ciaries can be than .filing a 
iii Ren1:ev.a1 of Defendants: w@uid .best serve.the interests of the Beneficiaries. and 1s 
not itroo11sistent with the mat-erfal pui:pose;of·the Trust . 
au,rB·enefiefaries h~now had an,ad,1ersarial rela'tlonghi_p: for ·over. six years. Consequeiltly, it 
·w:ould be very .difiicult., if not imvoss1b!e~ .for D.efertdrul'~ to continue to· :spend tl1eir free tune 
managing_a Trost in the best.interests oftbeir~dversar-i.~,. L:Ucewise., it is. v:ery ~$cult-for the 
Benenciaries to pla~ anyingr~e. or-~s.Jhey'ftiiay.have-fro.m the Tl1:!$t Property m the. hands 
oftlie D~endants· wh-:eij ¢.ey ·<jo µat -beii ev.~thafDefe~4an.ts are ·acting in their 'b.e.st m.t-etes.ts. 
In. addTTilllla r~ev~ mfDe.fendan:h.1 would:not:be..-incomist-ent -w:ith ·a m.at.erial 12urpo-se o.ffhe 
trust See §15..~1,,;706(2)(d}4 Tmstot cle.ariytmtlmeci'the matet.ial.pilip.pse of tbe Uitst as· f.otrovir.s·: 
The objectofthls·TntSt :shall be·.tcftec¢iy~, ~~quire;_ li.~14 ·and-transfer all 'l:Uaru;ter 
of,m.pp~iie.$, ·qons~a~tl'an,m ·aonveyed, fur ·Ul,e:··"rorship of the. Alnuighty God~-
clim:ily. to ~4~and faii_ pr/jn,t0.1;lng#i;e.-ge.~~a1 -w.~are,_ the 1~engio.us beliefs 
and edu-caff.(:)n -0f its .. Ben;~ffclaries/ STE°"~lA.RDS .amt-the. o.olnl1ii.l.mty o.f man. 
See· ExhibifB at 7 :f40 (em:phasis added). There is no -evidez,i_c.e whatsoever that:fJie materi:al 
purpose bf fue:T:J:USt is it'> ·keep, tb.~ ori~a;l.T~t~es, ·iri theit pos1ti9µs fo;rlis .Jong as they waitt.. 
Additionally-> ~,e.nefici.ades· are. cori.fide.il.t :~t a suitalile .su~c~ssor trustee would ·be .a:vailableif 
13: 
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tbe-ccrurforde~er.hhat. op.~·be fouad · Therefut~, there m:emultipie reasons for .. fhe .com to 
r.~v.e Defe.adan:1:s.,as .:trustees per.§V-S~'!/;1-05~ 
Defen~ts:. mai¢ _the. :~r~~t that ""lz'e¢ova1 cf '$e current Trustees .go~s .against. the 
.manifest u1tent. of :the 'Trustt l>~caus:e ~Mr~ IC,rldand str.m11i~y-de,sited'the.,curre.n.t Trustees to 
waf.cl1 over his•,e;stafu." Se~. MSj .at ~li,14 •. How.e'f\r.er~ Defendai1t'S .fail. to mention that -the "Trustor 
added pr.ovisii:>ns .. fot the;·r:em.tnmi :of.any trustee who ib:eca.tne.;(,1ui~ea1 -t-0 this ·Trost and its 
Beneficiaries.'' See· abioitB ~t-1Jl9-;. In :acl4ifi~li, tµe T11:1st.pro-vi.des: 
. · ... [Tn:Jstee~J a.re 1iabl~-~ rernqy.al ~d ~it~ f.ar·p~~pp:al:--:d~a.~es. iqitl~ted by. .any 
B:e11eficl-ary-f6t atty ltrss.es $uffer.e.d.hy-1h:e 1\ust b.ecause:•offraru:l;. oon=v.ersion of 
Titist property tp pens,on~ use~ mqss. ~~gte~ :ofd~ty~ :or b~aoh oft'rust Qn the.it 
pm . 
Id. at2.4·. 
t11e tnrst¢1:.made.:}1T-0~i:ons. b th~~.et t~m:Q.1i.aL. Thus:,1~em~iv.aL0fDefendants as the 
-current Trustees--wo:citd:not be:~omg_aga.instthe.material or manifest:futent of tl1e Trust. 
Furtlier.mwe;.,as .o.~~~µ $fJ1~r~ the ''~~J;Tt'.'°~Qf.the tt~s~is n:ot tP-~'e D.efend~nts a.peqnaµent 
posifto~ Qf'po~ret crv.f# ~ ~~C:?r!'~ w.iip,edy"~d f~l,y. $ee fd. at 7-;f~ CobJe~fives_ :include 
'~rop;iali.ng-the .t=etal:·w.elfar~ ~i~:~ligt'Qµs}J:?eijd's:~Ad-aj.®a.iiGP' .of-its lle~e-fi:9iarlet')~ 
Ft. ~~~d;a!l~~S,:~labne.d.-:eontpens~~-b~ ls~~tr;ea~J9.,·.·noi:_•,~ticlp~~:by-th,e 
T.ms{;:~n-th~if!~. wb~l~~dotte· fur.~~lifoli~~om.g,eii®atfo:tt.·.:sliott1~:no:H)e. giveL · 
not entitled to· oompe.nsation fi:om-=the Trust Deftmdants. essentially argue tliat S:nrit11 should be 
_ 14: 
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gfv.ea the sums,:!1~-.i~ askmg.:.as '.C.o.awensatio11 for:bi-s dti:ties.as Trost Man~er because the-Trust 
allow.s _.a: Trust Manag~i:-~-be pai4, How-eVeJ;o even.if~ Ttlist-aliows a Trust Manager to he 
paid~- fuere·.are multi~le·reasons .wlly Defendaat-S$1th s,~ul.d .not be _givm 1h,e ~.um:s 4e is 
elaim.mg-. F.ttst of~-~e Trust ~tes-·ta~ the_·~tees s1w~~ no.t .r,~cs:iv.e. =c.91npensatj~n for their 
sen1-ce.s . .Id. at ·11 1 f T1~st'eeivwilf sei~1tf wltiiout o~~aj;f ~n. '~l- lij.fuqu.gli Pef-e.:'ldapf Smitli 
clajms -~at:he l¼ts. ~ot squght eo.mpens~on-foran,ydutles he-performed .as ·a ,ttll:Stee,:tbe iriroen·ce 
shows o±ber~vis~. Aside fi.'Omatt:endi:ng_boar-d.m~tin:gs~ ·it.appears that all .other .duties. 0ftrustees 
were-transf.-etted to 11,e Trost.Man~·g?t;·~eaufugtba:tthooe duti~, pteviouslypetform.ed·by 
Ttus~ -without cost to fhe.·Tmst1 w~:nHc!':~~e~d,ep.et:fonned by Smith as_tlie Trust Ma.n~ger 
for ·$5-0 p.e1: lioux .. Fo:r :example1,see· Exm~tit p~:at 1Q'l:~~10-{Smitb. ~s.e$..h.~ can delegate .any 
trustee d.utYfu th& Ti:qst M'~j;l~ger-)fand see Jobl;l_.1\{U;es D~po at .6l tb,ro:µgh ~-,~- attached hereto .as· 
Eihibjt I-I. Smit14 as a ,trn.st~e) would then .. vote ·1o. approve his ,ovm T~t .rvfanager timesheets. 
Seo.amt De-fe11dant Smith is :Claiming oompens.ation for time as Trust Manager for doing 
things·thathe:wa-s not authorized te do .. For·exmnple,. Smith.· would do :St3inething -aild then a~~ 
the Board of 1\iJStees ·tp 1jtify it~~pt, ,fJ.;i~-~~t See: EJ;:Jil'l;.it.~-- H~-a~u~~s,.1,4~J..:3~·:an~ ~"bit 
H a.f29=~l1~l5;--~P.'A~=.6J .;,6$; l1liit4> ·-011-e.-.~fitlie..i»~s,t~gt;~gi~t.¢='@.Ol.r;i-tie.s Smith.~•-~--as 
. . . .· . •"• . 
Trµsffyfa~~i$ s~ the 'trus.t,·reCQr.d:~.ijeJ.J~ .madi.1~n. bill:d.ie-Tn;ist (Qr f$.;tiJ.ne.,dofug it See 
ExhlniflJ at 8.1:5~2.s-~thl:ough 85·:1:-1°4.'?-
llf 
Ill 
5:11qsµq;iri.singly,.Sj;Jiiµ., ~1aim~]1~ was·.ipuh~u~,i to do ili.is·tecause..th.e Trustees .(\i,;liich includes himself).mid him 
te.-c-.elfectthe-:iilb.ney he wa-s owed. See. ExhibitD .m S:3':7-12. 
i:s 
005479 
( ( 
Fomth,.4esp:it:eth-r/T~' s~un1e.~n.ts. tbat.00311:pe.nsation be-~'tetsonable-i,· $d_·what-b. 
it$WlilI)1p.sd for siroli w01ik/'Smita:ref.i:rs~d :1:0· aohi:s. Tms.t:~tm~er 1Url.ess-1.ie ~ta.s p.al~· :$5:!l-G'O-
per 1iour.. SeiiExhlbit D :.at 40:l ~lS-; 41 -~a ..:it,.-42:21 ~.23~_!+3!·1 • 7. S-tr.ufu .admits fhat flus is his 
. . . . .. . . 
$5Q.:00 is-reasQ]}laGle-oo~eus9iti-011,f-or-wotk as ·1'rIJSt.Jv1anag~ .In faot, the-. Tnrst.M~ag~r had 
been .ru.1;-unpai~. j)O_si.tioa ·len-·-rf\~er ten ye.ars., See.tBxln1:,i{D. .. at4:S: 13~21·. Furthen~-0re, henefi.c.iary 
J:olmlikland ·:actetft.a:s.the TtIM .Ma:n~r fur many yew,iS without -cornpensatiotfafte1··1le was-
appointed:Ptesi.de.ttt :ruid ~"ec.ufive·M~~~r ~f the T~t.- Se~ . .Minutes _of the ~11a fil¥eting of the 
ttustees, a~cl~J1erets as Exhl.bit I; see ~so ~xhlbi t D-at 5'8:2-25; S:9: 1-9 (Smith adn1i ts John 
Manag~r po,sitfo~.1n aodidon;J)efettdant=-Cr-run-..ad.mits.:that~e r.r.ustees did i:10htte.1npt to hire 
some,:me witb pm,:en:y managerial skills bf·_p.lacini:afh; ·in t1l&·p111,.er:-01\byputting.-0ufbi<ls,.See 
El&tlbit..A at-82:1+25-, 82;1 .. J.(t. 
Mo~t ~nun{iii.1g is t.hat,~n.jifh -~~l th~1~11i¢ruJtg_:~t~~~ _detetnµue4 ±bat $~Q~OO ·p·er 
M;aµag~,. an9 th~:-$-2.5.-pe.rlmur w~ reas.o~le:~e:9m~~D:S~11on.-~J~~Y .ru,:1Ats_sis.tant 
secr.et~l~ut-e.r .. SeiMinut~s · Qftbe. 29~b m¢e~~·of the tr.ustee~j attached, hereto ·:s.s· ~~bit J~ 
Y-&t; th~:Toust ,ws:·-genel;9tfi1g_:$.O _m.mcome·to .paythes-e t>wageo'us .fees. ,See 'Exhl-bit A ax-.'8-3-:23-
is=,-. 84:l-l i. ·Thus~ it \V.M .sim;piy unre~on~~e-fof:ili~;Pefen~arits/- r~stees to· :agi~ee to start 
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ADDENDUM4 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA 
NICHOLAS I. CHAMBERLAIN (Bar# 13045) 
Chamberlain 
Law 427 W. 100 
s. 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: ( 435) 673-8858 
Attorney for Vaiden Cram and Penn Smith as Individuals 
AND The Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust 
PENN SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, 
WASIDNGTON COUNTY STATE OF 
UTAH 
v. PARTIALSUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VALDEN CRAM, as Executive-
Trustee under the DECLARATION OF TRUST Case No.: 060501773 
dated 11/26/93, operating under the 
name of the TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM Judge: James L. Shumate 
OF GOD, 
Defendant, 
JOHN H. KIRKLAND, et al., 
Intervenors. 
The Court heard the Parties to this case on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
June 3, 2013. Wherefore, THE COURT, for good cause appearing hereby makes the following 
partial summary judgment on the case: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
As a result of said hearing and the evidence presented therein and beforehand, the Court finds 
that: 
July 091 2013 04:23 PM 
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I. Any lapse or failure of the Truster to prepare or deliver the Lease and Stewardship 
agreements to the beneficiaries of the Trust before his death does not invalidate the Trust 
itself. 
2. Mr. Penn Smith is entitled to immediate reimbursement of out of pocket expenses he has 
paid on behalf of the Trust, which expenses total $6,494. Said total is supported by the 
submission of the list of the same expenses which was presented to the Court with 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Further, Plaintiff should have the power to 
withdraw said amount from the Trust bank account, located at State Bank of Southern Utah. 
3. There are genuine issues of material fact regarding the amount, if any, to which Penn Smith 
is entitled for his work as Manager of the aforementioned Trust. 
4. There are genuine issues of material fact such that the issues of whether or not the Trustees 
of the Trust, namely Valden Cram, Penn Smith, and/or Whelton Myers, have breached their 
various duties to the Beneficiaries of the Trust and whether or not said Trustees should be 
removed should be reserved for trial. 
ORDERS 
Wherefore, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 
I. Mr. Penn Smith shall be reimbursed for out of pocket expenses he has paid on behalf of 
the Trust, which expenses total $6,494. Further, Plaintiff should have the power to 
withdraw said amount from the Trust bank account, located at State Bank of Southern 
July 09, 2013 04:23 PM 
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Utah. 
2. The keepers of said bank accow1t, employed at State Bank of Southern Utah, shall enact 
this withdrawal on presentation of this signed order by Mr. Smith. Since said bank 
account 
contains less than the aforementioned amount, the Court orders Mr. Smith to be enable to 
withdraw the entire amount remaining in the account, as long as it is equal to or less than 
the amount of $6,494. 
3. The issue of how much, if any, compensation Mr. Smith is entitled to for his work as 
Manager of the Trust is reserved for trial. 
4. The issue of whether or not the Trustees of the Trust, namely Va]den Cram, Penn Smith, 
and/ or Whelton Myers, have breached their various duties to the Beneficiaries of the Trust 
is reserved for trial. 
5. The issue of whether or not said Trustees will be removed is reserved for trial. 
Signed this_day of June, 2013. 
Fifth District Court Judge 
James L. Shumate 
July 09, 2013 04:23 PM 
Approved as to form this 10th day of June, 2013 
Isl William Rummler 
Attorney - Intervenors 
005603 ~ 
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ADDENDUMS 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA 
NICHOLAS I. CHAMBERLAIN (Bar# 13045) 
Chamberlain Law 
427 W. 100 s. 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-8858 
Attorney for Vaiden Cram and Penn Smith as Individuals AND 
The Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ENNSMITH, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
'.ALDEN CRAM, as Executive-Trustee under 
e DECLARATION OF TRUST dated Case No. 060501773 
11/26/93, operating under the name of the 
RRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD, 
OHN H. KIRKLAND, et al., 
tervenors. 
udge: James L. Shumate 
COME NOW the Plaintiff and the Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust, by and 
through counsel, and hereby submit this memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
their Second Motion for Summary Judgment. With the Court having ruled in the aforementioned 
Parties' favor regarding the validity of the Trust at issue in this case, Plaintiff and Trustees now 
asks the Court to dispose of the remaining issues of fact, which the they now argue are no longer 
materially disputed. 
FACTS 
I. On the date of August 14, 2012, this Court awarded $70,000 in attorney fees to the Intervenors 
in this case. (See Exhibit I, Order) 
005613 
2. Said order stated that, while it was not subject to objection at the time of said entry, that, " ... 
(i)f and when an ultimate ruling is made by the Court, said affidavit ( of attorney fees) may be 
subject to review by the Court and the parties for reasonableness ... " Id. at p. 4, first 
paragraph). 
3. On the date of July 9, 2013, this Court awarded Partial Summary Judgment to Plaintiff and the 
Trustees of the Trust in this case. (See Docket) 
4. Said Partial Summary Judgment affirmed the validity of the Trust at issue. (Id.) 
5. However, said Judgment designated two remaining factual issues: I) how much compensation 
Plaintiff is owed for his services as trust manager, and 2) whether or not the Trustees of the 
Trust have breached their various duties to the Beneficiaries. Id 
FACTS REGARDING COMPENSATION OF PENN SMITH AS TRUST MANAGER 
6. As has been shown before, the Trust, which has been ruled valid by this Court, empowered the 
Trustees to appoint one of their number to serve as " ... manager, who will conserve and oversee 
the properties of the TRUST that are not in STEWARDSHIPS, and receive reasonable 
compensation for such service as determined by the Board of Trustees ... " (See Exhibit Il 
"Trust", Paragraph I 8) 
7. Plaintiff was later appointed manager of the Trust and the Trustees allowed him to be paid the 
amount of $50 an hour for his services. (See Exhibit m, Affidavit of Penn Smith) 
8. During his tenure as Trust Manager, Mr. Smith spent many hours managing the Trust and 
incurred the amount of $252,749 in fees as a result. (See Exhibit rv, Itemized Compensation 
for Penn Smith) 
005614 
9. In researching other Trust managers in Southern Utah, it is purported by the Plaintiff and 
Trustees that the amount of $50 an hour for Trust management is more than reasonable. See 
Exhibit V, Example regarding Trust Management) 
FACTS REGARDING PERFORMANCE OF TRUSTEES' FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
10. Prior to 2007, Intervenors in this case accused Trustees ofbreaching their fiduciary duties. 
11. In that the Trust in this case required that all disputes arising under the Trust be submitted to 
a board of arbitration, said arbitration was convened on February 13, 2007. (See Exhibit VI, 
"Findings of Facts and Conclusion of Law of the Board of Arbitration for the Terrestrial 
Kingdom of God Trust") 
12. The arbitration went before a board of arbitrators, namely Michael Barker, Lee Cox, St. 
George Mayor Daniel McArthur, Sam Miles, and Ryan Rarick. (Id. at p. I, second paragraph) 
13. After listening to arguments from Intervenors, the board concluded that " ... the Trustees have 
acted in the best interest of the.Trust..." (Id. at p. 2, first full paragraph) 
14. The arbitration board also recommended " ... that the Trustees send a letter to each steward 
Beneficiary (Intervenors) offering a payment schedule ... to cover Trustees' out of pocket 
expenses and any other legal Trust expenses ... " (Id. at p. 2, second full paragraph) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE cotv.lPENSATION AMOUNT REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF IS REASONABLE 
AND SHOULD BE PAID BY INTBRVENORS OR OUT OF THE CORPUS OF THE 
TRUST ITSELF 
005615 
The Plaintiff, Mr. Smith has spent many hours in his capacity as Trust manager. In doing so, at 
the rate of $50 an hour, which has been shown to the be more than reasonable by the Exhibit 
shown above, he has accrued the amount of $252,749 owed for his services. 
Paragraph 18 of the Trust (see Exhibit II) allows for said appointment and compensation. In 
light of the evidence, Mr. Smith deserves to finally be paid for the s~rvice he has freely rendered 
all these years. 
II. THE TRUSTEES HAVE ACTED WITHIN THEIR AUTHORITY AND HAVE NOT 
BREACHED ANY OF THIER FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
All that need be cited in this area is Exhibit VI, attached hereto. An objective arbitration board, 
composed of duly appointed members, found no breach ofTrustee's duties to the Beneficiaries or 
Intervenors. Further, Intervenors have no evidence of any breach of duty in this case. 
III. INTERVENORS SHOULD BE PERSONALLY CHARGED FOR ALL THE 
ATTORNEY FEES LEVIED IN nns CASE BECAUSE THE CAUSES OF ACTION 
THEY HAVE BROUGHT WERE FRIVOLOUS, PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED AND 
INIMICAL TO THE PURPOSES OF THE TRUST 
As Exhibit I shows, this Court stated that the issue of attorney fees could be revisited upon the 
final resolution of this case. To date, large swaths of the corpus of the Trust have been depleted 
and blown away in the hunicane of frivolous litigation that has been perpetuated by the 
Intervenors. Literally hundreds of thousands of dollars have been lost to attorneys :fighting over 
meaningless causes of action. 
005616 
This case should have been over in 2007 after the aforementioned board of arbitration found 
that the Trustees had been acting properly. However, Intervenors chose to continue their useless 
fight against the intent of their father, Stephen Kirldand. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, in that no material issues of fact remain, Plaintiff and Trustees ask the Court for 
the following: 
1. Ajudgment awarding Plaintiff the amount of$252,749 for his work as trust manager, and the 
remaining amount he has yet to be paid for reimbursement of out of pocket expenses, to be 
paid out of the corpus of the trust, as the trust allows. 
2. A declaration that Trustees have not breached any fiduciary duty to the Intervenors. 
3. The full amount of attorney fees billed to the Trust to be paid by Intervenors, out of their 
personal assets, so that the Trust may be replenished from that which it has paid so dearly. 
4. An order for a full accounting of the attorney fees billed by both sides of this case so that the 
aforementioned fees can be paid by the Intervenors. 
5. An order allowing the Trustees to have full banking privileges regarding the Trust 
Signed this 23 day of August, 2013. 
Isl Nie Chamberlain 
Attorney for Valden Cram and Penn Smith as Individuals AND 
The Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to William Rummler, attorney for 
Intervenors, this 23rd day of August, 2013. 
Isl Nie Chamberlain 
005617 
@ 
@ 
ADDENDUM6 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA 
GALLIAN WELKER & BECKSTROM, L. C. 
WilliamF. Rummler (13093) 
Christopher A. Lund (14074) 
965 East 700 .South, Suite 305 
St. George, Utah 84790 
Telephone: (435) 628-1-682 
Facsimile: (435) 628 .. 9561 
wfrummler@utahcase.com 
clund@utahcase.co1n 
Attorneys for l1J.tervenors 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH 
PENN SMTIH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VALDEN CRAM, as Executive-Trustee Consolidated Civil No. 060501773 
under the DECLARATION OF TRUST 
dated 11/26/93, operating underthe name of Judge: James L. Shumate 
the TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD, 
Defendant. 
JOHN H. KIRKLAND, et al., 
Intervenors. 
Intervenors, by and through the law offices of-Gallian Welker & Beckstrom, L.C., hereby 
submit their Memorandwn in Support of Motion to Strike Defendants' Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment as follows: 
Ill 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff and Defendants ( collectively referred to as "Defendants") .are attempting to talce 
a second bite at the apple on two issues with their Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
("MSJ2), Yet, Defendants fail to present any evidence that was not already available to them 
when they filed their First Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJl "). Defendants' MSJ2 
involves three issues with.the two main issues being: (1) whether Plaintiff Penn Smith.should be 
paid the amount he is demanding; and (2) whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties as 
trustees. However, the court in its· Order on MSJl addressed these two issues, finding that there 
were genuine issues of material fact in dispute and reserved the issues for trial. This is the law of 
the case. Therefoi-e, Defendants' MSJ2 should be stricken. 
Alternatively, if the court finds that Defendants' MSJ2 should not be stricken in its 
entirety, the cou1i should strike Exhibits V and VI as inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore, 
Defendants' third issue regarding allocating attoiney fees should also be dismissed in the event 
that the court strikes issues one or two, since the court ordered that the issue should be addressed 
"[i]f and when an ultimate ruling is made by the Court. See August 14, 2012 Order at 111, on file 
with the court. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On May 6, 2013, Defendants filed their MSJl, which included the following two 
issues: (a) Whether Plaintiff is entitled to :fue payment of wages ai1d expenses he is- claiming as 
Manager of the Trust, and (b) whether Defendants as trustees breached their fiduciary duties, See 
MSJl at 5, on file with the court. 
2. On June 3, 2013, a hearing was held on MSJl in which 1:he court made the 
2 
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following findings of fact: 
III. 
a. "There are genuille issues of material fact regarding the amount, if any, to which 
[Plaintiff] is entitled for bis work as Manager/' See Court'.s July 9, 2013 Order, 
attached hereto as Exhibit A at 2: if3. 
b. "There are genuine issues of material fact such that the issues of whether or not 
the Trustees of the Trust, name1yValden Cram, Penn Smith, and/or Whelton 
Myers, have breached their various duties to the Beneficiaries of the Trust and 
whether or not said Trustees should be removed should be reserved for trial." Id. 
at,r4. 
3. The court then ordered these two issues reserved for trial. See Exhibit A at 3: ~,r3-4. 
4. On August 23, 2013, Defendants filed their MSJ2 in which they ask for summary 
judgment on the same tw-0 issues previously ruled on by this court. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The law of the case doctrine precludes Defendants from reopening the same issues 
lnMSJ2. 
In filing their MSJ2, Defendants are attempting a second bite at the apple on two issues 
for which the court issued an order just 45 days prior. In MSJl, Defendants sought summary 
judgment on (1) whether Plaintiff Penn Smith should be paid the amount he is demanding; and 
(2) whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties as trustees. See MSJl at 5. After a 
hearing on the issues, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact that 
precluded summary judgment on the two issues and reserved the issues for trial. See Exhibit A at 
2:mf3-4; 3: 113-4. Yet, Defe11dants are now seeking-summary judgment 011 these same two 
3 
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issues. Under the law of the case doctrine, Defendants should be precluded from raising these 
same issues in summary judgment. See IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K MANAGEMENT, 
INC., 2008 UT 73, 196 P. 3d 588, 596, 
"[T]he law of the case doctrine acts much like the doctrine of res judicata-furthering 
the goals of judicial economy and finality- but within .a single case.'' Id. at ,J26. Under the law 
of the case doctrine, "While a case remains pending before the district court prior to any appeal, 
the parties are bound by the court's prior decisio11, but the court remains free -to reconsider that 
decision." Id. at ,21. However, there are three exceptional circumstances in which a court should 
not apply the law of the case doctrine: "(l) when there has been an intervening change of 
con1rolling authoricy; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when the-court is 
convinced that its plior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id. 
at 34. 
In IHC Health Services, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a district court, s refusal to 
reopen a forfeiture issue that itnad previously ruled on, per the law of the case doctrine. Id. at 
135. After addtessing the three exceptions to the Doctrine, the court held: 
None of the exceptions required the district court to reopen the issue of forfeiture 
:in this case. The first two exceptions did not apply because [ defendant] did not 
point to any new facts or law which might have excused it from arguing 
substantial compliance whe11 the forfeiture claim was decided. First, [defendant] 
has not pointed to any intervening change in law. We agree with the district court 
that "[t]he defense [defendant] wa11ts to now argue is not new or novel, and 
indeed the main cases it relies upon in its present motion were all issued before 
[defendant] opposed [plaintifrs] initial Motion foi-Partial Judgment on the 
Pieadings." Nor has [defendant] briefed this court on any intervening change of 
law. Secoad, [defendant] has not pointed to any new evidence that it did nQt have 
ru1 opportunity to present when the forfeiture claim was decided. . 
Id. Similarly, none of these eX:ceptions apply in the present case. The first exception does not 
4 
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apply as Defendants have cited to no intervening changes in controlling authority. 
Exception two does not apply since all of Defendants -exhibits in their MSJ21 contain 
information that was produced in MSJl or was available at that time: Exhibit I is an August 14, 
2012 Order in this case, so it was available when Defendants filed their MSJl in May-of2013; 
Defendants provided Exhibits II, III, and IV in their MSJl; Exhibit V appears to contain 
infonnation about a company's fees for providing trustee Bervices, but there is no indication that 
this information is new or was unavailable at the time of filing MSJl; .and Exhibit VI is a 
document purported to be from March of 2007, so it was also available to Defendants when they 
filed MSJl. 2 
Lastly, the third exception does not apply as there is nothing .to suggest that the court's 
determination that there are material facts in dispute was clead.y erroneous. or that it would work 
a manifest injustice for the issues to be heard at trial. Thus, like in II-IC Health Services, 
Defendants do not satisfy any of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. Therefore, 
Defendants' MSJ2 should be stricken. See me Health Services, 2008 UT at 'if35. 
B .. Defendants' Exhibits V and VI are inadmissible hearsay. 
In a motion for summary judgment, evidence provided in suppo1t of the motion must be 
admissible. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d 482,487 (Utah Court App. 1990) 
("Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment"); D 
&L Supply v. Saurin-i, 775 P.2d-420, 421 (Utah 1989) ("It is true that inadmissible evidence 
1 (I) Order of court regarding attorney fees1, (II) Trust document, (III) Affidavit of Plain~ (IV) Document listing 
the compensation ·sought by Plaintiff, (V) purported fee schedule of a trustee company; and (VI) alleged findings of 
fact from a board of arbitration. 
2 In addition, Exltibits V and VI are inadmissible hearsay and should be excluded, as is explained later in 
Interveno1-s• Motion, 
5 
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cannot be considered in ruling on a motio11 for summary judgment''). Therefore, if the court 
determines that Defendants' MSJ2 should not be stricken in its entirety, the court-should sttike 
Exhibits V and VI as inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered ~'in 
evidence to pr.eve the truth of.the matter asserted in the statement," Utah R. Bvid, 801(0). 
Furthermore, ''Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law-or by these rules," Utah R 
Evid. 802, 
In the present case, Defendants have offered Exhibit V to prove Defendants' claim that 
Plaintiff's compensation as Manager is reasonable. In fact, Exhibit Vis the only evidence 
Defendants offer to try and prove :that Plamtiff's rate of compensation is reasonable. See MSJ2 at 
3: 11 ("at the rate of$ 50 an hour, which has been shown to be more than reasonable by the 
Exhibit shown above"). In other words, Defendants are offedng the statements made in Exhibit 
V, an out-of-court document, to prove their assertion that $50 per hour is reasonable 
compensation for Plaintiff. Therefore, Exhibit V is inadmissible hearsay that does not qualify for 
any exceptions found it1 Rules 803-804. 
In addition, Defendants have provided Exhibit VI, a document that purports to contain 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw of a board of arbi1ration that was allegedly convened by 
the trustees of the Trust in 2007. Defendants are attempting to admit Exhibit VI into evidence to 
prove that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary duties. However, Exhibit VI is a classic 
example ofhearsay without an exception. Exhibit VI is not a witness's prior statement or 
statement made by~ opposing party3, and does not qualify for any of the exceptions found in 
Rules 803, 804. 
3 See Rule 80l(d). 
6 
Likewise, Exhibit VI does not qualify under Rule 807's residual exception because 
Defendants are able to obtain more probative evidence on the issue of Defendants' fulfillment of 
their fiduciary duties through reasenable efforts than Exhibit VI. For example, Defendants or 
other witnesses could testify, Defendants could provide excerpts from depositions, etc. In 
addition, Exhibit VI does not have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness as 
there is no indication of how the board of arbitration was set up, the impartiality of the board 
members, what evidence was considered, what witnesses wer-e heard, etc. Therefore, admitting 
Exhibit VI would not forth er these rules or the interests of justice and it should be excluded as 
inadmissible hearsay. 
Furthennore, even if Exhibit VI was admissible under a hearsay exception, it should be 
excluded under Rule 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice and wasting time. By submitting Exhibit VI, Defendants are suggesting that 
because a board of arbitration allegedly found that Defendants did not breach their fiduciary 
duties, this court.should take that at face value and rule the same way. However, in rebuttal 
Intervenors could just as easily submit into evidence the September 12, 2006 findings of fact and 
conclusions of law from a previous board of arbitration ("Board of Arbitration l "). Board of 
Arbitration 1 concluded, among other things, that: (1) Plaintiffs compensation rate was 
unreasonable; (2) Defendants improperly billed the Trust for time spent as Trustees; and (3) 
Defendants breached their fiduciary duties on multiple occasions and aeted inimical to the Trust 
In other words, these two boards of arbitration came to opposite conclusions on the same 
issues, once again showing that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary 
judgment. Therefore, it would also be a waste of time and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 to 
7 005675 
present Exhibit VI, even if Exhfbit VI was not hearsay. 
i. Exhibit V should be stricken as an unauthenticated document 
Exhibit V should also be stricken as an unauthenticated document per Utah R. Evid. 901. 
"To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the pr~ponent 
must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims 
it ist Id. at 901(a). In the present case, Defendants lay no foundation for what Exhibit Vis, who 
created it, whether it is authentic, etc. Defendants simply provide it as an exhibit with no 
explanation. F:urthermore, Exhibit V does not appear to qualify as a selfMauthenticated document 
per Rule 902. Therefor:e, Exhibit V should be stricken. 
C. The isBue of .attorney fees 1s not ripe since there is no final resolution of th.is case. 
In their MSJ2, Defendants address the issue of attorney fees as outlined in the court's 
August 14, 2012 order. However, as Defendants point out, the court ordered that the issue of 
-attorney fees should be revisited upon the final resolution of the case. Id. at 11 1. Therefore, if 
Intervenors' Motion t0 Strike is· gr.anted on any of the two main issues addressed above, the issue 
of .attorney fees will not be ripe for adjudication and should also be stricken. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Intervenors respectfully request that the court grant its Motion 
to S1rike Second Motion for Summary Judgment. In the alternative, if the court does not strike 
Defendants' MSJ2 in its entirety, In.tervenors respectfully request -that Exhibits V and VII be 
stricken. 
!ti 
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DATED this i_ day of.September, 2013. 
GALLIANt WELKER & BECK.STROM, L.C. 
~A~ 
William F. Rummler 
Christopher A. Lund 
Attorneys for Intervenors 
CERTIFlCATE -OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 1__ day of September, 2013, I served a copy of the 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT via the United States Postal Service first~class postage prepaid and 
electronically filed same with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent 
notification of such filing to the following: 
Nicholas Chamberlain . 
421W. 100 S. 
St. George, UT '84770 ~-gfJLJWit~~u 
An employee of Gallian Welker 
& Becks1mm, L.C. 
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ADDENDUM7 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA 
NICHOLAS I. CHAMBERLAIN (Bar# 13045) 
Chamberlain Law 
427 w. 100 s. 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435)673-
8858 
Attorney for Vaiden Cram and Penn Smith as Individuals 
AND The Trustees of the Terrestrial Kingdom of God 
Trust 
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PENN SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
VALDEN CRAM, as ExecutiveM 
Trustee under the DECLARATION 
OF TRUST dated 11/26/93, 
operating under the name of the 
TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD, 
Defendant, 
JOHN H. KIRKLAND, et al., 
lntervenors. 
FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 060501773 
Judge: James L. Shumate 
THE COURT, for good cause appearing, hereby orders, pursuant to the Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment, made In this case on the date of August 23, 2013, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That, based on the evidence presented, the Trustees in this case, namely Vaiden 
Cram and Penn Smith, or any other Trustee which has been accused of any 
wrongdoing herein, are declared to be not in breach of any fiduciary duty they 
now owe, or have owed, to the Terrestrial Kingdom of God Trust (TKOG). 
January 23, 2014 10:02 AM 
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2. That Plaintiff, Penn Smith, through his duties as Trust Manager of TKOG, has earned 
the amount of $252,749.00 for compensation, at the rate of $50 an hour. 
3. That said amount has not been paid to him. 
4. That a large amount of attorney fees, later to be ascertained and totaled by this 
Court, have been billed by the parties in this case. Said trust stands in need of 
replenishment of said moneys, as they were taken out of the corpus of the TKOG trust. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Plaintiff, Penn Smith, is hereby awarded the amount of $252,749.00 for his work 
as trust manager, to be paid out of the corpus of the TKOG trust, as the trust allows. 
2. That the attorney fees mentioned above, which have been taken out of the TKOG 
trust corpus, later to be accounted for and totaled by this Court, are to be paid back to 
the Trust by the lntervenors. Said amount shall be paid out of the personal assets of the 
I ntervenors. 
3. That all parties to this case are herby ordered to fully account for all attorney 
fees billed in this case. Said amounts will be totaled at a hearing, later to be set 
by the Court. 
4. That the current Trustees of the TKOG trust are hereby allowed full banking 
privileges regarding the Trust, without the necessity of seeking court orders to 
engage in banking transactions. 
END OF ORDER 
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ADDENDUM8 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA 
~ ... ··--". 
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:c,r rbL" TI.m.itESTRI./.\J . .K.H-.JCiDOJ.v1 CJ.F nOJJ THL!ST 
________________________________ " _____ _ 
TERRESTPJAL JGNG.DOM of GOD TR11ST ) 
StcWi.L rds/f.·knefi ci uri t::S ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
'T'ERR.ESTRIAL KINGDOM of GOD TRUST ) 
TIU JSTEES ) Cuse nun: ... 1h ___ e __ 1· ..... J_________ _ 
The Board of Arbitration for the TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD TRUST met a1 7:00 pm 
on l Se_ptember 2006 at 545 N. 400 W. St. George, Utah to hear testimony of al] parties, and again at 7:00 
pm on 6 September 2006 ·at 2000.E. St. Georget Utah with the TRUSTEES and Jolm Kirkland. After 
having rcvfowed the provisions oftbe Terrestrial Kingdom of God TRUST, after l1av1ng read tile minutes, 
after haying looked at written evidence, and after having heard all testimony of the above parties the 
Board of Arbitl'ation makes the following: 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L~1vr 
1. TI1at the Board of Arbitration for the TERRESTRIAL KlNGDOl\1 OF GOD TRUST :finds that it 
has jurisdiction to hear all matters relative to TRUSTEES' alleged 11eg]ect of duty or breach of TRUST 
shlce the Board Arbi1ratio11 ,\1as properJy constituted pursuant to the provisions contained in the 
TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD TRUST, hereinafter referred to as the TR UST=- and the mhrntcs of 
the meetings of the Board of Arbitrators. 
2. Thatthc Bonrd of Al'bjtrators) oncejurisdic.tion was detcnnine.d at the 1 September 2006 henring~ 
resolved to sei aside formal procedures to hear testimon)' from all parties sine~ none ,vere represented by 
attorneys and almost all parLies were not familiar v.rjtl1 correct procedures of Im,,. At the second hearing at 
7:00 pm on 6 Septcmber2006 the TRUSTEES and John Kirldandpresented more testimony ~md evidence 
and no o~jections to jurisdiction were made. · 
3. TI1n1 there was no e,~dencc presented in support of the TRUSTEES 11cvc1· l1aving done anything 
beneficial for the T'RUST and in fact a letter from the Stc.':wards/Bencficiarks dated 24 June 2006 
concluded ,vitl1 a statement thanking the TRUSTEES for hnving served '\vithout pay"' and give tl1£!nks for 
what ~-mliy have done". 
4. That 1J,crt'. a!'c missing mhmte~ of TRUSTEES meetings> howc-:vcr=- that said mjssing mcords ,~,L~rc 
Jus~ ut the death ofthL~ TR'USTEF writer ofthc TRUST nnd ,vcrc not recovcruhk thro11gh no fimlt of the 
curnmt TRUSTEES. J'>rnsent TRtJSTEES lrnvc: kept cum=n1 thL" rninut.~s nf th1,;.ir mut.!lings nncJ Hwy ha\'c 
b~c11 at all timl!s m·ailah.lc for insp<.:ction hy the Stl!Wurds1Beneficfr1rit.:~. 
5. Tbai 1l1ere \,·as 110 evide.m;l! prc~~e1,1ed th~t the 'l1ZT.J8TT:ES mi~mtes me t111inkl!it?hk tmd void of 
i h1.:. Tf~l iSTEES intent. 
(,. Tlml TRU8TEE8 haw tbc n:sponsibility to appoinl JX>t<;ntiul Stt'\r,irds '!3t.:neficiurirn, 011fy if a 
St::·ward/Bcncficiury dit$ without naming an heir. EXHIBIT 
JV1)0167E 
.- ,· · Tlrndhl:·Sft:~wn.rd u.nc.1 ~rRus:f:E-ES wcrc.-appi..;inted•by-btt~:i.:e,n . .B .. .J·:.irl~lcmd ... thc .C1:<:!nlor oft.ht!.. . ··- . 
TRUST: and !ilrlh~!": tha1 ;; Swward ,md TRUSTEE is nol in thL' cfau;s of SLc\.\.-a.rd!.;lfkmc.:ficiarh.::;. 11~,r '"''ti:i 
h th:.: inkn! Clf the TRlJS'J' for Steward~1Ber~cfic.:iadcs 10 dect) vntt or approvt• ofth<: Board of 
TRl!STEES. 
8. That TRUST provjsfrms pursuant to TRUST pngc 5, paragraph 18~ alJow TIUJSTEGS to dee! 01w 
ofth<.:il' number or other h1djvidual, t1s a Manager of the TRUST propc;rtit=t, nDt v,·itbin stc\,van.lship~~ wh~, 
mny receive rl!u3onabk compensation. The TRUST ]ms nc'> provision for appointmr.m1 c,f othur p::rid 
individuals 01· offices. 
9. That the TRUSTEES ignored the SJ)~cific TRUST prc.rvision and legal advice J)ert,tining, to the 
swnc, that only one pa.id TRUST Manager be elected to manage non-Stewards/Beneficiaries prop~rty. m: 
evidenced by a Jetter from retired attorney John L. MjJes dated 3 July 2006'1 a TRUSTEES meeting 
Jvfinutc dated 16 November 2005, she-wing that TRUSTEES elected themselves to positions of TRUST 
Manager, Assistant Manager, and Secretary/Treasurer, at the rate of $50.00, $50.00, and $25.00 per hour 
respectively., m1d an itemized claim for money that was maintained as valid at the .arbitration heating by 
the TRUSTEES. 
10. That !RUST page 4, paragraph 11, states that t&Any compensation paid others is to be that usual1y 
pmd for sucb work..,, The annuaJ national salary for a full time real estate propcrt~, ma11ager is 
approximately $40,000 do_l]ars per year, 
PR9PER11' MANAGEMENT- Property manngcrucnt in"oh•cs maximizing net revenues or productivity of 
property bnsL-d on mnnuging rental flows, tenant r.etenUon, managing mid contracting propurty operation. Property 
c.>p~.rntion includes cleaning, maintemrncc .and repairs, paying utilities, property insumnc:e, property tnxes JJnd so o:n)J 
reporting to owners und oversceb1g rcsldcnt or on-site mm1u.gcrs. Propt:rl)' managers an.: usm1lty inyoh1cd io lensing 
and facility management decisions. Those. that manage se,1eral properties and arc luvolvecJ in .acquisition, disposition, 
finnncing a11d portfolio management decisions are known ns ".asset mnnngers." Most property managers star( 2$ on-site 
mnrrngcrsJ m•rking closcl)' witl1 tcnanf:s. Example firms: Lincolll Propcrcy• Company, TrnmmclJ Cmw Compnn~·1 
A ,•erngc Salary! '$40,000 per ycur. 
11. That an imputed hourly rate of $19.00 per hour is reasonable for part time duties in the St. Georgc:, 
Utah area. 
12. That the TRUST Manager, Assistant 1'1anagers, and Managers Secretary, biiled the TRUST for 
various 'ffiUSTEE mecth1gs 01· time said Manager and Assistant Managers spent with City of 
\,\
1ushington~ Utc~1 officials and others as to the routing of a road that would intctfer~ ,vith 
Stewards/Bcncficia1ies wllO have entered into leasc/stewardsl1ip agreements, including the farmiur. 
ac..~tivity and by doing so have allo·wed a gross neglect of duty or breach of TRUST which is inimical to 
th<.: TRllST to take plac.e. 
J 3. The TRI lST prigL' 6~ paragrap]1 27~ says: 'The TRUSTEES ofthh~ 'DUJST shall normally hire n~, 
om.~ on u salaried basis; 110 service!-: s1111]] be performed by this TRUST unks.s on a contn1ctt1al b,l!~is:, 
111 t1 <.:ss ~ucl1 an arrungL:m(.~nt is unlawful or impossible.!:) 
1~·1. ThAt no TRl JSTEE has proffor-t:d evjdcncc of a co1itmc: a::; 1\.:quirctl by '1·.Rus·i· puge 6: JJ:t~ngr~1pl! 
'27., hu1 even ifth~v had TRU8TEES arc limited in .the Minute changl:!s madl: to tlie TRl 1ST by P[lr,e {,~ 
parngraph 33, that.~mys: "That this Ll\IDENTLIRE OF TRUST shull ~t:rve a:{ tlw complctt' aud offici aJ 
gnitfo for tbe TRUSTEES in the pursuit and performance of t1,ei.r duties herem'll1~r; nnd th:i:. th::y slwlJ 
hm'l! only such outhnri1y, powers, c111cl dutil!~ l:lH m·c con:forrud herniu und hctl!~mdcr. ,:-
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L::. -· .. :.::h~Uli!:.:r:PJ.:ST.sta(~~.tl1r1L.1h·:~ TRl IST_MarnHwr.c,umol ~o!;t:r~)~ prop~rlv ,,f 
S!c:,\·,n-ds'Bi.:11~riciarit.:s bul CaJ! control and ovcrsct· on.ly properly witr~-fs 11riun'ticr-·c:c;i1t1·c>°J ·a( - ... .. . .. . . .. 
~.wward::i/1-h:!n~ficirdt.:;~ anci nH!)' t~ccivc: limited power to muh. nt.!c.:e.ssG1J'y day to d,1y dispc.~r:::e111cn~ ir. Lk· 
du:.· cnur~~c ofbusin~::s sui~jcc1 le, the rcvh.:w am] appro,·aI of TRUSTEES. · 
: 6. ]1mt if is not illc.: function of the TRUST Manager, or Assistant Manager, nnd Secre1i:ff}','Truasun..:r, 
c,·cn if thl! lattur two dectcd posjtions wm·e authorized, 10 negotiate prnpC!ri)' eminent domain matlcrs that 
would a-:-foct the ubHity of Stcwarcls/Bcncficinrics continuing in their skvmrds.hips; :md tha1 time cha1·g~~d 
to the TRUST for said nc;gotiations is not auib01faed by provisions of th~ TRUST. 
17. That TRUST provisfons preclude P~nn Smitl1 as Manager and others as Assistant Managers und u 
Secretary/Treasurer in dealing with eminent domain matters that re-routed thc: road through prope11ies of 
Stewnrds/Benc.ficiuries ·who have entered into property ste,vardships agwcmcnts therefore i1 fo1lr1ws that 
time charged doing so is not authorized. 
J 8. That thl! TRUSTEES may exercise oversight aud control of the Stewards/Bcm:..ficiaries who have 
entered into property stewardship agreements in the instant matter of eminent domaill proceedings cmJy to 
tJ1e eh1:ent that both TRUSTEES and Stewards/Beneficiariesjoh1tly 21!:,TTee, for if the 1'RUSTEES wero to 
exercise exclusive contr.oJ it would violate that portion of TRUST page 3, paragraph 7., that says: uThe 
TRUSTOR parcels su.id farm property to provide for the pursuit of happiness t'br each and cvc:ry 
Belleficiary along v.dth the rights and responsibi1ities of their inheritances in tbere respective 
STE\V ARDSHIPS. These Jots shall ~ways remain an inviolate inheritance for _these respective families 
in perpetuity.'' 
~ 9. Thal the Stc,vards/Beneficiaties testified that the intent of the TRUST ,,,as to preserve the 
farm.lm1d parceled to the St.cwards/.Beneficiaries so that in future hard times e:011templated~ the 
Stewards/Beneficiaries ,,~ould have a place to gather and even farm to survive. The farmland tax status 
has been maintained!! taxes paid: m1d the irrigation pond kept intact so that irrigation '111ater can be 
a,1ailable to the tilJablc ac-reage i11cludh1g the river meander ]and, by the several Stewards.'Bcneficiar.ies 
since the TRUST was fanned. 
20. That the TRUSTEES testified that the commercializ.ation of the TRUST properties for the benefit 
of all Stcwnrds/Bcneficiarles was the prudent course to pursue. 
21. The TRUST page 4, paragraph 11, says: "TRUSTEES wiIJ serve without con~pensation.'~ The 
sarr,e parngrapb says that TRUSTEES may be paid "out of pocket CXJ.1Cnscs". Definjtion -Expendi11lrl$ 
usuully paid with cash. 
,,,., That tht! Mi1~ulL~s of the second meeting of the BOARD OF TRUSTEES dated 30 December l ~>93 
rdl:.!ct the foci ihnt. tJu: T'RVSTEES dcctcd John J-ludsnn Kirk.Janel as Exer.L1~h1e l\fanagcr of the TRUST. 
~~-;. That hY :.:1t.:c1i1w John Hudson Kirkland as Manager or the TR i JST no provision::; of tile TRlJST 
Wl!l't.: \'iol,1tcd ~incc m~~aging uon-SlcvYltrds.'Beuc.ficbdes _propt!rly was und~.r 11'1t~ direction r:nd e~m1ro1 ()'.. 
J'J{USTEES and m~ money \Wlf: charged by Jolm Hucl::ion Kirkland as Manager of the 'fR.lJST. 
:.-1. Tlrnt by cleeti11p. John Hud~nn Kirkland as Munagur of the Tl~ UST·1w pro,·jsiom; uflhL' TRUST 
WG1·c Yiolated sin~a' u 8tL~ward/Hencficiu.ry can elected by thL· TRUSTEES as thL: non-
S1ewards/Bc11cucim·ies pmpG1ty Mmiagcr. A Manager of nnn-Stewnrd 'Bc!1c11ciury pwp~rty W:ltdd J,u \\.! 
t(J 11cbnini~tcr sDid 11ropertic:s under the dir0c.ticm of the. BOARD or TR{ l~TEES i.lnd could no1 cxerd:w 
uny fonctio11 over sufrl propurLi~s without the approval ofthc BOARD OF TR.l JSTE!~S, :;upporlec.l hy 
i 001680 
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·.\Tiu~:n TJa:STEE Minu1~~~·.-·,i1e;:,;by Jwcping th<: TRUSTEE burd~n Jlgl--1~ gi\'hl·L:··i1i·t;·,c)11: ..... ••···· .. .. 
,:;i1.•ward.-'B,:n~ficiary properly Munagcr the option. su~jl!ct 10 the apprond of lh<.: TRUSTEES, tc, kt:~p 1!,1. 
~c,.::[ o.r said Mm10gcmon1 to L! minimum for the bem:fit of all ~tewards/Bencfidmfos and poiuntial 
Stcwarc.L:'Bcneficia.ril!!i. Such i:!rrangcmcnt ,,vott1d also ser\'c ·10 c.Jiminate any 1hrca~ of an ulh.:gc.d s!!lJ'~ 
~:L!rdng en~mpt on the purl.of P~rm Smith tCJ receive remuncr;;rt:ion for t11c· .function of the ~~tid nun-
Slt'Wilrd-'Bcncflciary propt:rly M' m1ug(;J' at the cxpt:nsu of Stewards.'Benefiujarics. 
2S. That the 20 Ju)y 20[)6 letter from the TRUSTEES to the::. Bcneficiarit!s r,hdng t.I job descdptim~ for 
~ Bo~u·d ofManagers, Executive Manager, and Secrctary/freasurel':- comprised of the Beneficiaries, to 
m,mugc ull Stcwal'd~/Beneficiarics property and day to day business activity is confusing. 
First of all, there is no provision fo the TRUST for Managers or a Board of Jvfanagcrs to manag~ 
Stewards/Beneiicimfos properties ,vho have entered .iuto lease stewardship ab'Teements. The TRUST foa~e 
and ste-wardship agreement on page 3 paragraph 4 {c) states that Stewurds/Bencficiaries who have:. entered 
into said agreement nre "To manage, control, maintaill and operate tl1e Suqjcct Properly on a full-time 
basis and to be solely responsible for a11 activities tlmreon or therewith.'\ 
Secondly, the Stewards/Benc:ffoiaries have alleged that 'file Executive 11anagcr for 1.ha1 function is 
an attempt on tl1e part of the TRUSTEES to change the TRUST Manager status away from John Hudson 
K.il'klnnd as granted in the second meeting of the BOARD OF TRUSTEES, dated 3-0 December J 993. 
Thirdly,. the Stewards/Beneficiaries are una11imous in their allegation that by removing John 
Hudson Kirkland TRUST Manager status that the TRUSTEES have sci tl1cmselves up as a Managcr.t 
Assistant Manager, and Secretary/Treasurer to recdve pay for managing tl1e TRUST which is a gross 
neglect or breach of TRUST and ,,,hich is also inimical to the TRUST. 
26. '?hut the TRlJST wording in paragraph 17 on page 5 ,,.,,as changed from the ''Board of Managers'' 
10 the ~'Board of Arbitrators'\ 
27. That th!! TRUS't wo:rcling correction in paragraph 17 on page 5 in no way dissolved or changed 
the .responsibility fol' the Stewards/Btmeficiarics 11t1ho l1avc entered into property ste,,lnrdslup agrtmm.mti.: 
to perfonn the day to day management of their individual stewardships. 
28. By changing the TRUST \?i1orcling to "Board of ArbitTators" a unanimous approval by said Board 
of Arbitrators wou]d be required to reinstate the TRUSTEES who did not unanimously automatically 
reinstate tl1emsclves ,,•hich is not consistent with TRUST pmdsions on page 5, par11::,arapl1 20 which states 
that "Tlwir mt~ority vote will ruJe nnd resolve all disputes," Moreover=- it is not the function of the BCJard 
()f Arbitrators to determine who will be or not be a TRUSTEE absent n charge of wrongdoing. 
29. If .. nftcr foilurt: of lht: TRUSTEES to w1animously vote to autom~ticclly reinstate thcmsulvcs aJh!r 
t.;n year:-: and if, Ftb~t~nt a unanimous vote by the Board of Arbitrutors to do Hkt'Wisc~ th<.~ TRUSTEES arc 
di,·t~ctt~d by the TRUST to muk<.: a nc,v TRUSTEE npp:..1inLmc~1t: mul~ing unn~~c:essnry fl Board of' 
1\r~1it:'!ltOr:-i 10 ht.· t·o11v~n~d in l11c first place. The only timt: c:1 Bcmrd nf Arbi tn.tl or~ may fal_i ud ie~lL' rJ 
ni11tll:r pursu,mt to thu TRUST fa the following: 
When. purs11a11t to TRUST p~tge, 5 .. pumgraph 19, N B~l~1tn of /\rbim1tioll cLmeurs Ll\ l:1c unanim:,u!'-
Vi..)lt: of LhL' ot.lmr TJHJ~T.EES to remove n TRUSTEE for e~:tr<:tnl' eau::ie. 
\\'hen the TRt:ST'EES an:. unabi~ tl: CL11"'.1c 1.o u m~jodly ue,~i~ion~ fbr ex:impk . .if for :1r Pde! 
:t!imhc:· ofTIUJ::r:·EE!.S) 1hc:·<.: wc;re absh~!1tions nml n volt: wm: tied, or if .. for n11 t'\'cn numhi;r ui' 
'i'JH!STEI:S~ th~n.~ ,,·as ti tk vote. 
When there is a ri:qt1l~s1 of u BL·mdfoiary in muUei·s Ll t:il ol leg~ los~t!~ l.o !hi: TR 1 !ST b~!e:i.JSC ,, f" 
:hllld. conversion rlf TRl !ST prop:.:rty 10 persona! use, gm.~:::: :1egluel uf duty .. or hrettch of TRUST or 
ac:.lions which are iltimicnJ lo 1hc TRUST. 
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"30: ... :n1~: 'i"'f u~1:.·,~:,;·;:cni:1r• ji-ic>"u"fo" fin,;e l,eci~ cfaing-t:a··a, tfa; ··HCV\'RD lll•"'f'Jtl"!S'J'Jrns~ •in ord~.r tr I hr .. 
c:l1wi:ncr:t with f.ht: TH UST .. pagLi 5~ p:mJpraph J 91 dutit:s nflht: TR USTEES1 ,vbic;h i., fhL· su!·'.hx:t or I h:: 
Jli.i:·i1g:--a;1~ nr,d "'lliCh b a!:m t:on:ii~t.ent with prnvi!-don.~ of the: TRUST. wJu~~rL'in the ·i~R1 lSTEES tl::.:~:: 
rt:piilt:t:m:.mt.~ m,d ~t::w:1rd~1JJc;Jl.!'ffoimfos nor Arbjtratcm" are 1101 to determine.: \4'")W tht TH1 lS'J'[:ES ,:vi.Ii 
b~. 
Thtm~fo re, the Bonf'd of Arbitration conchules thnt: 
31. That Board of A rbitra:Litm _has jurisdiction to adjudicate this matt.1.1r. 
:c. That at this point in time there has been 110 conversion of pro_pcrty il1im icru to the.: ']1{UST by ai1y · 
c'.i'Lh1: parties and tht.!r!! has been no evidence in supper( of fraud allegations against Penn Smith. 
33. The Board of Arbitration finds that Penn Smith and the other TRUSTEES have mistakenly gone 
outside of the TRUST provis1ons by attempting to deal with eminent domain matters that affect 
Stcwards/Beneficfarjes property i.11.hedtance agreements and cho.tging for the ti.me spent doing so. whkh 
was grossly negligent and an inimicaJ breach of TRUST. 
34. As to the TRUSTEES having elected themselves Assjstant Manager.:; a11d appointing .a Manager 
Secretary~ the Board of Arbitration finds a gross neglect of duty m· breach of TRUST on the part of the 
TRUSTEES. Besjdes the specific TRUST prohibition of the same on page 5, paragraph 19 th3t says: 
'\ .. The TRUSTEES may elect one of their number or another du]y guulificd pci·son as Mimagl.!1\ who win 
conserve and oversee properties ofthe. JRUST, that are not in STEWARDSHIPS, and receive reasonable 
compensation for such stjrvice as determined by fue Board of Trustees.'\ electing iliernselves As~istant 
Managers and appointing a Jvfanager Secretary places morn:.ta!T claim on the Steward:s'Bencficiuries tbat 
is bi11densome and inimicn1 to the JRUST. 
35. That TRUSTEES have so.le authority to act on hehalf-ofTRUST which cannot be. contw11ed by 
Stewards/Beneficiaries unJess there is evidence of wrong doing that is inimical to the TRlJST. 
36. That Penn Smith did not elect himself as TRUST Manager but rather said appointment ·was done 
by majority vott! of the TRUSTEES: bo,7\rever, the hourly rate voted upon was excessive and di<l not tal\c 
into cm1sideration standard fee.s for 1be same type of service. 
iii 37. Thu1 nn imputed hot1rly rate of $19.00 p::r hour fa reas'1nablc for part time pmperly management 
tkttics in th~ St. George, Utah ar~a. 
38. That r<lutiug of the rottd further to thc. 110:th rnth~r than ilie originully proposed south r.iYcr 
rm.'-andcr hind rouk would atfoc1 ,:vatcr rights from n spring, i.h~ fltrming opewticm, a p~1i-miblc.; ch~m1!.L' nf 
<ii) :-:n:~:nbdl ta:: 8la1m: du!.! 1ci pt1~~iblc zoning changes that ,i.·::n11d nfft:cf. th~ tlb.ility orsrnm: 
~,t~\,·;wd.=i/B..:ncfa·.iurit.$ wl'w h~1v<.: entl!rcd in1l' m1 in.l1L·rituncL·- ugrl~em~~,t tn continue in the.fr skh·;ml:.;hip 
tlj.'l'!":1fiJn as prescnt:y cnn.c.:(il.uh:d. 
·;{;. Tli~11 tile: l)!"!f~irndly p.,·opMed snnth rh·t;r m~am.ler Jm1,! ro~ik. i r ,·t..~!) sJ}f!ht"ly r\.~nrnkd n:;:l:- l he c:·1~:1 
~ t·::ri. woukl ~lkm ftw pr:,pns!.'d L',c.nmnercinl ckvdopment whik 110; a,:h·ur!.;dy affr:cti:-1~: t.l1L'. 
~:.:•words.'[kn~·fid:1rics whr h:!\'l' entl'rctl 11110 inhc,ritance ngrc:!mc11Ls. By lwnorinr tht' riglir.s. as 
!::~1:1d:.J1cd by thi.: TRl:ST. c1.f ~wid SleWtll'Js-'Bc11c.~ficiarh!~ !.l1u:·c ·would Jike1y bt· 110 f'ulure ki1:d dabn 1h:.11 
wt,~lc! prevuil from ntlicr Slewmcls1Bi..:nc:!iciaries ag;ainst" the 'fRlJSTEES. 
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..1r1. TJmi 1bc: TRU~Tl~ES ~n·f• tr, hL~ n:.imlmrscd for out or po.;b! cxpml:-:1~;;;. Le ... i.du:.:d cwTi:11ry 
~~=P~l1d..!d out of p0cb:.L 
tiJ. Thal TRUSTEES h:J\'~' mistakenly intc1prctud provisions oftht~ 'J"'RUST li_y ull<.1wint ~miHL!~·Jt 
t.bn11dn matters to he cm,ch1ctcd by tht TRUST Manager t.o tl1t· extent tha1 S1.c,,..1ai·ds/ffo1w£icimfos 
rr~,p~i'Lics are affected. · 
42. That TRUSTEES huvl! kept currl.!:nt intclligibJe minutes of their mct!tings, subsequent w the death 
nf01.c TRUSTEE and write!' of1hc TR.l.JST, and have kept said nllilule:s 1:1vailabJc for inspection by 
St.t·wards/Bcncficiuries arid 1hat TRUSTEES are not negHgcnt for not being ah1E- to obtain records lost a( 
the d~nth of the TRUSTEE and \1'1riter of the TRUST. 
43. Tbn1 a 'JRUST Manager election ·was within the provisions of the TRUST. 
44. That Stewards/Bene:ficiaries do n.ot control the TRUSTEES. 
45. That a TRUST manager does not coutrol TRUSTEES. 
46. That the TRUST wording in paragraph 17 on page 5 should 1101' have be,~n changed from ibc 
"Board of Ma11agors" to the 4'Bt1ard of A.rbi1ratol's't', but rather should have been changed 10 the ''Boa.rd of 
TRUSTEES1' • 
47. When TRUSTEES appointed themscJvcs as Assistant Managers and another persoJ1 a~ Secretary 
1\fanager ii wns gross negJect and a breacl1 of TRUST and wa~ inimical to said TRUST. 
48. That the TRUSTEES cannot be members of the Board ofMnnugcrs nor was it TRUSTEES int~ut 
to eliminate the Swwards/Bencficiaries Board of Managers; n~r did TRUSTEES intend to set thcmsc]ves 
up as Stewards/Bent!ficiades but confusion resulted from Steward.s/Bene:ficfaries mistakc!Jly interpreting 
the words of tbc TRUST Manager letter as said letter related to the TROST wording. 
4 9. TI1at the TRUST wording in paragrapl1 17 on page 5 should not l1a"e been changed from the 
"Board of Managers" to the "Boord of Arbitrators'>, but rather sl10u)d have been changed to the -'Board of 
TRUSTEES'' in order lo be consistent with the meaning of duties of the TRUSTEES which is tl1e sul~icct 
of the paragroph and which 'is also consistent v,•ith provisions of the TRUST' v,.1hcrdn the 
Stcwords/Bene:fichu-ic~; nor a 'Board of A.rbitrators arc not to determine ,vl10 the TRUSTEES will be. 
Moreover, if the wording were chtmgcd to "Board of Arbiirntors" a unanimous approval by said Board of 
Aibi1ralors ,-,..,c,uld be required to reinstate; tbc TRUSTEES wh.icl1 ii;; 1101 cm1sistent ,\>ith TRUST pnwisfonr. 
n:~ page St paragrnp11 20 that ·'Tltt!:ir mr,jority vote will rufo and resolve all dispt11C!s." 
50. Thar ~iaid wordin~ s.hc,ultJ nnf· have lwcn chanr.ed to Board of Arbiu·n1ors is furtfo.~r cl:1rifo:.d by thL' 
f(1!i.,win~:: ]fthl' Bt>ard ~fTRUSTEES did not unauimcrnRJy J'dnsl.at.c 1be11istdvt\t: rrnL~r ten yt!:-trs and a 
1 b:!l'ci r.f .A thit:-lli or~ diu H01 rcnch a ummiuwus decision 'lei so r0iust~11e. then the TJ-u .. :sTJJ~S wn1 d rl liH·r; 
\\•k 1:, rt;r,lacc: tt TRUST.EE, whid1 tJ1c TRUSTEES could Jm\::.• aone j11iliHl1y~ rnakiu~ t!1t: t:(1;~wning_ nJ' u 
1bnrd of Arbilraltm, m~1ut. 
lJ :1 Bunni rd' /\rbilrntt>r:.~ \.Vt·n· 1t.l un:mimnusly C\'~rrult: 1l1e TR1.:STI.m~ · 1mdnd1y vnt<: 1c 1 1101 
r .. ·;ns:111: nil nf the TRl '8TEY.:$ the: Hnmd of Arbjtmlc.u·g w0uld bt.: mcdtHiri[. in nn a~e,: not p~·<widt!d fai hy 
L1t'. THlJST. lf j{ WLJ~ the- inle111 of 1hc.: 'J'RU8TOR n.lkrw thc;Jb:!rd 0Ll\r~,ilr:rtc1.rs to c:-m;o;c· Z:i ·r;~ t 1STEE Lt, 
lk renrnved without caw:;c:- that intent ,v011ld lluvc been clearly ~t:1kd jn TRUST provisions. 
001S8i 
l 
,,.,-,\ 
":., I • • 
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• • • • • • •• •• • • •-•· •• • • • • • "It... •,.. • I lo f O I .. o O ~• 
..... -· .... -···-- ..... _. ·-· .. _ ··-- - .... ··--···· .. ·--, ..... _ ....... - _,.._ ..... - .. .. . ·• .... . 
: I. !)U!'~Mm: lo ·;·.Rus·r pn2.e. 5. pm-ug.rapb 19 I a Board or 1-.. ~·hitratio11 i:: to udj~.1dk:t1h: t!ll' m1aniJ11c11 I!-: 
v:,lt' of L'.1c.. TJUJST.EES tCl rcawvc. a T.Rl.lST.EE for cxlrenw cr.m~;c, 
.52. AJso. pur3uant lo TRUST pag~ .. 5. paragruph 20~ £1 Board of Arhjtr:iticm i~ 10 makl! n (:n:.1J 
d~Lc:-mi!latiOJJ '"-'J1en the TRUS'I1~E~ are :.mnbJc to come to a majority de~-ision. 
53. That 11UJSTEES did ignore suggestium: from Slewards/Bcnuficfades bu! tJ1at confusion and 
misundcrstundh-1g of both parties resulted from the Steward.s/Bcneifojru:fos not l1Uving u clear 
understanding oftbe words oftht: TRUST and words ofletters from the Executive TR.US'11~E thereby 
en.using a breakdown of understanding and a non-reply to written Jetters from TRUSTEES. 
Likewise, TRUSTEES gave rise 1o the mistmderstanding by TRUSTEES ]1mrjng misunderstood 
the words of the 11<.UST evidenced by a n011-intentionaJ mi.staJ,en change of TRUST verbiage of "Board 
of Managers" to ''Board of Arbitrators". 
54. That the TRUST Manager canno1 control property of Stewards/Beneficiaries but can onJy control 
nnd oversee onJy property ,,·i1h is not under control of Stewards/Beneficiaries and may receive limited 
power to make necessaJ)' day to day dispersements in the due course of business suqject to tl1c rcviev .. 1 and 
app1·0,1al of TRUSTEES. 
55. That routing of the City of~Tasbington road right of way further to the north rather than t11e 
orjginal1y proposed south river meander ]and route would result in the loss of an irrigation pond. ,1i1atcr 
rights from a sprb1g~ the forming operatic~ the loss of Greenbelt tax status, and an in.crease of taxes on 
land that would have remained in a Greenbelt status which would then ,give ds~ to zoning changes further 
affoct the ability of Stewards/Beneficiaries continue i.n tlu:ir stewardships ,:vhile simuhaneousJy placing 
the TRUST properties in debt which could result in the loss of TRUST p:·op~rtit·!-:. 
56. That it is was gross negligence for the TRUSTEES to vote themselves as Assistant Manager, 
Secretary/Treasurer, and Assistant s~crd:ary /Treasurer thereby forming a Board of Managers. Said ~c;ti<.m 
was a clear violation oftbe bask intent of the TRUST. The TRUST states on page 5 Paragraph 24 that 
TRUSTEES may be removed for neglect of duty or breach of 1RUST. When TRUSTEES appointed 
themselves as Assistant Manager, Secretary/Treasm·er. and Assistant Secretary /Treasurer is was a clear 
violation of TRUST page 5~ pnragraph 19 that says ,.:Tbe TRUSTEES may elect one of their number or 
another du]y qualified person as Mallager, who '"'ill conserve and oversee properties of the TRUST=- that 
nn. not in STEWARDSHIPS~ nnd receive reasonable compcnsatio11 for snc11 service as dt:termincd by the 
Bl,a?'d of TRLiSTE.ES. 
57. That it is not tlH.' 1.i.mc.tion of the TRUST Jvfanag,cr to 1mr,Nic.11e pro_µc11y eminent domain matters 
lha1 would affoct the !lbility of Stewards/Beneficiaries continuing in th~b- stcw~-irdship agrce1m.~ni!~ nnd t-h;.1! 
t im<.: clrnrgcd f'o the TRUST for said ncgotiaticms is not authoriz .. ~d hy pro\·i~i om:: of the TRVST, 
1i.)!Wjths!1mclh1g~ thL· 'J'RVS~~~~F.~ a!·c to he.rcimhursr.~c.l for ont ofpoekl!1 l~x1x~n:,t.·~:- i.e.: ac.tuul cnrrenc.r 
L~.,~p.:nd .. d. 
5f-;. ·~h~;l the rin1L' J1cnn Smitl. !;pen! tbuling with e.n::in~-n'. domain rna:l~t~ ~bat 1·c-:·;1u(n! {lw r\>:1d 
1.!,ro11gl: ~rope~tic.:s of'S;,ewarc:s.rJendiciarie~: whD havi.· enl1.~?·1·d intn propcr~y ~tc.:wan.isJ1ip~ ,·111:c.·c~nh.'JJ!1' 
' .. .· ;,.. · 1 ,, j- · · ·r·}""' .. ,,.,. • • l'.:lJlr:t'l Ix~ c~har.~•.ed to t11e rR t !~ 1 or SteWi.ll'i. :-;•1k11L· l{'IUrtt.::-:. rurnuant l(l I \,l ....... JJ?'C)\'i!{I('~ :~. 
5lJ. That u1 thi!-: pt,inl jn tin-IL' t1JLTt' h:!s been nc, conversirn1 Clf pr~,pl~r!y inimk~t! l(\ the '!'Rl.'ST hy :i:~y 
o: tlw pm1il.!s. 
.. (t(h •-• .. •NTirnt nn1.with:;trn1dlng. wha1.nHmy.pc.~rce;vt to ht:.ttn PVCJ'buaring_and ofTiciom: manrn.!r that w(1uld 
SL~l!rn 1n !;uppor: ,1lkl',Ll tfoIH tliat Penri Smith is altempling to dt:fraud the S(C\,\',U .. ds0 'B~iii."~ffcTa-ricS:·un~· MOO •••••• 
Board of Arbi1rmfo1~ finds tha! Perm .Smith was actinf! (.'lil the advfot.! of u rctirc:d atl!micy :md bnd ::: forn:n: 
intent. ulheil misr.~1i ded. 1.C'l foirJy curry out Wi duties as TRllS'I:EE an<l tJJso TR CST Mrnrngur. and 
ther~forc~ absent any evkle11cL· in support of fraud a1J~go1iour~ a3uins1 Penn Smilh ,ve. cont:.1u:k· thcr<.! i~ r,r1 
fniud. 
61. That the TRUSTEES1 \1..1or1:ing ,vith the StcwardslBcncficiarit~.Ci who lunrc c:nt:::ted into property 
stm:\'ardship agrec;mcnts, LUJd not the TRUST 1,1anngcr shall reevaluate th1.:. plriccmcn1 ofthc Cily of 
Vlashington road., keeping in mind that the intent of the TRUST Creator ,:i..,as to try secure to 
Stewarcls/Bent:fi~iarics v.rho have: entered into property stm"·ardship., rights that would he :;ect!T'ccl by 
t:,llodia1 freehold stu1.us .. and to preclude. the TRUST from being encumbered by debi including excessive 
·rR.t;ST Managir foes and an increased tax burd~u which would rcsu]t from the-. loss of Gr~cnb1:;lt tax 
status. Absent the parties working to resolve the differences, the Board of Arbitration, upon petition by 
any of the affect parties, wi11 as soon as is possible give a written decision as io the road placement 
62. That the aUegation that TRUSTEES having igoorod Bll)' and a1l counsel or suggestions from 
Stewards/Beneficiaries resulted from the Stewards/Bencficiarjes not replying to written letters from 
TRUSTEES and is the rcsu11 of misunderstanding on 1.he patt of both the Stowards/Beneficiru·jes and the 
TRUSTEES stemming in part from the change of TRUST vcrpfage of'·:Board of Managers,, to nBoard of 
A..l'bitrators'\ _,./ 
Dated l 2 September 2006 
·/' 
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ADDENDUM9 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637,.CA 
-~ 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSION OF LA\\' OF THE BOARD OF 
ARBITRATION FOR THE TERRESTRIAL KINGDOM OF GOD TRl"ST 
On February 13. 2007 at 8: 15 p.m. the Board of Arbitration, (herein after referred lo as the 
Board). for the Terrestrial Kingdom of God trust. (herein after ref erred to as the Trust), met at the 
City of St. George, Vtah, Recreation Division Building at 285 S. 400 E. for the purpose of 
adjudication of allegations brought by the Beneficiaries of said Trust against the Trustees and the 
Manager of said Trust. The Board members all concurred that in all matters not before the 
Washington County, Utah 5th District Court the Trustees acted in the Trust's best interest. 
Arbitration Board members present were Michael Barker, Lee Cox, Daniel McArthur, Sam 
Miles, and Ryan Rarick. Trustees present were Val Cram and Penn Smith. No others were 
present. 
FINDINGS 
The Board members viewed allegations in letters from the Trust Beneficiaries. 
The Board finds the Trust minutes have been as accurate as the situation allowed, with the 
exception of the minutes that were lost when a trustee died, which was an extenuating 
circumstance beyond the control of the Trustees. 
The Board finds that exhibit A contained no valid allegations, therefore the Board finds the 
Trustees acted within the provisions of the Trust. 
The Board finds that exhibit B contained no valid allegations; therefore, the Board finds the 
Trustees acted within the provisions of the Trust 
Exhibit C alleges that any claim for compensation other than out of pocket expenses should be 
denied. The Board finds that out of pocket expenses of Trustees should be paid. As far as facts 
in controversy between Trustees and Trust Beneficiaries relative to the Trust Manager's 
compensation; the Board finds the matter is being adjudicated by both parties in the Washington 
County, Utah 5th District Court and therefore leaves judgment to that court. 
Exhibit D alleges the Trustees have forced the Beneficiaries to pay tithes. The Board fmds this 
allegation to be invalid due to the fact the dollar amount is an assessment for the out of pocket 
expenses which is allowed in paragraph 7 of the Trust docwnent. 
Exhibit D alleges the specific request of time spent as a Trustee as opposed to the time spent as a 
Manager is not cJear. Since facts in controversl relative to that matter are being adjudicated by 
both parties.in the Washington County, Utah 5 District court the Board finds that judgment 
should be left to that court. 
The Board finds the Trustees are not encroaching on ~he stewardship property of the 
Beneficiaries relative to the placement of the road. The Board finds that the city is making the 
dctennination of which properties will be condemned and that the Trustees are attempting to 
mitigate any adverse effect the placement of the road would have to the Beneficiaries; properties 
by offering consideration to Beneficiaries in the form of money or additional land. 
The Board recommends that the Trustees send a letter to each steward Beneficiary olTcring a 
paymcnl schedule to pay the $3,032 to cover the default contracts. 
001773 
The Board strongly encourngcs the Beneficiaries take possession of their stewardships and pay 
all back out of pocket expenses the Trustl.!es have lent the tlust so as to preclude the loss of 
inheri lance. 
CONCLt..;SIONS 
Therefore, based upon the aforementioned Findings, the Board Concludes that the Trustees ha\'e 
acted in the best interest of the Trust and that those matters dealing with facts in controversy 
between the Trustees, the Trust Manager, and the Trust Beneficiaries are being adjudicated by all 
parties in the Washington County, Utah 5th District Court and final judgment of that controversy 
should be left to that court. 
Additionally, the Board recommends that the Trustees send a letter to each steward Beneficiary 
offering a payment schedule to pay the $3,032 to cover Trustees' out of pocket expenses and any 
other legal Trust expenses. 
Further, the Board strongly encourages the Beneficiaries take possession of their stewardships 
and pay all back expenses the Trustees have lent the trust and any other legaJ Trust expenses so 
as to preclude the loss of inheritance. 
The Board adjourned at 9:50 pm on February 13, 2007 
Dated March, 2007 
. .· 1· 
· · . 1 ! I r·.... / 
I i , • (_:L /. ·---~.-(,.i J .... )..-,~ 
Dated March, 2007 
Dated March, 2007 Ql-0 JD, iv, ';;(tic 
Dairiel McArthur, Board member 
Dated March, 2007 
Dat~d March, 2007 
Ry Rarick. Board member 
21 l W. 100S. Washington, UT 84780 
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ADDENDUM JO 
Smith v. Cram, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20150637-CA 
.. 
.. i' 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PENN SMITH, et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VALDEN CRAM, et al, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
} 
) 
) Case No. 060501773 MS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
November 26, 2013 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
Fifth District Court Judge 
For the Defendant: 
For the Intervenor: 
APPEARANCES 
Nicholas I. Chamberlain 
35 s. 400 w. i301 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-8858 
Christopher A. Lund 
William F. Rummler 
PO Box 2318 
St. George, UT 84771 
Telephone: (435) 628-5405 
Jeffrey N. Starkey 
192 E. 200 N. 3~ Floor 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 674-0400 
Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT 
152 E. Katresha St. 
Grantsville, UT 84029 
Telephone: (435) 590-5575 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on November 26, 2013) 
3 THE COURT: Now let's get to the case that has everybody 
4 in the courtroom and give it some time. We've got Smith vs. 
5 Cram and the companion, Washington City Terrestrial Kingdom 
6 case, and we'll invite everyone up to Counsel table. I hope 
7 we have a number of Kirklands here as well. We do. All right. 
8 Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Smith and Mr. Cram still hav~ individual 
9 capacities that they're appearing in, or are you representing 
10 them on all capacities? I'm not sure you can wear all those 
11 hats, can you, Counsel? 
12 MR. CHAMBERLAIN: There.-- it's a complicated hat 
13 wearing situation, and I -- I'll take what I can get today as 
14 far who I'm appearing on behalf of. 
15 THE COURT: First off all, before we start in the pre-
16 trial conference, are there any pending motions that need to be 
17 disposed of by the Court? It was my understanding that we did, 
18 and your motions, Mr. Chamberlain? 
19 MR. CHAMBERLAIN: We have a pending motion for summary 
20 judgment. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Counsel, let me hear you on 
22 that motion. As you know, I have lived with this case for quite 
23 awhile. Mr. Lund, what do you want to say about that? Do you 
24 have something that we should probably handle sooner? 
25 MR. LUND: Yes, your Honor. We have a motion to strike 
~i 
~-· 
,1 
I 
l_ 
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1 that motion for summary judgment. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. Then maybe we ought to deal with that 
3 one first. The other record I should make is Mr. Rummler, you 
4 and Mr. Lund are here side by side, and Mr. Starkey, you're 
5 coming into this case for which parties? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
MR. STARKEY: Washington City. 
THE COURT: F.or Washington City, and you' re here on the 
condemnation case --
MR. STARKEY: Right. 
THE COURT: -- that has been so long, and maybe I ought 
to address that one first. Counsel, do we need to do anything 
12 more in the condemnation case? Has Washington City got any dog 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
in these fights? 
MR. LUND: I'll let Washington City address that. 
THE COURT: What do you think, Mr. Starkey? 
MR. STARKEY: I've got to be in front of the mic to 
catch that. 
THE COURT: I think we better have him close to one 
anyway. Sorry, John. 
MR. STARKEY: I apologize, John. From Washington City's 
standpoint, your Honor, I think that the case was initiated, the 
funds were deposited. The road had been built and had been used 
for the last five or six years. So from the City's standpoint, 
I think we need to know who is going to be representing the 
defendant or any claims for just compensation, for example. I 
-4-
l think really nothing went much further because the companion 
2 lawsuit joined the condemnation lawsuit. 
3 So the City is happy to wrap that up anytime, but I 
4 think it based on the other lawsuit, my understanding is it 
5 may make a difference in what that defense is depending on who's 
6 the representing party. 
7 THE COURT: The City might still find itself in 
8 litigation over fair market value? 
9 
10 
11 
12 
MR. STARKEY: That's my understanding, your Honor, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. If that's a circumsta~ce, then I 
don't see any reason to make you hang around for today's matters 
in a companion lawsuit. You~ interests are going to be covered 
13 later, Mr. Starkey, and I'd just as soon let you go, unless 
14 Washington City really wants to pay you for another hour or so. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
MR. STARKEY: No, I would enjoy sitting and soaking it 
all in, however, yeah, if that's the case -- the question may be, 
your Honor, is that there's been -- the cases have been joined, 
although it appeared that we still have -- we're running with two 
19 case matters. I just don't necessarily want all of Counsel in 
20 the initial case to continue to either have to send notices or 
21 for that matter for the City to have to appear because a motion 
22 is pending. 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'm going to relieve you from any 
responsibility -- both of you -- from copying Mr. Starkey on any_ 
of these matters until the case filed in 060501773 is finally 
i 
\ I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
B 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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disposed of, and then the City's interest can be later 
adjudicated. That will save trees, save Mr. Starkey and his 
client the time of having to review what he gets. Then at that 
point the City can come back into it. Make sense to everyone? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. STARKEY: Thanks, you guys. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Starkey. We'll let you go. 
Gentlemen, let's go back to your motion to strike, Mr. Lund, 
let's hear you on that motion. Why shouldn't the Court consider 
a summary judgment at this date knowing of course that I've 
already looked at it once? 
MR. LUND: That is the argument, your Honor, is that a 
few months before the second motion for summary judgment was 
filed there was a first one in which the Court made an order 
ruled that there are genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether or not the trustees have breached their duties. So with 
that, there is an order in place. So having a motion for summary 
judgment on the same issue a few months afterwards, it's a law of 
the case that there are genuine issues of material fact. 
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, this is an odd circumstance 
to say the least, and that's why it takes my computer nearly 10 
minutes to bring everything up --
MR. LUND: Yes, it does. 
THE COURT: -- over the many years that we have had this 
case. Just for the record, we are now on page 55 of just the 
-6-
1 minute entries in the matter. I want to help get your help in 
2 reasoning through this process. The position of the plaintiff, 
3 Mr. Smith, and of the initial litigation is that those 
4 individuals that I'll classify as the Kirkland parties have 
5 never complied with the requirements of the· trust in becoming 
6 signatories to the agreements that were extended under the terms 
7 of the trust, and that the failure to do so is a threshold of any 
8 rights in the trust, and would be a threshold to any -- in any 
9 standing that the dispute that r~ve already ruled on saying that 
10 .there's justiciable issues that these potential beneficiaries 
11 would have to make claims against the trustees. 
12 Now if the summary judgment that is being urged upon 
13 the Court revisits that issue after all the discovery, after 
14 everything that's taken place, after we'va got a full record, 
15 and indicates that I must follow the language of the trust as 
16 Mr. Smith and Mr. Cram have urged upon me from the get go on 
17 this -- and just for the fun of it, we'll go back to the first 
18 minute entry in this case took place back in September of 2006 
19 when it was filed. 
20 Since 2006 if I -- now• that discovery has taken place, 
21 if I adopt their interpretation of the trust and their operation 
22 of law argument that these individuals -- the Kirkland parties 
23 that we've referred to -- do not have standing because they did 
24 not show any evidence of having signed the agreements mandated by 
25 the trust, then at that point they don't have standing to contest 
l 
2 
3 
-7-
the activities of the trustees. I can see your point because you 
have a good law of the case argument because back when we heard 
that a long time ago, all that was still up in the air. Do you 
4 think that I am so bound by the law of the case that it can never 
5 be brought back? 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
MR. LUND: Your Honor, in their second motion for 
summary judgment they make no argument that my clients do not 
have standing to assert their -- these rights. 
THE COURT: Well, and standing would be an operation of 
law issue at that point. I understand the argument hasn't been 
11 made, but the Court is bound to work under the laws as I know 
12 them, and that might be an issue. That's why I put it out there 
13 now. Let me bear you on it, Mr. Lund. 
14 
15 
MR. LUND: Well, as far as standing, the trust document 
itself lists who the beneficiaries are, and by name lists and 
16 names each one of my clients. So right there the trust document 
17 
18 
19 
20 
shows that as beneficiaries they have standing to contest the 
activities of the trustees. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Lund. Your argument 
is well taken. It's something that I'm still rolling around in 
21 my mind, just because this is such an unusual setting, but you've 
22 
23 
24 
25 
told me exactly why it is that you think we can't hear a summary 
judgment. I'll take your motion under submission while I hear 
Mr. Chamberlain to see what he has to say. 
MR. LUND: All right. May I add one more thing on 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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that --
THE COURT: Certainly, Counsel. 
MR. LUND: their second summary judgment. In support 
of it, all they did is add two pieces of evidence from what was 
filed a few months prior in their first motion. In our motion we 
argue that it's inadmissible hearsay. 1n their objection they do 
not contest that it's inadmissible hearsay. Since there's no new 
evidence, there's no reason to entertain the new motion. 
THE COURT: Okay, I've got you on it, Mr. Chamberlain, 
let's hear your side on your motion for summary judgment. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Thank you, your Honor. First of all, 
the law of the case doctrine I think is what I'd like to address 
first. The case law, as I've read it, that has to do with the 
law of the case -- and as I've submitted in my reply memorandum 
to the Court -- states that the law of the case only applies to 
decisions that have actually been made within a case rather than 
a Court deciding not to decide on a decision. 
For example, our summary judgment motion decided on one 
issue -- or excuse me, there's been a summary judgment partially 
on one issue, and that is whether or not the trust is valid, and 
the Court decided that it was. However, there were two remaining 
issues that the Court said, you know, "At this time we're not 
going -- I see" I'm paraphrasing you. Please forgive me if I 
do it incorrectly, but the Court essentially said that it saw 
justiciable issues of fact in two remaining areas, and that would 
l 
~ -9-
1..$) 
1 be first whether or not the trustees have breached their 
2 fiduciary duty, and second, wbether or not Mr. Smith is entitled 
3 to any compensation, and if so, what that amount would be. So 
4 we have those two remaining issues. So to -- in an attempt_ to 
5 judicially vacuum up the rest of the issues in the case, I made a 
6 second motion for summary judgment, which Courts entertain all 
7 the time. 
8 Within that second motion I hava tried to bring more 
9 evidence to the Court's attention regarding the fiduciary duties 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
of the trustees and whether or not they have breached those 
duties. The document that we brought forth was a former 
arbitration that took place, and I think the Court might have 
already seen that where the trustees were held within that 
arbitration not to have been in breach of their duties. 
In response, the intervenors stated that that document 
itself was inadmissible hearsay. So in order to authenticate 
that document in response we filed an affidavit of Mr. Ryan 
Rerrick who was one of the trustees on that board stating that 
it indeed was his board of arbitration that he presided over and 
that he was there in order to be able to solve the hearsay issue. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: So we have an affidavit to 
authenticate that. So as far as the law of the case goes, it 
doesn't apply in this situation because the Court simply decided 
to leave some of the issues open rather than deciding on them. 
-10-
1 If the Court had decided on those issues, then the law of the 
2 case doctrine would apply, but the Court simply decided at that 
3 time to allow them to go forward to trial. 
4 So we're simply trying to achieve some judicial economy 
5 by finishing up as much of this case as we can through summary 
6 judgment so that if we have to go to trial over any issue at all~ 
7 which we argue in our summary judgment motion that we don't, but 
8 if we have to go to trial, then those issues are honed and they 
9 are cut down to absolutely what cannot be decided through a 
10 summary judgment motion. 
11 
12 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: As far as the trust document itself, 
13 one of the assertions that the intervenors have made is ·that 
14 the trust document lists who the beneficiaries are, and this 
15 goes to standing, the argument that you brought up previously, 
16 your Honor, in that there's a possibility that the trustees 
17 themselves -- or excuse me, the intervenors may not have standing 
18 to bring these arguments at all now that the trust has been 
19 declared valid. 
20 Our response to that is the trust actually doesn't 
21 designate beneficiaries. It designates stewards. In order to 
22 qualify as stewards, certain documents have to be signed before 
23 they can even be listed as any sort of a beneficiary. While 
24 their names are listed in the trust, that doesn't mean for legal 
25 purposes that they are beneficiaries because they have to --
,--
·' 
1 
2 
3 
THE COURT: Counsel --
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- let me -- let me look at that. I'm 
-11-
4 trying to read the trust as a whole, as I'm required to do, but 
5 it at least seems to me conceivable a reasonable look to read the 
6 trust as a whole, to say that the naming of the individuals ·who 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1_2 
are now intervenors as stewards or naming them gives them 
qualification to be potential stewards under the way that you 
read the trust because the truster -- I prefer that over the 
French (inaudible) trust, but I should like the French because 
that's one language I do know a little bit about, but the trustor 
designated this class of people named in the trust as those with 
13 potential rights of signing stewardship agreements. That's the 
14 way that looking at the entire document the Court could reason it 
15 
16 
out. Is that what you're urging upon me? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yes, and I can see how that would be 
17 a rebuttable presumption, and so we would choose to rebut that 
18 presumption with this, and that is not only were their names 
19 listed, but in order to be considered actual stewards under the 
20 trust they had to sign lease and s~ewardahip agreements, which· 
21 they have not done. 
22 
23 
THE COURT: Uh-hub. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: So since there is that presumption 
24 because they are named in the trust, we would then say yes, 
25 that's true, but Mr. Kirkland, the truster, added a requirement 
-12-
1 that not only are they to be named in the trust -- it's not 
2 enough to be just named. They also have to fulfill certain 
3 requirements which they have not done. So in order to have 
4 
5 
6 
standing they have to do those requirements as he dictated. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: One more argument that I would make, 
7 your Honor, is in my summary j u·dgment motion I simply am as king 
8 both sides to lay down their cards. I think this is the last 
9 thing I'll say today, at least in this portion of the 
10 proceedings. 
11 We simply have said okay, if you think that the trustees 
12 have breached their fiduciary duties, then show us evidence. Our 
13 
14 
summary judgment motion simply said fine, give us what you have 
on these three men. Show us the wrong they have done so that we 
15 can at least see what you have. Instead of responding to our 
16 
17 
summary judgment motion with any sort of evidence, they moved to 
strike it, to which they are within their rights to do. However, 
18 that to me is telling because they -- instead of actually showing 
19 us what they have, instead of laying their cards on the table, 
20 they have decided still to keep them close to the breast and to 
21 tell us we shouldn't even be playing this card game as it is. So 
22 we simply asked them to show what the trustees have done wrong, 
23 and they have not done so. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Mr. Lund, let me give 
25 you a chance to respond to the motion for summary judgment, 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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knowing that I'm still keeping the motion to strike under 
advisement. 
MR. LUND: May I respond to his arguments? 
THE COURT: Absolutely, Counsel. 
MR. LUND: All right. First of all, his arguments on 
6 law of the case where he argues that in summary judgment purposes 
7 the law of the case does not apply. However, there is Utah law 
8 that directly contradicts that, which I mentioned in my reply 
9 memo, first one AMC Salt Industry vs. Magnesium, 942 P.2d 315. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
The Court explicitly recognizes the that law of the case doctrine 
applies to subsequent motions of summary judgment on a same issue 
subject to exceptions, and there are several cases after that 
that cite to these holdings for that same proposition. They say 
that unless there -- you can show three things, the law of the 
case doctrine applies. 
One is when there has been an intervening change of 
controlling authority. Nothing has happened in this case. When 
new evidence has become available. The evidence they attempt to 
19 present for their second motion for summary judgment has been 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
available for many, many years. lt~s been passed back and forth 
through discovery. There's nothing new there. Three,.when th~ 
Court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous 
and work a manifest in justice, there's -- he's -- they've made 
no showing that your ruling that there are genuine issues of 
25 material fact is erroneous or it would be injust -- unjust to 
-14-
1 hear it. So clearly the law of the case doctrine does apply. 
2 Furthermore, as far as laying cards down, I think it's 
3 disingenuous to suggest that my clients have not made any 
4 
5 
6 
arguments to support their positions. First of all --
THE COURT: I ordered it for years, Counsel. 
MR. LUND: In their complaint they allege 11 causes of 
7 - action having to do with breach of fiduciary duty. In 2008 
8 they filed a motion to remove the trustees and laid out several 
9 reasons why and evidence for it, No. ~ being that one of the 
10 trustees sued the trust, obtained a default judgment against the 
11 trust without even telling the beneficiaries about the lawsuit. 
12 That's per se breach of fiduciary duty. I mean that's huge, and 
13 that's just one of the -- one of the reasons that my clients have 
14 been showing for years why there is a breach of fiduciary duty. 
15 So to suggest that they've been waiting to -- for us to lay down 
16 our cards is simply not true. It's been time and time again 
17 we've raised that. 
18 We also provided evidence in the motion for summary 
19 judgment, one, as to why that the trustees breached their 
20 
21 
22 
fiduciary duties. Based on that, the Court ruled that there 
are genuine issues of material fact. That hasn't changed. 
THE COURT: Counsel, how do you deal with 
23 Mr. Chamberlain's argument that says that those issues have 
24 been resolved by the results of the arbitration which would have 
25 been hearsay save the declaration of the arbitrator? 
n 
1 
2 
3 
4 
MR. LUND: The declaration of the arbitrator only 
shows that there was a~ alleged arbitration that took place. 
-15-
It doesn't change the fact that it's hearsay. You could have 
someone come in and testify that they made a statement and that 
5 verifies that someone made an out-of-court statement. It still 
6 doesn't· change the fact that it's inadmissible hearsay. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
THE COURT: Well, if the arbitrator comes in and says, 
"I conducted an arbitration, and as a result of the arbitration 
I ruled A, B, c, D and E," that's no longer hearsay. That is 
asserting the truth of what the arbitrator did because the 
arbitrator is on the stand subject to cross examination. Isn't 
12 that .what the affidavit that we have before the Court now 
13 basically does, Counsel? 
14 
15 
MR. LUND: It's stating that one took place, and yes. 
However, in response to that I would argue there is also a 2006 
16 arbitration in which the arbitrators found the opposite, found 
17 that in multiple ways the trustees breached their fiduciary 
18 duties. That has also been produced in discovery back and forth. 
19 So even if that evidence was before you, that arbitration 2007, 
20 it doesn't change the fact that there are genuine issues of 
21 material fact because two arbitrations found the exact opposite. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: All right. Is the 2006 arbitration before 
the Court with an affidavit or a declaration that's part of this 
record that the Court can consider? As you can probably tell, 
Counsel, I'm focusing on the requirements of Rule 7 to make sure 
1 
2 
-16-
that the information is in the record. ls it before the court? 
MR. LUND: It is not be£ore the Court at this time. 
3 However, it is in the records of the trustees, so when they make 
4 their notes of the trustees' meeting it is in the record there. 
5 Also, for the motion to strike, that is not in the record. We 
6 have yet to respond to the motion for summary judgment. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LUND: Then lastly as far as the standing issues 
goes, there are some beneficiaries that have signed stewardships, 
so --
THE COURT: ~re they parties of the lawsuit? 
MR. LUND: Yes, they are. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LUND: Furthermore, the truster, Steven Kirkland, 
after the trust was created while he was still alive, he had the 
16 ben -- some of the beneficiaries at meetings. The beneficiaries 
17 
18 
19 
20 
were part of a manager group. So the -- Steven Kirkland himself 
recognized the beneficiaries to be legitimate under the trust. 
THE COURT: Who signed the stewardship agreements, 
Counsel?• Do we have those intervenor's name? 
21 MR. LUND: The names I do not know off the top of my 
22 head. 0-
23 
24 
25 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Oh, yeah, we did -- I did. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: And I did. 
THE COURT: Okay. You've got three people. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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MR. LUND: So we've got --
UNIDENTIFIED .MALE: I think there was nine, if I recall 
correctly. It's eight or nine. 
THE COURT: Okay, eight or nine signed the agreements. 
5 Okay. Anything else? 
6 
7 
MR. LUND: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. All right. 
8 Mr. Chamberlain, with eight or nine signing the stewardship 
9 agreements, does your motion have any wings? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: It does, because even if they do have 
standing, even if the intervenors still have standing, they 
haven't responded to the evidentiary issues that I have brought 
up in my motion for summary judgment. Simply saying that there 
exists a 2006 arbitration that rules opposite to the arbitration 
that we've already authenticated to the Court 
THE COURT: Doesn't it put it before the Court under 
17 Rule 7. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN.: And the same thing could be said for 
any of the other documents that they've spoken of, which were 
allegedly signed. They haven't responded with any facts. So our 
only argument here is that we've asked for them to bring facts to-
the Court; they haven't brought them here. Even if they have 
standing, which they allege and it hasn't been confirmed yet, we 
haven't seen the facts. There's nothing. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's step back from this careful 
-18-
1 examination of this particular bunch of trees in the forest and 
2 look at everything. If I grant your motion for summary judgment, 
3 does that resolve this litigation? 
4 
5 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: As I see it, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Then who is it that represents 
6 the interest of the trust in the Washington City condemnation? 
7 Would that be the three trustees that you have now? 
8 
9 
10 
MR, CHAMBERLAIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Undex the terms of the trust, which 
11 the Court has considered valid. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. So that's where we stand. All right. 
13 Your motion is granted, Counsel. 
14 
15 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Now that order being prepared, is there 
16 anything else to do today? 
17 
18 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Not that I could see, 
THE COURT: Strike it from the trial calendar, circulate 
19 the order and that will take care of it. 
20 
21 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Thank you4 
(Hearing concluded) 
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